Education Cannot Wait Hosting Review

Final Report

Mokoro Limited

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The views expressed in this document are entirely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent DFID's own views or policies, or those of DAI.

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in memory of

Christopher Colclough

10 July 1946 – 28 June 2017

lifelong friend, colleague, mentor,

and a great champion of education for all

https://goo.gl/KrhZQL

S.L.

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Summary

Background

This is the final report of a review of long-term hosting options for Education Cannot Wait (ECW). Launched in 2016, ECW is currently being hosted ("incubated") by UNICEF for an initial period. The review was required to consider a wide range of options for permanent hosting of ECW and to define appropriate criteria for making the choice amongst them. An Assessment Design Report (ADR) was submitted in November 2017, and approved by ECW's Executive Committee (ExCom). The ADR proposed criteria for selection of a host, and the criteria were used in defining an agreed short-list of potential hosts for detailed consideration.

The second phase of the review involved detailed interactions with the short-listed organisations, namely UNICEF, the Global Partnership for Education (GPE), the Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office of UNDP (MPTFO), the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) and the World Bank (WB). (UNOPS and MPTFO had been included as potential ingredients of a "UN other" option.) The review team undertook a systematic comparison of potential hosts against all of the agreed criteria (essential and desired characteristics) defined in the ADR. This report presents findings against the agreed criteria and provides an analysis of comparative costs. As foreshadowed in the ADR, it also considers issues of timing and transition, and the scope for strengthening hosting arrangements during the incubation period. It makes detailed recommendations (many of which propose immediate action) for consideration by ExCom, and, in due course, by the ECW's High Level Steering Group (HLSG).

Approach

In line with the ADR, the review team took as axiomatic that any decisions about hosting should seek to maximise ECW's ability to achieve its core objectives. Short-term implications for ECW's effectiveness need to be factored into any decision on the most appropriate long-term host, and the findings of this review have relevance for the existing hosting arrangements as well as for possible long-term ones.

The team had to factor into its analysis some developments that were not anticipated in the ADR – namely (a) the possibility that an ongoing trust fund review by the WB could substantially change the WB hosting environment; and (b) the fact that GPE is now considering whether or not to continue being hosted by the WB. (It should be noted that GPE does not have a separate legal personality, and its staff are employees of the WB; thus, for as long as it is hosted by the WB, "GPE hosting" would mean, in legal and administrative terms, being hosted by the WB.)

The detailed analysis to support the review's conclusions is provided in Annex F which considers the differences between potential hosts against each of the ExCom-endorsed hosting criteria.

Conclusions

The review team's principal conclusions are:

a) The initial choice of UNICEF to host ECW was appropriate from the perspective of maximising ECW's overall impact, given the organisation's global reach, extensive involvement in education in emergencies (EiE) and other humanitarian work, its related credibility with potential ECW donors, and the strong support of its Executive Director for the ECW initiative.

UNICEF was a strategic choice to ensure strong links to existing UN humanitarian architecture. However, it does not necessarily follow that UNICEF will still be the most appropriate location after the incubation period.

b) The choice of UNICEF involved inherent conflicts of interest, which were recognised at the time (and not unique to UNICEF among potential hosts). Genuine efforts to mitigate conflicts of interest have not sufficed to assuage serious concerns among key stakeholders. Perceptions of conflict of interest are deterring some parties from full engagement with ECW (and UNICEF's efforts to avoid such perceptions may even be detrimental if it means UNICEF is too hesitant in some contexts where more involvement would be helpful).

c) It has not been clear how long the incubation period was expected to last (ECW design documents anticipated 3-5 years, but the permanent hosting review was mandated to take place after one year of operation). The present uncertainty about the incubation period tends to undermine ECW's effectiveness, and ought to be resolved. Our judgement is that an incubation period that coincides with the 2018–21 ECW strategy period would make sense.

d) It is desirable that ECW should spend several more years in incubation at UNICEF, so as not to disrupt ECW's early development. In any case, it would take a considerable period to prepare and effect a transfer to GPE, even if desired (especially in view of the uncertainty about GPE's own hosting), and the review sees no merit at this early stage in moving to an administrative host (such as MPTFO or UNOPS) that does not have technical and operational expertise in education. It is therefore important to maximise the effectiveness of the incubation period, and at the same time to guard against sources of inertia that could prevent desirable change later.

e) It is not possible at this stage to anticipate precisely what ECW's hosting requirements will be, or what hosting arrangement best responds to them, at the time the successor strategy is being prepared – it will depend on (a) the precise business model ECW adopts; (b) how successful ECW is, including in fund-raising (with self-hosting as one conceivable option if ECW attains the scale it aspires to); and (c) the alternative hosting options available at that time. The choices available then may be significantly different from the ones available now (particularly in view of current uncertainties about GPE and the WB noted above). Accordingly, a choice of permanent host made now could not be as well-grounded as one made at a time when some of these uncertainties have been resolved.

f) If, nevertheless, a final decision on long-term hosting for ECW were to be made now – which we do not recommend – we consider that the strongest currently available option is the combination of UNICEF as administrative host with MPTFO serving as financial host. However, this option is not necessarily superior to other options that may become available in the medium-term. (The decision tree at Figure 1 in the main report clarifies the choices available now and the additional choices that may be available when ECW's next strategy is being prepared.)

Recommendations

Recommendations follow directly from these conclusions, and are set out in detail in the report (see Table 2). A full rationale is given for each one, along with proposed timing and responsibilities for

implementation. A decision tree (Figure 1) depicts the main alternative decisions that ExCom could consider, Annex I provides a detailed guide to implementing the review's recommendations, and Annex J links each recommendation to the supporting evidence in this report and in the ADR.

In summary:

- ECW's incubation at UNICEF should be continued through the period covered by ECW's strategy for 2018–2021. However, ECW and UNICEF should ensure, including by adopting the recommendations below on strengthening incubation arrangements at UNICEF, that this does not create unnecessary obstacles to a future change of host.

- The choice of a permanent host for ECW should be deferred until the end of ECW's incubation period, and the question of long-term hosting should be reconsidered during 2020/21, as part of evaluating ECW's early performance and preparing ECW's strategy for 2022 onwards.

- While administrative hosting should remain with UNICEF during incubation, financial hosting should be transferred from UNICEF to MPTFO, primarily so as to take advantage of MPTFO's specialist expertise in trust fund management and much greater experience in setting up and managing a variety of global and country level funds than UNICEF can offer. Additional benefits of this transfer would be to mitigate conflicts of interest (and so potentially increase overall support for ECW) and to secure more advantageous terms for managing ECW funds.

- The incubation arrangements at UNICEF should be strengthened in a number of ways so as to simultaneously consolidate ECW's separate identity and address concerns about conflicts of interest (COI). Recommended measures include clearer branding and changing ECW Secretariat contract terms to emphasise that they are specifically ECW staff. Moreover, in order to increase transparency and efficiency, ECW should draw up and publicise an explicit policy on COI as well as developing a full Grants Manual that should be widely available so that all partners are clear how decisions around grant allocation are made.

- In addition, specific steps are recommended to strengthen ECW's relationship with GPE, clarify ECW's grant management and oversight role, and strengthen other dimensions of ECW strategy and forward planning that have implications for its hosting requirements. For instance, the ECW strategy for 2018–2021 should more directly address the complementarity of GPE and ECW offerings and the mechanisms for ensuring that they dovetail effectively, while also linking to, and strengthening, the cluster mechanisms.

Next steps

The draft of this report was discussed at a telephone meeting of ExCom held on 9 March 2018, with the Mokoro team making a brief presentation and responding to questions. This final report includes clarifications and elaborations that were requested in the meeting and in written comments. A new annex provides more details on the recommended UNICEF+MPTFO configuration, and on the steps required to implement the full set of recommendations. Potential hosts were also given the chance to comment on the factual accuracy of the draft report, and this final version also takes account of their observations.

We understand that ExCom will make recommendations to the HLSG in the light of this final report, which is accordingly accompanied by a draft decision paper.

1. Introduction and Report Outline

Background

1. Education Cannot Wait (ECW) was launched at the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016. It is designed both to achieve a step change in levels of funding for education in emergencies (EiE) and to transform the way in which education is prioritised and addressed in the continuum between humanitarian interventions and long-term development.

2. The ECW High Level Steering Group (HLSG) decided that ECW should be hosted ("incubated") by UNICEF for an initial period, and that a review of the options for permanent hosting should take place after a year of operation. A team from Mokoro Limited was contracted to undertake the review[1] and began work on 31 August 2017, against the Terms of Reference (TOR) reproduced at Annex A. The team included:

- **Stephen Lister**, senior management and development consultant and team leader.
- **Ruwan de Mel**, strategy development consultant and global funds expert.
- **Marian Hodgkin**, education in emergencies specialist.
- **Paul Isenman**, global funds and international aid expert.
- **Christine Fenning**, researcher and analyst.
- **Allison Anderson**, education in emergencies expert, providing quality support.

Review tasks and phases

3. The review took place in two phases. During Phase 1 the review team undertook an extensive document review (see bibliography at Annex K) and interviewed more than 90 stakeholders (see Annex B for the full list of people consulted). Phase 1 culminated in an Assessment Design Report (ADR). The ADR (Mokoro, 2017) included a review and analysis of ECW's origins, objectives and early activities; it also considered relevant experiences of other partnerships and their hosting arrangements. It proposed criteria for selecting a permanent host, identified a long list of potential hosts, and proposed a short list for further detailed consideration during Phase 2. The ADR was reviewed and approved by ECW's Executive Committee (ExCom) in November 2017.

4. The agreed tasks for Phase 2 (see Annex C) were (a) to refine the review team's understanding of ECW's hosting requirements under alternative scenarios; (b) to liaise with the short-listed potential hosts to obtain authoritative information about their capacities; (c) to draw up a comparative assessment of the options, using the criteria set out in the ADR and approved by ExCom; and (d) based on this assessment, to make recommendations for consideration by ExCom and HLSG. Table 1 below shows the overall review timetable and summarises activities during Phase 2.

[1] Contracted by DFID through the Expert Advisory Call Down Service Lot B, on behalf of the partnership.

Table 1 Hosting Review Timetable

31 August 2017	Review commences
13 September	E-conference with Informal Reference Group (IRG)
14-15 September	Meetings in New York with ECW secretariat
09 October	Draft ADR submitted to DFID
23 October	Revised draft ADR submitted, circulated to ExCom
01 November	ExCom discussion of draft ADR
14 November	Final draft ADR submitted; commencement of Phase 2
22 November	Feedback from Executive Committee received
➔ 22 December	Mokoro team: • reviewed benchmarks and indicators for administrative hosting comparison, and developed alternative scenarios for future ECW scale; • developed detailed information requirements from short-listed hosts; • submitted detailed information requests to short-listed hosts; and • undertook additional interviews; • held further consultations with the ECW secretariat; and • held preliminary discussions with potential hosts to review options and explain information requirements. The timetable assumed that all key information would be provided by potential hosts by 22 December
25 December	Christmas break
29 December	All submissions by shortlisted hosts received by 29 December
January and February 2018	Compilation of information and comparison of hosting options Various rounds of calls with all potential hosts and the ECW Secretariat for clarifications Further interviews with people who were not available before Christmas Preparation of draft report and recommendations
18 February	Draft final report and recommendations submitted to DFID
26 February	Revised draft final report circulated to ExCom,
9 March	Discussed at ExCom meeting
20 March	Final report submitted, along with draft HLSG decision paper

Structure of Report

5. The rest of this report is structured as follows:

- Section 2: process and approach for Phase 2
- Section 3: assessment of alternative hosts' capacities
- Section 4: cost comparisons and value for money
- Section 5: considerations of timing and transition
- Section 6: conclusions and recommendations

6. The main text is deliberately concise (the TOR stipulated a maximum of 20 pages – Annex A, ¶26b). Several annexes present more detailed evidence and analyses to support and elaborate the main text.

2. Process and approach for Phase 2

Introduction

7. The ADR (Mokoro, 2017) provided a comprehensive review of ECW and its potential hosting requirements, along with an extensive discussion of appropriate methodology for choosing amongst potential hosts. The ADR remains relevant as the platform for this final report. Its summary of essential and desirable characteristics of potential hosts is reproduced, for convenience, at Annex D.

8. Other key points to recall from the ADR are:

a) The fundamental criterion is that the selected hosting arrangement should be the one that maximises ECW's effectiveness in achieving its core objectives.

b) The choice is not simply between a discrete set of unique hosts, because partnerships may acquire the support they need from a variety of sources (see Box 1 below).

c) ECW's optimal hosting requirements are likely to change over time as its strategy and business model become clearer and it scales up.

9. ExCom agreed that the Phase 2 review should consider the following short-listed options for long-term hosting of ECW (not in any presumed order of likely preference):

- UNICEF;
- an alternative UN-centred configuration (in which, for example, the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), the Office of the UN Special Envoy for Education, and the Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office of UNDP (MPTFO) might have roles to play);[2]
- the Global Partnership for Education (GPE); and
- a solution based on World Bank hosting in parallel to, rather than within, GPE.

[2] See ¶12 below for more on how this option developed during Phase 2.

Box 1. Alternative sources of services for ECW

What are the available options for obtaining each service?

Not every potential host has to be able to provide every potential service. There is more than one way of sourcing most services, and it is worth thinking in terms of four main options:

a) provision by the host;

b) ECW undertaking the activity/service directly;

c) obtaining services via the partnership; or

d) outsourcing to a third party.

Such options can apply to most aspects of ECW's activities (including for example grant management, fund raising and obtaining EiE expertise), but the way in which services are sourced may have significant effects on the efficiency of the secretariat and the partnership, and on its effectiveness in performing all of its core functions.
The costs and benefits of obtaining services in different ways need to be carefully considered.

Source: ADR ¶68-69 (Mokoro, 2017)

Phase 2 approach

10. The team's approach was based on building a thorough understanding of each potential host's offerings. Hosts were asked to provide written self-assessments against the criteria adopted in the ADR (Annex D), and the team had several rounds of discussion and e-mail queries with each host, both before and after their initial written submissions. Further interviews were held with various hosted organisations, and the additional documents reviewed included various guidelines and manuals used by potential hosts, along with reports and evaluations that could shed light on the performance of hosted entities (see Annex K for documents consulted). The information requested from potential hosts included standardised financial information against alternative scenarios for the scale of ECW funding and the size of its secretariat (see Annex G for details).

11. The team held further discussions with the ECW Secretariat about current hosting arrangements and lessons of experience concerning the services the Secretariat needs to draw on. In January, the Secretariat shared drafts of ECW's proposed strategy for 2018–2021 which helped to inform the team's understanding of possible future hosting requirements.

12. Concerning UN options, it quickly became apparent that the Office of the UN Special Envoy for Education was not in a position to act as an administrative host, and that the MPTFO and UNOPS each saw their offerings as mutually exclusive. In effect, therefore, there were five organisations under consideration: UNICEF, GPE, MPTFO, UNOPS and the World Bank, with the MPTFO, UNOPS and UNICEF as potential ingredients of the "alternative UN-centred configuration" envisaged in ¶9 above.

13. The review team considered in sequence: (a) possible long-term options (discussed in Section 3 below), including their cost implications (Section 4); and (b) issues of transition – when and how might it make sense for ECW to move from its incubation hosting to a permanent arrangement – and the short term implications of the review's findings in the meantime (Section 5). (The different elements of this analysis are captured in the decision tree diagram – Figure 1 below (on page 19).

Challenges and limitations

14. The review faced a number of challenges and limitations, including some which became apparent only after the ADR was completed. Thus:

a) With ECW still in a formative stage, its long term hosting requirements cannot be known with certainty. Its strategy for 2018–2021 is still being drafted and is not yet accompanied by detailed budget and staffing plans for the Secretariat.

b) The landscape for education financing may also change significantly in the coming years (e.g. the impact of IFFEd – the International Finance Facility for Education – is yet to be felt).

c) There are substantial uncertainties concerning two of the short-listed hosts:

- The World Bank is undertaking a Trust Fund Review, which has not yet reported. It is likely that this will lead to significant changes in WB policy and practice for the hosting of trust funds. This has direct implications for the WB hosting option, and indirect implications for the GPE option, since GPE is itself hosted by the WB.[3]
- It emerged from the December 2017 meeting of GPE's board, that GPE is seriously considering decoupling from the World Bank, and the board will consider the matter further in June 2018.[4] An independent GPE might be a very different hosting proposition than GPE in its current (institutional and geographical) location.

15. It should be stressed that this review was not a formal bidding or negotiation process. We believe we have gathered enough information to provide strong evidence-based advice on the choice of host, but a decision in principle on future hosting would need to be followed by detailed negotiations with one or more potential hosts before concluding a formal hosting agreement.

Review of the draft final report

16. Following the discussion of the draft report at ExCom, the five potential hosting organisations were given an opportunity to review the draft for factual accuracy. No major errors were identified, but a number of useful elaborations and clarifications that were offered or requested have been reflected in this final report. Significant additions are flagged where they occur.

17. This final version also responds to various requests from ExCom members (in the meeting or separately in writing) for clarifications or elaborations. There are no changes to the substance of the recommendations or to the thrust of the arguments presented, but, in addition to minor edits:

- The wording of some recommendations has been clarified and they now appear in what we hope is a more logical sequence.
- A new annex (Annex I) provides: (a) a fuller explanation of the proposed division of responsibilities between UNICEF and MPTFO (Table 6); (b) a table showing how the review's recommendations will mitigate COI (Table 7); (c) a comparison of costs between the existing and proposed arrangements (summarised in Table 8); and (d) more detail on the timetable and actions required to implement the review's recommendations, including a table (Table 9) which is designed to facilitate a systematic management response.

[3] This point was emphasised by the WB in its comments on the draft version of this report.

[4] See footnote 22 in Annex F for details.

3. Assessment of alternative hosts' capacities

Introduction

The short-listed potential hosts

18. The Phase 2 review has involved assessing and comparing the hosting credentials of five organisations:[5]

a) **UNICEF** is the current host of ECW, acting as both the financial and administrative host of ECW for an (unspecified) incubation period. Details of the present hosting arrangements are provided in Annex E. UNICEF is a major actor in education in both development and humanitarian contexts, and at both global and country levels. As noted in the ADR, the most serious doubts about UNICEF's suitability as a long-term host for ECW relate to the perception of institutional conflicts of interest (COI) in several dimensions.

b) The **Global Partnership for Education (GPE)** is a major education-specific global fund and multi-stakeholder partnership. It was from the outset considered as a possible host for ECW, and the GPE Board has commissioned a number of studies of the feasibility and implications of ECW hosting for GPE. It does not implement programmes itself, but has relationships with 65 developing country partners, and is increasingly adapting its approaches to serve education needs in crisis-affected countries. GPE is itself hosted by the World Bank; it does not have a separate legal personality, and its Secretariat is a part of the World Bank, to which the World Bank's policies and procedures apply (i.e. GPE staff are World Bank staff). Therefore, GPE currently cannot, at least in a legal or administrative sense, provide any services of its own to ECW as a "host" institution, nor would it be able to enter into any legal agreements on behalf of ECW; rather, the World Bank as the host institution of GPE (and ECW, in this case) would act on their behalf.[6] However, it is not certain that GPE will continue to be hosted by the World Bank. Advocates of GPE as host point in particular to potential synergies and economies of scale in co-locating ECW with GPE.

c) The **World Bank (WB)**has a large education portfolio, and is host to numerous Financial Intermediary Funds (FIFs) in addition to GPE. The WB was included on the short-list in case direct hosting, in parallel with its hosting of GPE, might prove to have advantages over "nested" hosting via GPE. However, the WB is not actively seeking to become ECW's host, and it is possible that imminent reforms of its trust fund policy may make it less able to meet ECW's preferred hosting criteria.

d) The **Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office (MPTFO)** of UNDP is a specialist fund management agency with a very large portfolio, including numerous humanitarian funds. Financial hosting is its core business, but it does provide administrative hosting services, through UNDP, to secretariats of some of the funds it hosts. It is willing to provide administrative hosting to the ECW secretariat, but also proposed a model in which MPTFO would become the Trustee/Fund Administrator for ECW while UNICEF continued as the administrative host. It would not bring any education expertise to its hosting role.

[5] Two of which – MPTFO and UNOPS – could be part of the "alternative UN-centred configuration" that was shortlisted in the ADR.

[6] This point was emphasised by the WB in its comments on the draft report.

e) The **United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)** is an agency which specialises, inter alia, in providing hosting services. Among the bodies it hosts are the SUN secretariat, Stop TB, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and the Roll Back Malaria (RBM) partnership. Its main hosting hub is Geneva but it also hosts entities in other locations. Hosting support accounts for about one quarter of UNOPS' financial delivery. UNOPS is also involved in project implementation and direct support to local governments, and is mandated "to expand implementation capacity across peace and security, humanitarian, and development efforts".[7] It would not bring any education expertise to its hosting role.

Assessment criteria

19. The ADR (Mokoro, 2017) developed a taxonomy of the characteristics/services that may be sought from a host, and used this taxonomy to propose which characteristics of a host may be considered essential ("need to have") and which additional characteristics may be desirable ("nice to have"). The full set of criteria is reproduced in Annex D.

20. During Phase 1 of this review, these criteria were used to conduct a first screening of the long-list of potential hosts, and to narrow the choices down to the short-list approved for detailed review during Phase 2. During Phase 2, the same criteria were employed in a much more detailed assessment of the organisations still under consideration. The criteria were an important guide for further interviews, and each potential host's written submissions to the review team were, in effect, a self-assessment against these criteria. In the course of the exercise, the review team not only learned more about the potential hosts, but also gained a deeper understanding of some underlying issues which have implications simultaneously for hosting and for ECW strategy per se.

21. Annex F provides the review team's detailed assessment of the potential hosts against all the main criteria.[8] It notes differences between the potential hosts on each criterion, and gives the team's judgements on the implications for the choice of host and hosting configuration, as well as noting other relevant implications of the view team's findings.

22. Key findings are summarised below, drawing on the more comprehensive, detailed and nuanced review provided in Annex F. We comment on the relative strengths and weaknesses of each potential host against each main criterion, but formal ranking of organisations against each criterion is not attempted because the criteria are often interdependent and what is seen as a strength from one perspective (e.g. EiE expertise) may simultaneously be seen as a weakness (e.g. as a source of COI) – see ¶128 of the ADR, which is reproduced in Annex C. The findings presented here contribute, along with those on costing (Section 4) and timing (Section 5), to our overall conclusions and recommendations (Section 6).

Strategic support for ECW core functions

Governance

23. In the review team's judgement, all the hosts considered could potentially allow ECW sufficient autonomy at governance and operational levels. However:

a) In practice there would be somewhat less operational autonomy under UNOPS hosting, because of UNOPS' hands-on approach to the entities it hosts.

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[7] https://www.unops.org/about/governance/mandate-and-reforms. See also UNOPS, 2016b.

[8] The comparative assessment of hosting costs is deferred to Annex G.

b) The parameters of hosting by GPE and/or by the WB are likely to be affected by the imminent review of WB trust fund policy, and therefore cannot be known with the same level of certainty as for other hosts.

c) GPE hosting parameters will also be affected by whether it remains hosted by the WB or seeks full autonomy. In either case, GPE hosting would imply some streamlining of GPE and ECW governance arrangements, and some degree of operational integration. Arrangements to maximise synergy between the two agencies could range from a simple but comprehensive division of labour and agreement on areas and modalities of collaboration, to a more thoroughgoing merger of staff and sharing of common functions, in which the ECW funds would be distinct windows within a common overall offering. For as long as GPE is hosted by the WB, any "GPE hosting" would involve the WB providing hosting services to both GPE and ECW (see ¶18b) above).

Fundraising

24. In the review team's judgement:

a) The "support to fundraising" criterion is not a strong reason for choosing either UNICEF or the WB as host. Although both have undoubted fundraising expertise, neither would take responsibility for managing the major fundraising effort ECW requires, and both acknowledged the conflict of interest that would be involved in such efforts. At the same time, it is important to seek UNICEF's continued strong general advocacy for ECW.

b) The lack of sophisticated fundraising expertise of MPTFO and UNOPS is accordingly less of a disadvantage than it might at first appear.

c) Moving to hosting by GPE would imply a decision to maximise perceived synergies between the two organisations, and their respective fundraising efforts would need to be closely coordinated, if not merged. However, closer alignment of their fundraising efforts would be a corollary of a decision taken primarily on the basis of other criteria, rather than a prime motivation in itself. (Indeed, a degree of alignment is desirable irrespective of hosting arrangements.)

25. *Corollary*: Given the importance of fundraising in ECW's strategy, the ECW secretariat must be staffed to provide adequate support in fundraising to the HLSG. ECW's partnership relations may enable it to draw expert advice from partners such as the WB and UNICEF, and it may benefit from other developments in the international architecture for education financing, such as IFFEd, but ECW must expect to shoulder the main responsibility for meeting its ambitious fundraising objectives.

Brand and identity

26. ECW was established on the premise that a new and distinctive initiative was needed, in order to give EiE the prominence it merits, and to transform approaches to, and levels of funding for, EiE. Its distinctive brand and identity is an essential element of ECW's strategy. The review team notes that it is uncertain, pending the results of its Trust Fund Review, whether the WB would satisfy this criterion. It is also not certain that the WB would allow a "GPE-hosted" ECW to maintain separate

branding in the same way that GPE does.[9] However, the other potential hosts would satisfy this criterion.

Convening power, coherence and legitimacy

27. In order to fulfil its second core function, ECW needs to bring together key development and humanitarian stakeholders. This requires both legitimacy (other actors recognise that the role ECW aspires to is appropriate) and convening power (enough influence to mobilise other actors). The coherence issue turns on whether ECW positively complements existing initiatives and enhances the overall aid architecture for education, or whether it has a negative effect through unnecessary duplication and fragmentation of efforts.

28. The review team does not share the view that respect for the principles of aid effectiveness necessitates a full integration of ECW with what previously existed, in either the development space or the humanitarian space. ECW is premised on a need to be (positively) disruptive. Coherence does however require that ECW should fully coordinate with and complement other parts of the aid architecture, notably the Local Education Groups (LEGs) and the IASC Education Clusters. There is a danger that a preoccupation with ECW's location becomes a distraction from ensuring operational coherence (*Are you in the right place?* gets in the way of *Are you doing the right things?*). Moreover, hosting by UNICEF – a dual mandate organisation – does facilitate ECW's articulation with the humanitarian and development architecture, and this has been an important factor in helping ECW to establish itself during the incubation period.

29. *Corollary*: we consider that the draft strategy thus far does not pay enough attention to ECW's articulation with the pre-existing structures of country-level Education Clusters and LEGs. This is an immediate issue for the strategy to address, and not only a consideration for the long-term hosting of ECW.

Geographical reach

30. UNICEF has the most extensive in-country connections and the most experience of operating in crisis contexts. In the review team's judgement, rapid and efficient access to areas of humanitarian crisis is a fundamental requirement for ECW – a factor which reinforced the case for UNICEF as the initial incubator for ECW. However, dependence on UNICEF for access carries risks of perceptions of conflict of interest which need mitigation. Other hosts could also provide a framework for ECW access (including UN status and security cover), and ECW should be able to elicit in-country support from all key partners, not only its host.

Partnership credentials

31. ECW is an initiative which simultaneously seeks to draw on and to galvanise its partners. Its hosting should at least allow, and ideally reinforce, such inter-agency working. In the judgement of the review team, all the short-listed hosts can satisfy this criterion. GPE and UNICEF are the most directly experienced in education partnerships, with UNICEF's track record much stronger in humanitarian contexts. The WB is not actively seeking to become the direct host of ECW, and would probably be a more detached host than either UNICEF or GPE. Both GPE and UNICEF are committed to continued advocacy and support for ECW whether or not they are selected as long-term host. Selecting either carries risks in relation to conflict of interest perceptions that would need to be

[9] A point emphasised in WB comments on the draft of this report.

systematically addressed. The underlying issue is not so much whether a host can effectively partner, but how well ECW itself can manage partnerships.

Grant management services

Grant management

32. During this review's analysis of potential hosts' self-assessments, it became evident that while the basic trustee services provided were relatively similar across hosts (legal agreements, funds disbursement, consolidated financial reporting etc.), the grant management models offered by the potential hosts were much more diverse. These differences and their implications for ECW are discussed in Annex H (see Table 5,which explores the different models and approaches offered by different hosts).

33. Based on the analysis in Annex H, the review team's judgements are:

a) that UNOPS' default model of grant management is probably too restrictive for ECW[10] (cf. the earlier comments under operational autonomy);

b) that long-term hosting requirements will be clearer once ECW has drawn on its initial experimentation to develop a transparent strategy and processes for grant management;

c) that in the short-term, it makes practical and strategic sense for ECW to draw on the specialised expertise of the MPTFO as it develops its grant management models, including but not limited to, pooled funding approaches.

34. *Corollary*: ECW's choices between different possible models of grant management have major implications not only for ECW's overall effectiveness but also for grant management skills and staffing levels required within the ECW secretariat. The drafts of ECW's overall strategy seen by this review did not yet sufficiently address grant management strategy or its implications for the role and staffing of the ECW secretariat.

Transparency, oversight, audit

35. This is an extremely important criterion in terms of maintaining ECW's reputation and credibility with funders, but all the shortlisted hosts are able to meet the necessary standards.

Specific technical expertise

Expertise in education (including EiE)

36. ECW seeks not only to increase the provision of education in emergencies, but to improve the equity and the quality of that provision. The review team considers that only one of the shortlisted hosts – UNICEF – combines significant education in emergencies technical expertise with a seat at the table in in-country humanitarian coordination forums, supporting the key function relating to

[10] As noted in Annex H (Table 5), UNOPS' "default" Grant Management approach is one of *Direct Grant Management*, in that UNOPS essentially takes on grant management responsibilities, with fiduciary responsibility remaining with them. The UNOPS model assumes a competitive bidding selection process for grants. Depending on the type of grantee (UN or I/NGO), greater or lesser oversight is provided by UNOPS, but their standard grant model expects, for example, at least one monitoring site visit per year. UNOPS does also manage some multi-donor trust funds with their own Boards (illustrations are provided in Annex H) but the review team did not consider that UNOPS' grant management approaches were likely to be the best fit with the speed, flexibility and global reach ECW aims for.

raising the profile of education in emergencies. ECW can potentially leverage this expertise towards its own objectives. However, it will be important to ensure ECW is able to maintain independence and its "disruptive" intent if it is hosted by UNICEF.

37. *Corollary*: GPE has very relevant broader education sector expertise which should support the Fund's goals to bring humanitarian and development actors more closely together and aligned. It is also increasingly working in fragile contexts. In order to fulfil its strategic functions ECW can and should utilise the technical expertise of both these major partners – UNICEF and GPE – whether hosted by them or not.

Expertise in humanitarian response

38. The review team considers that:

a) In the incubation phase it is important for ECW to be hosted by an organisation with a strong track record in humanitarian response and with a thorough understanding of, and active engagement in, the systems and processes that make up the humanitarian system. The choice of UNICEF as incubator was therefore appropriate. UNICEF is the potential host with the strongest profile in this regard.

b) In the longer-term, as ECW becomes more established as an actor in its own right, the humanitarian entry-point provided by UNICEF may diminish in relative importance and the range of hosting options that are consistent with maximising ECW impact may increase.

c) The fact that UNICEF was appropriately chosen to incubate ECW does not mean that the detailed hosting arrangements currently in place are necessarily optimal. While humanitarian response expertise is a critical factor that supports ECW's current location, fund design and management in humanitarian response is a sub-category of expertise that is particularly relevant to the ECW Secretariat as it seeks to establish itself and design its model and operational approach. MPTFO has much greater depth of expertise than UNICEF to support this element of ECW's organisational development.

Administrative services

39. Cost comparisons are provided in Annex G. The review team's judgements on other dimensions of administrative hosting are:

a) All the potential hosts apply their own HR systems. As in the area of grant management (discussed above), UNOPS appears to be the most "hands on" in its approach.

b) MPTFO is less oriented than the others towards physical hosting, and has not been the administrative host of an initiative that matches ECW's scale.

c) All have established travel management services, but UNICEF's experience in organising travel to crisis and conflict areas stands out from the others.

d) All can handle essential financial, accounting and asset management services, but UNICEF is alone in retaining the interest on funds for which it is trustee.

e) All can provide adequate legal services.

40. *Corollary*: This review was an informal process, and the information provided by potential hosts was not binding on them. It is clear that there is room for negotiation on a number of dimensions of hosting arrangements, including financial terms, and possible derogations from some

of the host's regular systems and procedures. In order to achieve the best possible terms for ECW, it would be necessary to negotiate binding terms as a part of the final decision on hosting.

Conflict of interest

41. Perceptions as much as substance of conflict of interest can be a problem with real effects. The ADR noted:

> This was an area of some very strongly held concerns, both about conflict of interest as a major risk to be addressed if any hosting arrangement was to be considered acceptable, and as the most trenchant criticism from some stakeholders of the current incubation arrangement. (Mokoro, 2017, ¶99)

42. There are three main areas in which conflict of interest is likely to be an issue:

a) Fundraising: ECW and a host may, in effect, be competing for funds from the same sources.

b) Grant allocation: there is an obvious potential conflict of interest if an organisation involved in allocating grants is itself a potential recipient.

c) Accountability for grant utilisation: similarly, there is a potential conflict of interest if a host seems to be involved in the monitoring and evaluation of its own grant utilisation. Moreover, part of ECW's remit (Core Function 5) is to "improve accountability by developing and sharing knowledge ... of what works and what does not". This could involve (constructive) criticism of a host's performance in EiE, whether or not ECW funds were involved.

43. Absence of substantial conflict of interest could not be made a "necessary" criterion, because it would automatically rule out hosts such as UNICEF and GPE who may be very strong on other criteria.

44. In the review team's judgement, it would be unwise to discard a potential host on conflict of interest grounds without first making sure that potential conflict of interest cannot be effectively mitigated. UNICEF has strong positive attributes that can accompany its administrative hosting of ECW; potential conflicts of interest are the other side of the same coin. Its efforts to mitigate acknowledged conflict of interest have not succeeded in allaying conflict of interest concerns among significant ECW stakeholders in more than one constituency, and such perceptions are likely to have negative effects on fundraising and other elements of ECW's strategy. A disinterested host (UNOPS or MPTFO, say) could resolve such concerns, but at a potential cost in other dimensions. It is therefore important to make all efforts to mitigate conflict of interest at UNICEF, not least because of its ongoing role as the host during incubation. Genuine and transparent autonomy of the Secretariat is a key factor in mitigating conflict of interest and perceptions of conflict of interest.

Previous hosting experience

45. The review team notes that all the short-listed hosts have plausible previous experience of hosting, but with different degrees of experience in administrative and financial hosting of trust funds. In each case, any hosting arrangement with ECW should be designed to offset the relative weaknesses as well as building on the relative strengths of a host's experience and expertise. Thus:

a) UNICEF has significant previous hosting experience (allied to the EiE and humanitarian expertise highlighted above). However, it does not have particular expertise in supporting hosted organisations' grant management, or in operating multi-partner funds.

b) The MPTFO, on the other hand, specialises in managing multi-partner funds, although it does not have experience of hosting a secretariat as large as ECW's is likely to become, and relies on UNDP for its back office services.

c) UNOPS provides dedicated, specialised hosting services to numerous organisations,[11] but we have some reservations about whether its grant management approach and organisational culture would allow ECW as much autonomy and flexibility as it needs (see our comments at ¶23a) and ¶a) above, which are amplified in Annex F and Annex H respectively).

d) The WB's track record leaves little doubt about its capacity to host funds and secretariats. However, its appetite to host ECW is doubtful, and the trust fund reform process under way may make it a less suitable host for ECW.

e) Choice of GPE as a host would have to be based on expectations of synergies and economies of a scale in a closer relationship between GPE and ECW, but GPE would bring to that relationship its own experience of developing as a hosted entity. The institutional configuration of the relationship would greatly depend on whether GPE remains hosted by the WB (see ¶18b) above).

4. Cost comparisons and value for money

Introduction

46. As described in the ADR, we support an interpretation of "Value for Money" (VFM) guided by the UK Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI), which does not limit VFM to financial considerations, and recognises that effectiveness and value for money are inextricably linked (ICAI, 2011,¶2.17-2.18).

47. We expect that the HLSG's final decision on long-term hosting for ECW will be based on a judgement as to which hosting alternative will best contribute to maximising impact. This requires a hosting arrangement which helps maximise the funding raised, ensures the most effective use of resources, supports all core functions of ECW, and contributes to ECW's broader objective of inspiring political commitment so that education is viewed by governments and funders as a top priority during crises. These strategic criteria are not susceptible to a meaningful ex ante financial calculation or cost-benefit analysis.

48. Nevertheless, comparing financial costs of alternative hosts for comparable services is certainly useful and relevant. The results of such a comparison across the five potential hosts under consideration are presented in Annex G. Our analysis was conducted under two scenarios (1) a Base Case comparable to the current level of operations and (2) a High Case reflecting a size that ECW aspires to within the strategy time frame. The analysis sought to estimate costs under different host options under these scenarios. This was a 'steady state' comparison: we did not attempt to estimate the one-off costs that might be involved in migrating to a new host.

49. The aim of this approach was to maximise comparability across the different organisations, but the results are nevertheless approximate, because different organisations have different ways of

[11] Although hosting is part of its wider portfolio of activities. In comments on the draft report, UNOPS noted that "75% of UNOPS financial delivery in 2016 were for non-Hosting support, i.e. direct implementation, trust fund and pool-fund management, and joint programming".

charging for their services, and also make slightly different assumptions about components such as staff costs. At the same time the exercise enabled a deeper understanding of hosting models, fee configurations and differentiated service offerings.

Context

50. To provide context, it is useful to identify the types of hosting services typically provided, while recognizing that terminology varies across hosts. These services include:

a) The Trustee function – where the host acts as custodian (and in some cases investor) of funds received by ECW, fulfils the necessary contractual and fiduciary arrangements with donors, reports on consolidated funds and executes disbursements.

b) Administrative hosting functions – providing support functions to enable the day-to-day operations of the ECW Secretariat, including in particular, human resources, office infrastructure, travel facilitation etc.

c) Grant Management support functions – these are more fully described in Annex H, and the service offerings are more diverse across host organisations. Many aspects of grant management will typically not form part of the standard hosting relationship, but may be secured as an additional paid-for service.

Principal findings

51. There is considerable diversity in the service offerings and fee structures across the alternative hosts. (Figure 2 in Annex G illustrates the different points at which charges for hosting may arise under different approaches.)

52. As a consequence, there are material variations in the cost outcomes across the different host options. GPE and the WB (on whose hosting platform the GPE model is based) are at the lower end of the spectrum due to a comparatively low funds management (trustee) fee. Costs for MPTFO and UNICEF are reasonably aligned. UNOPS fees are substantially higher due to more 'hands-on' grant management support within its hosting structure.

53. The costing analysis has highlighted the importance and impact of the ECW business model on the hosting decision. As the ECW portfolio expands in scale the Secretariat will need to determine the extent to which grant management functions, monitoring and assurance functions are fulfilled from within the Secretariat, Grant Agents, partner organisations, third party private contractors and/or the host.

54. All the hosts considered, with the exception of UNICEF, will credit interest/investment income earned on any surplus funds to ECW. Especially as ECW income grows, this can become a material amount.

55. It is also important to note that while our analysis was built on information submitted by potential hosts, no formal bids or submissions were solicited. Any eventual fee and service package would emerge from formal negotiations between a potential host and ECW.

5. Considerations of timing and transition

Introduction

56. In this Section we consider:

a) How long ECW requires for its incubation period.

b) Optimal timing for a decision on long-term hosting.

c) Some implications of our judgements on these points.

The incubation period

57. As noted in the ADR, the initial hosting arrangement was seen as covering a 'start-up phase' of 1-2 years in ODI's draft proposal in mid-February 2016 (see the roadmap described in ODI, 2016a), but the Evidence Paper dated May 2016 refers to an incubation period of "ideally up to five years" (Box 17 in ODI, 2016b). The "incubation" concept seems to combine two slightly different things: (a) temporary arrangements that allow for a rapid start-up; and (b) providing a sheltered environment in which a new initiative can concentrate on developing its strategy and proving its operational model, without closing off longer-term strategic options, but also without being distracted by those aspects of administration and management that an appropriate host can take care of.

Optimal timing for a decision on long term hosting

58. Continuing uncertainty concerning future hosting clearly has costs. However, in practice, the present review is taking place very early in the operational life of the Secretariat,[12] and before ECW's strategy has fully taken shape. This has made the task of assessing hosting options much more difficult, and the review team also considers that the potential distraction and upheaval involved in a near-term change of administrative host could undermine ECW's efforts to develop a clear strategy, operationalise it, and begin to establish a track record of performance in line with its fundamental objectives.

59. Moreover, an early decision on long term hosting would have to be made without full knowledge of some of the options, given the WB trust fund reforms that are in the pipeline, and the possible decoupling of GPE from the WB that is under consideration. Given these uncertainties, the review team shares the view expressed by several interviewees that it would be premature to make a decision on long-run hosting at this time. The challenge for ExCom and HLSG is to find a way of minimising uncertainty without taking a premature decision on the long term hosting of ECW.

Implications

60. In the review team's judgement, it would make sense to align ECW's incubation period at UNICEF with the current period of its strategy (2018–2021). This would defer any major upheaval for Secretariat, and allow agreed long term hosting arrangements to be fully factored into the subsequent strategy period.

[12] Although ECW formally established at the WHS in 2016, it has had an accountable Secretariat only since mid-2017.

61. At the same time, as foreshadowed in the ADR,[13] the hosting review has identified several ways in which the current hosting arrangement with UNICEF could be significantly strengthened in the interests of maximising ECW's near-term effectiveness and long-term impact. This strengthening includes steps that would facilitate changes in ECW hosting arrangements, as appropriate, after the incubation period.

62. In the final section of this report we take account of these factors in our overall conclusions and recommendations.

6. Conclusions and Recommendations

General conclusions

63. The review team took it as axiomatic that any decisions about hosting should seek to maximise ECW's ability to achieve its core objectives. Short-term implications for ECW's effectiveness need to be factored into any decision on the most appropriate long-term host, and the findings of this review have relevance for the existing hosting arrangements as well as for possible long term ones.

64. The review team's principal conclusions are:

a) The initial choice of UNICEF was appropriate from the perspective of maximising ECW's overall impact, given the organisation's global reach, extensive involvement in EiE and other humanitarian work, its related credibility with ECW donors, the strong support of its Executive Director for the ECW initiative, and a strategic choice to ensure strong links to existing UN humanitarian architecture. It does not necessarily follow that UNICEF will still be the most appropriate location after the incubation period.

b) The choice of UNICEF involved inherent conflicts of interest, which were recognised at the time (and are not unique to UNICEF among potential hosts). Genuine efforts to mitigate conflicts of interest have not sufficed to assuage serious concerns among key stakeholders. Perceptions of conflict of interest are deterring some parties from full engagement with ECW (and UNICEF's efforts to avoid such perceptions may even be detrimental if it means UNICEF is too hesitant in some contexts where more involvement would be helpful).

c) It has not been clear how long the incubation period was expected to last (ECW design documents anticipated 3-5 years, but the permanent hosting review was mandated to take place after one year of operation). The present uncertainty about the incubation period tends to undermine ECW's effectiveness, and ought to be resolved. Our judgement is that an incubation period that coincides with the 2018–21 ECW strategy period would make sense.

[13] Thus the ADR noted:

> 123. ... there are important time dimensions that should affect the consideration of ECW's future hosting. In the light of these factors, an important part of Phase 2 work should be to consider:
>
> - Whether and for how long the present interim arrangements with UNICEF should continue, and how concerns about perceived COI should be addressed during this period.
> - The time scale for any proposed transition to a permanent host.
> - Bearing in mind the lessons of other hosting transitions, ways to minimise the risks of entrenching present arrangements in ways that might unhelpfully constrain future options. (Mokoro, 2017, also in Annex C.)

d) It is desirable that ECW should spend several more years in incubation at UNICEF, so as not to disrupt ECW's early development. In any case, it would take a considerable period to prepare and effect a transfer to GPE, even if desired (especially in view of the uncertainty about GPE's own hosting), and the review sees no merit at this early stage in moving to an administrative host (such as MPTFO or UNOPS) that does not have technical and operational expertise in education. It is therefore important to maximise the effectiveness of the incubation period, and at the same time to guard against sources of inertia that could prevent desirable change later.

e) It is not possible at this stage to anticipate precisely what ECW's hosting requirements will be, or what hosting arrangement best responds to them at the time the successor strategy is being prepared – it will depend on (a) the precise business model ECW adopts; (b) how successful ECW is, including in fund-raising (with self-hosting as one conceivable option if ECW attains the scale it aspires to); and (c) the alternative hosting options available at that time. The choices available then may be significantly different from the ones available now (particularly in view of current uncertainties about GPE and the WB noted above). Accordingly, a choice of permanent host made now could not be as well-grounded as one made at a time when some of these uncertainties have been resolved.

f) If, nevertheless, a final decision on long-term hosting for ECW were to be made now – which we do not recommend – we consider that the strongest currently available option is the combination of UNICEF as administrative host with MPTFO serving as financial host. However, this option is not necessarily superior to other options that may become available in the medium-term. (The decision tree at Figure 1 below clarifies the choices available now and the additional choices that may be available when ECW's next strategy is being prepared.)

Specific recommendations

65. This report's recommendations follow directly from these conclusions. The hosting review team recommends that:

- ECW's incubation at UNICEF should be continued through the period covered by ECW's strategy for 2018–2021, but ECW should ensure that this does not create unnecessary obstacles to a future change of host.

- The choice of a permanent host for ECW should be deferred until the end of ECW's incubation period, and the question of long-term hosting should be reconsidered during 2020/21, as part of evaluating ECW's early performance and preparing ECW's strategy for 2022 onwards.

- While administrative hosting should remain with UNICEF during incubation, financial hosting should be transferred from UNICEF to MPTFO, primarily so as to take advantage of MPTFO's specialist expertise in trust fund management and much greater experience in setting up and managing a variety of global and country level funds than UNICEF can offer. Additional benefits of this transfer would be to mitigate conflicts of interest (and so potentially increase overall support for ECW) and to secure more advantageous terms for managing ECW funds.

- The incubation arrangements at UNICEF should be strengthened in a number of ways so as to simultaneously consolidate ECW's separate identity and address concerns about COI. Recommended measures include clearer branding and changing ECW Secretariat contract terms to emphasise that they are specifically ECW staff. Moreover, in order to increase transparency and efficiency, ECW should draw up and publicise an explicit policy on COI as

well as developing a full Grants Manual that should be widely available so that all partners are clear how decisions around grant allocation are made.

- In addition, specific steps are recommended to strengthen ECW's relationship with GPE, clarify ECW's grant management and oversight role, and strengthen other dimensions of ECW strategy and forward planning that have implications for its hosting requirements. For instance, the ECW strategy for 2018–2021 should more directly address the complementarity of GPE and ECW offerings and the mechanisms for ensuring that they dovetail effectively, while also linking to, and strengthening, the cluster mechanisms.

66. The alternative choices ExCom/HLSG needs to consider are depicted in the decision tree at Figure 1 below. This is intended purely as an aid to clarity of discussion. Stakeholders may rationally reach different choices than the ones recommended by the review team, but in doing so they should be able to identify the particular issue where their judgement branches away from that of the review team.

67. The review team's recommendations are fully set out as follows:

- Table 2 below presents the recommendations in detail; it also elaborates the rationale for each recommendation and suggests timing and responsibilities for implementation.
- Annex I provides more detail on the rationale for the recommendation to transfer financial hosting to MPTFO, on the ways in which the recommendations address COI issues, on the costs of the recommendations, and on the timeline for implementing both the immediate and the longer-term recommendations of this review.
- Annex J links each recommendation to the supporting evidence in this report, its annexes and the ADR.

Next Steps

68. We understand that ExCom will make recommendations to the HLSG in the light of this final report, which is accordingly accompanied by a draft decision paper.

Figure 1 Decision tree depiction of the major alternatives




1. Long term decision now or deferred?
2. Implications for incubation period
3. Long-term implications
1.2 Immediate long-term decision
1, ECW Hosting Decision
Basic principles
• choose arrangements to maximise ECW's overall effectiveness
• can't eliminate COI in partnerships, so must mitigate COI
Pro
• End uncertainty
Con
• Disruption if immediate move takes place
• Biases decision towards UNICEF
1.2.1 Uncertainty can alternatively be mitigated by defined incubation period and review plan
1.2.2 Potential to undermine ECW effectiveness by distraction of arranging move
1.2.3 Immediate options are limited:
• Sole hosting now by UNOPS or MPTFO not plausible
• WB not seeking to host, pending trust fund review
• GPE option highly dependent on GPE's own hosting decision: no clarity until at least June 2018; whatever the decision, likely to be a drawn-out process to agree and implement terms of a transfer to GPE
• UNICEF the likely choice, but by default
2.2 Most plausible options if decision taken now:
(a) UNICEF as long term administrative host, with immediate effect
(b) GPE as long term host, but details to be worked out, taking account of GPE hosting developments
2.2.1 Closes off other options which may be superior in future Risks weakening ECW partnership
2.2.2Since GPE alternative will take substantial time to design and implement, incubation will continue de facto, but incentive/ability to optimise incubation arrangement will be reduced by attention needed to GPE design
3.2 UNICEF or UNICEF/MPTFO option provides certainty but not necessarily optimal for the long term
3.3 GPE as long term host but risks include:
• turbulence of transfer hampers ECW effectiveness
• premature decision to link to development architecture constrains ECW ability to strengthen humanitarian–development nexus
3.4 Other long term host.
• Theoretically possible to choose UNOPS or MPTFO as sole host.
• Would ensure neutral host, but also, in the review team's judgement, provide a weaker short-term platform from which to achieve ECW objectives

Table 2 Recommendations

#	Issue	Recommendation	Rationale	Responsibility, timing,
1.	**Extension of ECW's Incubation**	a) ECW's incubation at UNICEF should be continued through the period covered by ECW's strategy for 2018–2021 (subject to the improvements embodied in Recommendation 3 and the safeguards in Recommendation 4 below).	ECW's original design documents envisaged an incubation period of 3–5 years. Confirming the length of the incubation period would allow ECW to focus on establishing and consolidating itself without the potential disruption of a major change in hosting. Uncertainty is potentially damaging to ECW and to its relationships with other actors in the field of EiE. The HLSG should therefore make clear that there will be no change of host before 2021/2022 and provide a clear timetable for linking any future decision to the preparation of ECW's strategy for 2022 onwards.	HLSG (next meeting, April 2018)
		b) ECW should ensure that UNICEF's hosting of ECW during incubation does not create unnecessary obstacles to a future change of host.	As ECW grows and matures there may be a change in the balance of advantages between its current hosting and possible alternatives (including the alternative of independence if ECW becomes, in financial terms, a very large fund). Experience of other global partnerships that have outgrown an initial host shows the importance of anticipating the possibility of a future move, and ensuring that staff contracts and expectations do not become a major factor resisting change and raising its costs.	(details incorporated in Recommendation 4 below)
2.	**Choice of ECW Permanent Host**	a) Choice of a permanent host for ECW should be deferred until the end of ECW's incubation period.	A final choice made now would be unnecessarily speculative because of uncertainties about: (a) *ECW's long-term hosting requirements*. ECW is still developing its strategy and business model. ECW's long-term hosting requirements, and its scale of operation, will be clearer towards the end of its current strategic cycle than they can be now. (b) *Alternatives to UNICEF as a long-term host*. In particular, uncertainties about the World Bank's emerging policy on trust funds, and about whether GPE may seek independence from the World Bank make it impossible at this point to define all the possible long-term alternatives with equal clarity. Moreover, a stand-alone option might also be considered if the scale ambitions in the strategy are realised.	HLSG (next meeting, April 2018)

#	Issue	Recommendation	Rationale	Responsibility, timing,
		b) The question of long-term hosting should be reconsidered during 2020/21 (and not before), as part of evaluating ECW's performance and preparing ECW's strategy for 2022 onwards.	There should be a defined process and timetable for reconsidering hosting options when ECW is more mature. The aim should be to end short-term uncertainty without closing off long-term options in a situation where both ECW itself and the international education financing architecture are evolving. (More detailed suggestions on process and timing are provided in Annex I.)	With ExCom approval, the ECW Secretariat and the strategy working group should include in ECW's strategy for 2018–2021 (to be approved by HLSG) a timetable and process for a review of hosting arrangements to take place in 2020/21. This should be linked to an independent mid-term evaluation of ECW's performance.
3.	**Transfer of financial hosting**	Transfer financial hosting of ECW from UNICEF to the MPTFO.	The MPTFO is a specialist in trust fund management with much more experience in setting up and managing a variety of global and country level funds than UNICEF can offer. A practical relationship between MPTFO and the ECW Secretariat is already developing. Financial hosting by the MPTFO would be more effective and efficient for ECW, it would have cost advantages, and would further allay concerns about conflict of interest arising from UNICEF's role as both a financial host and a major recipient of ECW funds.	Once mandated by the HLSG, implementation will require collaboration between UNICEF (the FSO) and the MPTFO. Full transfer of responsibilities should ideally be completed within the present calendar year. (The transition period should allow for orderly transfer of balances, modification of standard contribution agreements etc. At the same time, not spreading the transfer over two calendar years would greatly facilitate the reporting for both trustees and would provide more clarity and transparency to donors.)

#	Issue	Recommendation	Rationale	Responsibility, timing,
4.	**Strengthen the current administrative hosting arrangement**	The administrative hosting arrangements at UNICEF should be strengthened so as to consolidate ECW's separate identity, further address concerns about (perceived or actual) conflicts of interest, and avoid unnecessary constriction of future options for ECW.	Incubation at UNICEF has worked well in many respects: UNICEF has respected ECW's strategic independence and worked hard to facilitate its rapid launch. However, it also has downsides that undermine ECW's effectiveness and therefore need to be taken very seriously. Fortunately, non-disruptive remedial measures are available and could be rapidly implemented.	HLSG (next meeting, April 2018) authorise implementation of the recommended changes.
		a) Safeguard ECW's separate identity through clearer branding, e.g. with separate (non-UNICEF) email addresses.	ECW aspires to become a major international fund. While the connection with UNICEF may have been helpful during launch, the continuing confusion between ECW and UNICEF brands is unhelpful, and reinforces perceptions of conflict of interest that discourage some important stakeholders from engaging fully with ECW. In this respect, continuing to use UNICEF email addresses is an unnecessary own goal.	Immediate. ECW Secretariat and UNICEF.
		b) Change ECW Secretariat contract terms to emphasise that they are specifically ECW staff.	At present ECW Secretariat staff are UNICEF employees with the same privileges as regular UNICEF staff (e.g. in terms of eligibility to be considered for vacant positions anywhere in UNICEF). This implies possibly divided loyalties, feeds external perceptions of conflict of interest, and builds in a potential obstacle to a change of hosting arrangements if that could become desirable. There are precedents for hosted agencies adopting contracts that make clear that staff are employees of the hostee and not the hosting organisation. Revised terms should ensure that staff attracted to ECW are not swayed by the 'security' of a UNICEF position. UNICEF proposed to us that ECW Secretariat staff contractual terms could include adaptations to mitigate perceived COI.[14]	HLSG decision (April 2018) to be implemented by UNICEF as soon as possible.

[14] On reviewing the draft version of this report, UNICEF commented that: "ECW Secretariat staff are employees of UNICEF and any adaptations will still retain their UNICEF staff status (albeit with adaptations)".

#	Issue	Recommendation	Rationale	Responsibility, timing,
		c) Increase transparency – policy on COI	Concerns about conflict of interest (COI) in the present arrangement have been exacerbated because firewalls in place have been insufficiently advertised and understood. ECW should operate with maximum transparency: to this end it should draw up and publicise an explicit policy on COI that sets out the principles it will follow and the practical safeguards that are accordingly in place.	A temporary Task Team should develop the COI policy; allowing for appropriate consultations, this should be in place (HLSG approved) before the end of 2018.
		d) Increase transparency and efficiency – grants manual	ECW also needs to develop a full Grants Manual with documented business processes and formats, which should be communicated widely and available on its website so that all partners – global and in-country – are clear how decisions around grant recipients and grant agents are made, including the expected role of the Education Clusters at country level. This will also help ensure UNICEF is not inhibited by perceptions of COI and can continue to be a strong partner for ECW, as well as linking with the implementation of Recommendation 6 below.	The grants manual should be developed by the ECW Secretariat in collaboration with the MPTFO. Documented processes and formats for all ECW funding windows should be in place no later than July 2018. (Of course such manuals should always be subject to review and improvement.)
5.	**Strengthen ECW's relationship with GPE**	Ensure that synergy between ECW and GPE is maximised; reflect this in ECW's strategy for 2018–2021 and in working relations between ECW and GPE going forward.	Uncertainty about hosting has been detrimental to working relations between ECW and GPE. ECW was founded on a strategic premise that a new and separate global fund was needed. Nevertheless, in bridging the humanitarian/development divide as regards EiE, ECW needs to work closely with GPE (and with LEGs and Clusters at country level) through joint planning at global and national levels. ECW strategy should more directly address the complementarity of GPE and ECW offerings and the mechanisms for ensuring that they dovetail effectively, while also linking to, and strengthening, the cluster mechanisms.	ECW Secretariat and Task Teams (in drafting strategy, joint planning and through bi-yearly synergy checks).
6.	**Clarify ECW's grant management and oversight role**	Ensure greater clarity on who has operational responsibility for grant management and ensure proper resourcing for that function.	How ECW addresses grant management is inextricably linked to its hosting arrangements, now and in the future. As ECW evolves and scales up, the demands on the Secretariat for fiduciary and programmatic monitoring and oversight of grants will grow. ECW's desire to walk the localization talk also has implications for grant management and grant recipient engagement. Strategic choices will need to be made about the relative roles of the Secretariat, the host, partners, and grant agents.	Reflect in strategy and in the ensuing strategy implementation plan.

#	Issue	Recommendation	Rationale	Responsibility, timing,
7.	**Strengthen other dimensions of ECW strategy and forward planning**	a) The strategy under preparation will need to be supported by a well-articulated and costed strategy implementation plan, which will clarify secretariat staff requirements at the same time as it specifies services to be sought from the host or other parties.	Given its current stage of evolution, the strategy is not yet underpinned by plans for how it will be implemented. This again has implications for the hosting services that ECW will need in order to deliver on its Strategic Functions. Such an implementation plan will also begin to help identify more analytically the resources required and related budget allocations.	Immediate. ECW Secretariat.
		b) Provide an adequate number of qualified staff/human resources to ensure sufficient attention is paid to the resource mobilisation strategy and fundraising.	The resource mobilization strategy of ECW is currently a work in progress. The need for such a strategy is well recognised by current management. Naturally, with the scaling-up aspirations inherent in ECW's strategy, resource mobilization success will be at the heart of ECW's eventual impact. The hosting review has shown us that while some support may be forthcoming from hosts, the heavy lifting and strategizing will need to be from within ECW and its governance structures. ECW must be properly skilled to succeed in this competitive task.	Address as part of overall strategy and its aligned resource mobilization strategy. Immediate. ECW Secretariat

Annex A Terms of Reference

Consultancy to carry out an independent hosting review of
Education Cannot Wait, the Global Fund for Education in Emergencies[15]

Background

Education in Emergencies

1. 75 million school-aged children and youth are in desperate need of educational support – they are either in danger of, or are already, missing out on their education. Communities highlight the importance of education during times of crises, yet education appeals receive less than 2% of humanitarian funding. The right to education is most at risk during emergencies but it is also the exact time when it is needed the most. Educational provision for children living in emergencies and protracted crises is essential for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals and the world's commitment to ensuring access to quality education for all children and young people, leaving no one behind.

2. Overall responsibility for education sits with national governments; however, willingness, preparedness and capacity to fulfil these functions is varied, and mutual accountability by international bodies and civil society brings in a significant number of other actors involved in response, including multilateral agencies like UNICEF and UNHCR (with special responsibility for refugees), bilateral development partners, as well as INGOs and community based organisations.

3. The 2015 Oslo Summit on Education for Development called for the creation of a joint global effort to mobilise collective action and significant funding for education in emergencies and protracted crises. This call was echoed by governments, international and domestic non-governmental organizations, the private sector and global citizens. This consensus helped to drive forward the development of a new, collective way to support education in humanitarian responses and protracted crises by increasing the efficiency of current approaches, leveraging additional financing, and catalysing new and innovative approaches to funding.

Education Cannot Wait (ECW)

4. Announced at the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016, 'Education Cannot Wait' (ECW) is a new global fund designed to transform the delivery of education in emergencies. The fund joins up governments, private sector partners, humanitarian actors and development efforts to deliver a more collaborative and rapid response to the educational needs of the world's most vulnerable children and youth affected by crises. Its aim is that all crisis-affected children and youth are reached with safe, free and quality education by 2030. It is a key contribution to the United Nations Secretary General's 'Agenda for Humanity', and includes a number of the Grand Bargain principles and commitments for humanitarian reform.

5. The ECW model is based on comprehensive analysis of the systemic barriers to education in emergency and protracted crises affected countries. The Operational Model, Results Framework and governance structures were developed by Boston Consulting Group through a highly consultative process with key stakeholders. These documents were approved at the ECW High Level Steering Group (HLSG) meeting on 28 February 2017.

[15] These TOR were augmented by the agreed approach to Phase 2 set out in the ADR – see Annex C below.

6. ECW is designed to drive change in five key areas.

- Inspire political commitment so that education is viewed by governments and funders as a top priority during crises
- Plan and respond collaboratively with a particular emphasis on enabling humanitarian and development actors to work together on shared objectives in education
- Generate and disburse additional funding to close the USD 8.5 billion funding gap needed to reach the 75 million children and youth affected by crises with safe, free and quality education
- Strengthen capacity to respond to national and local crises and improve the ability to coordinate activities and deliver learning in the hardest to reach areas
- Improve accountability of education interventions in the humanitarian and development systems by sharing knowledge and collecting more robust data in order to make better-informed investment decisions

7. Achieving this change requires leadership and financial support at both a global and a country-by-country level. Education Cannot Wait therefore comprises of two types of funds – an Acceleration Facility and a Breakthrough Fund.

- The Acceleration Facility (5-10% of funding) will invest in global public goods, to raise international awareness, improve coordination and crisis preparedness, as well as developing new approaches and tools.
- The Breakthrough Fund (95% of funding) will support country-level initiatives, directly funding programmes and policies to ensure that more children can access a quality education. In the direct aftermath of a crisis, funding will be provided and children and young people will have the opportunity to learn in safe spaces. After the immediate crisis has passed, the fund will bridge the divide between humanitarian and development efforts with longer-term plans to finance and deliver education and strengthen systems.

Image 1: Education Cannot Wait Theory of Change



ECW Hosting arrangements

8. The initial paper on the creation of a new fund for Education in Emergencies (EiE) included a light touch assessment of institutional arrangement options, based on analysis of existing Funds (e.g. GAVI) and stakeholder consultations (see key documents list). **The report recommended that the Fund be incubated in a single organization, with an independent hosting review in the future. At its first meeting in 2016, the HLSG mandated that this review would be carried out 'one year from operation'.**

9. The analysis presented four possible options for an incubator host: UNICEF; Global Partnership for Education (GPE); a foundation under the model of a fiscal sponsor; or (4) a private company, in the form of a private sector fund. These were assessed against agreed criteria (these were: scope of work and in-country capacity; capacity to manage funding; interaction with wider system; education competence; strategic management and performance; cost and value consciousness and efficiency; partnership behaviour; transparency and accountability; location). The option of a foundation or private sector organization host was not looked into in any detail at that time, and no call for expression of interest was issued.

10. The role of the host in this analysis was considered to include full responsibility for hosting the functioning of the fund, including provision of:

- Human resources functions, including contractual matters, such as recruitment and separation; workplace safety; employee relations; compensation and benefits; compliance with labour and employment laws; and training and development
- Accounting, audit and fiduciary functions
- Working space and facilities for the secretariat
- Access to requisite technology and support services, such as IT, travel, meeting and procurement services

11. Initial findings presented in the report were that UNICEF was a willing initial host, and that GPE, given time, might be able to modify its mandate and become an appropriate host for ECW. During this assessment, members of the then Champions' Group (now High Level Steering Group) proposed that the new education crisis fund would initially be hosted by UNICEF, with a Secretariat based in New York.

12. As such, Education Cannot Wait is currently hosted by UNICEF, which acts as the Fund Manager for the Global Fund. In this capacity, UNICEF provides a Fund Support Office, and houses an ECW Secretariat. The ECW High Level Steering Group approved governance structures in February 2017 (see key documents list). Initial donors to the Fund have signed either bilateral agreements with UNICEF (Norway, Canada, EC), or have signed the Standard Contribution Agreement (SCA) with UNICEF (UK, USA, Denmark, France, Dubai Cares).

13. GPE has in the meantime commissioned some analysis of what changes would be required to absorb ECW, with a range of options for extent of absorption analysed. This work was carried out by Dalberg Consulting (see key documents list).

14. As per the HLSG minutes (28 February 2017), an independent hosting review must now be conducted to establish the long term, permanent host for ECW. The HLSG minutes from that meeting state that: *The TOR should include: criteria against which the independent review will be conducted, review methodology and process, and the expected skill set and experience of reviewer/review team. The TOR should recommend a timeframe for the review, which is currently anticipated to conclude by autumn 2017.*

15. In February 2017 DFID offered the financial and management resources to fund and procure the consultants to carry out this independent review, working within the governance structures of ECW. This offer was accepted by the HLSG.

Purpose and Scope

16. The overall purpose of the work is to:

a) Review and assess the current landscape for potential permanent hosting agencies for ECW

b) Assess potential hosts against agreed criteria and identify relative trade-offs

c) Make final recommendations for the permanent host for ECW, which will go to the HLSG

The recommendations should be backed up by sufficient analysis and provide enough detail for the HLSG to make an informed decision in light of trade-offs and risks. In addition, assessment and documentation of *how* the various recommendations could be operationalized should be included – i.e. an indicative timeline and areas which should be taken into consideration for action and additional analysis.

17. The work should define the role of a permanent host. In addition, it should review and refine the **suggested assessment criteria** (see below) against which potential permanent hosts should be assessed. At the same time, a methodology (e.g. weighting scale) for assessing the potential hosts against these criteria should be developed. Both qualitative and quantitative criteria may be used. In weighting, a spectrum of 'need to have' to 'nice to have' will need to be well-developed in each case.

Suggested assessment criteria – to be reviewed and refined

Strategic fit

- Management commitment and appetite for hosting
- Alignment with organization's objectives
- Brand value
- Fundraising
- Risk appetite
- Sustainability – ability of permanent host to support ECW into the future and to plan around different scenarios of ECW financing

Partnership fit

- Conflict of Interest potential/mitigation
- Coordination approaches, appetite and track record
- Legitimacy [to act] amongst relevant stakeholders
- Flexibility of the host to adjust to ECW

Process fit

- Speed, flexibility and agility of disbursement
- Process efficiency (e.g. accounting, audit and fiduciary functions; working space and facilities for the secretariat; access to requisite technology and support services)
- Potential for financing to range of recipient entities (e.g. non-state, private, governments, non-government)
- Risk management approaches

Operational fit

- Capacity to host
- Support quality
- Host expertise (e.g. human resources, recruitment policies and flex)
- Geographical location (including decentralization possibilities if thought relevant)
- Ability to provide coherent support to recipients (governments and grant agents) of ECW grants

Financial fit

- Value for Money – including on administrative and overhead costs
- Ongoing costs
- Switch costs
- Transparency

(Drawn from original ODI report, and recent hosting review undertaken by Boston Consulting Group)

Methodology

Identify potential hosts

18. The number of potential hosts is considered to be broad in the first instance, and could include bilateral donors, civil society organisations, UN bodies, multilateral development banks, GPE, private sector and foundations. This work should include scanning widely for potential hosting interest and welcoming, but not requiring, expressions of interest. The innovative and to some extent disruptive aims of ECW in terms of reform to global education provision to crisis and conflict-affected populations, and the need for complete transparency mean that 'outliers' should not be ruled out without some justification and analysis. It is expected that on finalisation and an initial application of criteria it will be possible to recommend a narrowing of scope in terms of potential hosts, as the refined criteria will rule out some candidates. This will be known as the primary analysis. The inception report should provide a recommendation on which potential hosts should be assessed in a fuller, secondary analysis.

Approach

19. The work should be fully independent, based on clearly documented evidence. All recommendations made must be backed-up by robust analysis. The consultants should submit an Assessment Design Report (ADR) that clearly describes the research questions, sub-questions, methodology and potential instruments to answer those questions. The ADR should also include methods for data collection and analysis as well as an initial list of Key Informants by type, influence, and position relative to hosting.

20. The work should take into account all relevant documentation, including the Education Cannot Wait Operational Model Design and Results Framework, the Education Cannot Wait Governance Structure, Education Cannot Wait Results Framework Monitoring and Evaluation Costing and the *ODI Evidence Paper: A common platform for education in emergencies and protracted crisis* (see key documents list).

21. The work should include a level of benchmarking of other Global Funds' and where appropriate education challenge funds' approaches and costs. However, while benchmarking has the potential to be instructive, it is critical to avoid normative comparisons because ECW's goals are to disrupt, innovate, and be fit for purpose, and the selection of the permanent host will be critical in supporting these goals.

22. A time and cost-efficient level of engagement with key stakeholders will be necessary as part of the research methodology. This will include interviews with key informants – including HLSG members, the Executive Committee, ECW donors, civil society representatives and ECW grant recipients. A full list will be drawn up by the consultants. The consultants should consider whether an informal "Task Team" or reference group of diverse, interested organizations would be useful and how they could use such a group to develop their assessment and reach evidence-based recommendations.

Recipient and management

23. As the contract holder, DFID will be the administrative and contractual liaison. The ultimate recipient of the work is the ECW High Level Steering Group. The ECW Executive Committee will act in its capacity as oversight of ECW business as per ECW governance structures and will approve the Assessment Design Report, and the final report and recommendations for onward transmission to the HLSG. As such, they will act as the management focal point for the outputs. A smaller reference group or informal "task team" of interested organizations may be helpful in steering the work and should be considered by the consultants during the initial phase of work.

Summary of Objectives and Tasks

24. The overarching objectives for this work is to

a) Identify potential hosts for ECW

b) Revise criteria for analysis of potential hosts

c) Analyze (including risks and trade-offs) the potential hosts based on specific transparent criteria

d) Share findings and provide recommendations to the ECW HLSG on the permanent host of Education Cannot Wait

e) An assessment of the implications and actions that would need to be taken forward by the recommended host

25. Breaking this down, the detailed tasks include:

Phase I

a) Reviewing existing relevant documentation on Education Cannot Wait, with specific attention to existing analysis on hosting

b) Develop a profile of the permanent host role, based on relevant documentation and other Global Funds where relevant

c) Scan widely for potential hosts in an open and transparent manner, testing for interest and potential match, and welcoming (but not requiring) expressions of interest

d) Define the potential hosts, and outline their institutional set-up for delivery of the role. Note that some benchmarking with other Funds may be required at this stage

e) Refine and elaborate the specific criteria against which to assess potential hosts and a methodology (including weighting, and analysis approach) for using these to assess their strengths and weaknesses. Note that some benchmarking with other Funds may be required at this stage

f) Apply a primary analysis of potential hosts and recommend which potential hosts to include in a secondary analysis

g) Draft and present inception report

Phase II

h) Conduct consultations with the potential hosts and key stakeholders (full list TBD) to identify further information; analyse relevant primary and secondary data

i) Develop a clear analysis of the options, systematically highlighting advantages, risks and trade-offs

j) Draft a summary report with relevant analysis and recommendations, including initial indications of implications for the recommended host (e.g. areas for further analysis/action should the recommendation be agreed)

k) Develop final information on recommendations and analysis for a decision paper to go to the HLSG meeting in Autumn 2017

Outputs

26. The outputs for the work are as follows:

a) Assessment Design Report, including specific criteria and methodology including:

   a. Background
   b. Assessment questions and objectives
   c. Methodology and approach
   d. Data collection approach
   e. Data analysis

b) Final summary report (max 20 pages). The structure should be determined by the consultants but should include:

   a. Executive Summary
   b. Methodology including data collection tools
   c. Data analysis
   d. Concrete recommendations and rationale
   e. Key risks and opportunities
   f. High level implications/future action for the recommended host
   g. References to documentation accessed and stakeholders consulted

c) Full documentation and analysis of any consultations undertaken

d) Power Point Presentation (max 20 slides) with key findings and recommended next steps

e) HLSG decision paper – draft and final version of the paper (2 pages maximum) for approval by the ECW Director and discussion by the HLSG

Methodology

27. It is envisaged the work will be carried out in two phases as suggested below. Bidders are required to outline in more detail their proposed methodology and rationale.

Phase one (up to three weeks, predominantly desk-based)

- Kick-off teleconference/face-to-face meeting
- DFID to gather relevant documents, including from potential hosts
- Desk-based literature review of all relevant documentation, as shared by DFID and potential hosts.
- Refinement of specific criteria; development of methodology; analysis of range of potential hosts for shortlisting

Phase two (up to seven weeks, combination of consultations and desk-based)

- Interviews with potential hosts
- Interviews with key stakeholders/informants
- Further data gathering and reviewing of documentation provided by potential hosts
- Data analysis and draft report writing
- Dissemination of findings, in the form of a presentation for the Executive Committee
- Final report and decision paper drafting

Timeline, Management and Reporting

28. The proposed total time for the consultancy is 40-60 days. There will be some flexibility in the length of phase two so that the outcome of Phase I (i.e. number of potential hosts for fuller review) can be taken into account. As such, Phase I will be up to 15 days; Phase II will be up to 40 days.

29. The consultancy will begin in May 2017 and work should be finalised by the HLSG meeting in autumn 2017. More detailed timings and a work plan must be included in bids, and should take into account likely slow periods over the summer.

30. Engagement with the Executive Committee will, where possible, be part of their regular quarterly meetings. If necessary, an extraordinary meeting may be called to discuss specific outputs.

31. Bids should specify how many total days required to fulfil the task according to their selected methodology, and how those days are split between team members.

Skills and Competencies

32. A team of experts will be necessary to cover the breadth and depth of this assignment. This should include the following:

- A Team Leader with at least 15 years' experience in similar assignments, expertise in management consultancy on organisational change management, institutional arrangements of Global Funds; good understanding of the international aid architecture, in particular on education.

- A selection of up to two relevant experts with experience of Global Fund structures, organisational capacity, value for money, human resources, strategy development, fundraising, and strong knowledge of issues related to education in emergencies.
- A Lead Researcher with qualitative methods expertise that can lead the data collection and analysis processes in order to ensure claims and recommendations are backed by the data collected in the process.

Tenders/bids package

33. Interested parties are asked to tender a detailed methodology, work plan and budget demonstrating how they will approach the assignment. Interested parties should also explain how and why they are suitable to carry out the work, highlight their value for money offer to DFID, and provide CVs.

34. Specifically, tender packages should include:

- A cover letter introducing the evaluators/organisation and how the skills and competencies described above are met, with concrete examples.
- A 4-page outline of the proposed review process including:
    - Proposed outline methodology
    - Management arrangements
- A budget covering all major costs, including:
    - Researcher/consultant fees
    - Reimbursable costs
- 2-page CVs
- One example of similar work

Duty of Care

35. The Supplier is responsible for the safety and well-being of their Personnel and Third Parties affected by their activities under this Contract, including appropriate security arrangements. They will also be responsible for the provision of suitable security arrangements for their domestic and business property.

36. DFID will share available information with the Supplier on security status and developments in-country where appropriate.

37. The Supplier is responsible for ensuring appropriate safety and security briefings for all of their Personnel working under this Contract and ensuring that their Personnel register and receive briefing as outlined above. Travel advice is also available on the FCO website and the Supplier must ensure they (and their Personnel) are up to date with the latest position.

KEY DOCUMENTS

- ODI report: ECW: Proposing a Fund for Education in Emergencies
- ODI evidence paper: A common platform for education in emergencies and protracted crises

- Dalberg report: Implications of Hosting ECW
- Education Cannot Wait Governance Model
- Education Cannot Wait Operational Model Design and Results Framework
- Education Cannot Wait Results Framework Monitoring and Evaluation Costing

Annex B People Consulted

* indicates face to face meeting; others were by telephone or skype.

Note this is a full listing of those consulted throughout the hosting review, not just Phase 2.

S/N	Category	Agency/Organisation/ Country	Name	Designation
1	Academia	Stanford University	Joel Samoff*	Professor
2	Academia	University of Sussex	Keith Lewin*	Emeritus Professor
3	Aid bilateral	Afghanistan	Abdul Wassay Arian	Ministry of Education
4	Aid bilateral	Canada	Marie Asselin	Senior Analyst
5	Aid bilateral	Canada	Julia Dicum	Deputy Director, Education
6	Aid bilateral	Denmark	Nicolai Steen Nielsen	Chief Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
7	Aid bilateral	DFAT Australia	Kirsty McNichol	Director Education Section
8	Aid bilateral	DFAT Australia	Kerry Leigh	Education Section
9	Aid bilateral	DFAT Australia	Rose Roxburgh	Health and Education Funds
10	Aid bilateral	DFID	Sophia Wootton	Deputy Programme Manager, Global Partnership for Education and Education Cannot Wait
11	Aid bilateral	DFID	Emily Todd	Programme Manager, Global Partnership for Education and Education Cannot Wait
12	Aid bilateral	DFID	Alicia Herbert	Head, Children, Youth and Education Department (CYED)
13	Aid bilateral	DFID	Chris Porter	Head of the Humanitarian Profession
14	Aid bilateral	DFID	Chris Berry	previous Head of the Education Profession with significant EiE experience
15	Aid bilateral	DFID	Richard Arden	Senior Education Adviser
16	Aid bilateral	DFID	Janice Dolan	Education Adviser
17	Aid bilateral	Lebanon	Fadi Yarak (by e-mail)	Ministry of Education
18	Aid bilateral	Norad	Camilla Fossberg*	Assistant Director, Head of Education Section
19	Aid bilateral	Norad	Randi Gramshaug*	Senior Adviser Education
20	Aid bilateral	Norway	Tarald Brautaset	Ambassador & Chair of ECW Executive Committee
21	Aid bilateral	USAID	Evelyn Rodriguez-Perez	Acting Deputy Assistant Administrator
22	Aid bilateral	USAID/E3/Education	Nina Papadopoulos*	Team Lead, Education in Crisis & Conflict
23	Aid multilateral	ECHO	Judit Barna	Policy Officer, Education in Emergencies
24	Aid multilateral	European Commission	Annica Floren*	Head of Sector for Education

S/N	Category	Agency/Organisation/ Country	Name	Designation
25	Aid multilateral	World Bank	Naohisa Konita	Senior Advisor, Development Finance
26	Aid multilateral	World Bank	Luis Benveniste	Practice Director Education
28	Aid multilateral	World Bank	Jaime Saavedra	Senior Director
29	Aid multilateral	World Bank	Douglas Sumerfield	Senior Operations Officer
30	Commissions	ICAI	Alison Evans	Chief Commissioner
31	Commissions	International Commission on Financing Global Education Opportunity	Liesbet Steer	Director
32	EiE network	INEE	Dean Brooks	Director
33	Expert individual	Center for Global Development	Michael Anderson	Health Consultant
34	Foundation	Educate a Child	Mary Joy Pigozzi*	ED
35	GF/partnership	ECW	Yasmine Sherif*	Director
36	GF/partnership	ECW	Daria Ng*	Governance and Operations Consultant
37	GF/partnership	ECW	Sara Bhinder*	Senior Administrative and Budget Assistance
38	GF/partnership	ECW	David Hartstone*	Grant and Recipient Support Specialist
39	GF/partnership	ECW	Johannes Kiess*	Innovative Finance Specialist
40	GF/partnership	ECW	Elise Bijon*	Donor Engagement, Communications and Advocacy
41	GF/partnership	ECW	Gabrielle Bonnet*	Senior Education Economist
42	GF/partnership	ECW	Emily Travis*	Senior Advisor
43	GF/partnership	ECW	John Solecki*	Senior Advisor
44	GF/partnership	GAVI	Eelco Szabo	Legal council
45	GF/partnership	GAVI	Barry Greene	Chief Financial Officer
46	GF/partnership	Global Campaign to End Violence Against Children	Susan Bissell	Director
47	GF/partnership	Global Financing Facility	Mariam Claeson	Director
48	GF/partnership	GPE	Alice Albright*	Executive Director
49	GF/partnership	GPE	Karen Mundy*	Chief Technical Officer
50	GF/partnership	GPE	Padraig Power	Chief Finance and Operations Officer
51	GF/partnership	OECD-DAC	Lisa Williams*	DAC Secretariat
52	GF/partnership	Power Of Nutrition	Martin Short	Chief Executive Officer
53	GF/partnership	Roll Back Malaria	Clara Mathieu Gotch	CEO of Roll Back Malaria
54	GF/partnership	Stop TB	Dr Lucica Ditiu	Executive Director
55	GF/partnership	SUN Movement	Florence Lasbennes	Director
56	GF/partnership	UN Girls Education Initiative – a UN-based multi-stakeholder partnership	Nora Fyles*	Director of the Secretariat for the United Nations Girls' Education Initiative (UNGEI)
57	Education Cluster	Education Cluster Somalia	Sara Skovgaard	Cluster Coordinator

S/N	Category	Agency/Organisation/ Country	Name	Designation
58	Education Cluster	Education Cluster Ukraine	Maryanna Schmuki	Education Cluster Coordinator, UNICEF
59	Education Cluster	Education Cluster Yemen	Afkar Al-Shami	Education Cluster Coordinator, UNICEF
62	Global Education Cluster	Save the Children	Tyler Arnot	Global Education Cluster Lead
63	Global Education Cluster	UNICEF	Maria Agnese Giordano	Global Cluster Coordinator
64	Independent	Independent	Helen Evans	Independent consultant
65	Independent	Independent	Margaret Sinclair*	Independent consultant
66	Independent	Independent	Nina Schwalbe	Independent consultant
67	Independent	Independent	Pedro Alba	Independent consultant
68	Independent	Independent	Peter Colenso*	Independent consultant
69	Independent	Independent	Landon Newby	Independent expert on needs assessment and planning
70	Independent	Independent	Ruth Szabo	Independent consultant
71	NGO/CSO	Action Aid /GCE	David Archer*	Head of Participation and Public Services
72	NGO/CSO	Global Campaign for Education-US (GCE-US)	Jennifer Rigg	Executive Director
73	NGO/CSO	International Rescue Committee	David Miliband	President and CEO
74	NGO/CSO	International Rescue Committee	Sarah Smith	Senior Director of Education
75	NGO/CSO	Jesuit Refugee Services	Giulia McPherson	Director of Policy & Advocacy
76	NGO/CSO	Malala Fund (contributed to the INEE consultation, lobbied for creation of ECW)	Chikondi Mpokosa*	National Advocacy Manager
77	NGO/CSO	NRC	Alberto Rampazzo	Institutional Partnerships Advisor
78	NGO/CSO	NRC	Cecilia Roselli	Humanitarian policy advisor and expert on pooled funding
79	NGO/CSO	Plan Canada	Nadine Grant	Vice President, International Programs and Business Development
80	NGO/CSO	Save the Children	Erum Burki	Coordinator Whole of Syria
81	NGO/CSO	Save the Children	Joseph Nhan-O'Reilly	Head of Education Policy & Advocacy
82	NGO/CSO	Save the Children	Maria Hagen	Director Institutional Partnerships, International Programs
83	NGO/CSO	World Vision	Jonathan B. Miller	Senior Education Advisor,

S/N	Category	Agency/Organisation/ Country	Name	Designation
				Strategic Engagement
84	Private sector	Boston Consulting Group	Lane McBride*	Partner
85	Private sector	Boston Consulting Group	Olga Berlinsky	Principal, social impact and public sector
86	Private sector	Boston Consulting Group	Rebecca Solow*	Social Impact Group, background in M&E)
87	Private sector	Cambridge Education	Nick Santcross	Director, Education for International Development
88	Private sector	Charlie Goldsmith Associates	Charlie Goldsmith*	Managing Director
89	Private sector	Global Business Coalition for Education	Tom Fletcher	Visiting Professor of International Relations at New York University, and an Advisor to the Global Business Coalition for Education and Emirates Diplomatic Academy
90	Private sector	PWC	Asyia Kazmi	Lead of Girls Education Challenge
91	Private Sector	Results for Development (R4D)	Nicholas Burnett*	Senior Fellow
92	Private sector	Rockefeller	Chris Page	Executive Vice President
93	Research Institution / Thinktank	ACAPS	Lars Peter Nissen	Director
94	Research Institution / Thinktank	Brookings Institution, Center for Universal Education	Rebecca Winthrop	Director
95	Research Institution / Thinktank	ODI	Susan Nicolai	Senior Research Fellow
96	UN agency	Executive Office of the Secretary-General	Alejandro Alvarez	Director, Rule of Law Unit
97	UN agency	OCHA	Andrea De Domenico	Chief of Funding Coordination Section (i.e. the office overseeing/coordinating the Country-Based Pooled Funds)
98	UN agency	Office of the UN Special Envoy for Global Education	Justin W. van Fleet	Chief of Staff
99	UN agency	Special Envoy for Education	Gordon Brown	Special Envoy for Education
100	UN agency	UNDP Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) Office	Jennifer Topping	Executive Coordinator
101	UN agency	UNDP Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) Office	Henriette Keijzers	Deputy Executive Coordinator

S/N	Category	Agency/Organisation/ Country	Name	Designation
102	UN agency	UNDP Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) Office	Louise Moretta	Chief of Finance and Operations
103	UN agency	UNDP Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) Office	Olga Oleshina	Senior Portfolio Manager
	UN agency	UNDP Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) Office	Mari Matsumoto	Portfolio Manager
104	UN agency	UNDP Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) Office	Philippe Grandet	Portfolio Manager
105	UN agency	UNESCO, International Institute for Education Planning (IIEP)	Kerstin Holst	Chief, Desk for Education in Emergencies
106	UN agency	UNHCR	Carol Batchelor	Director, Division of International Protection
107	UN agency	UNHCR	Ita Sheehy	Senior Education Advisor
108	UN agency	UNICEF	Omar Abdi	Deputy Executive Director
109	UN agency	UNICEF	Jo Bourne	Associate Director education
110	UN agency	UNICEF	Ted Chaiban	Director of Programme Division
111	UN agency	UNICEF	Diane Kepler	Deputy Director, Financial Reporting and Grant Management
112	UN agency	UNICEF	Atif Rafique	On Education team and GPE Focal point
113	UN agency	UNICEF	Rekiya Adamu-Atta	Chief, Funds Support Office
114	UN agency	UNICEF Syria	Francesco Calcagno	Coordinator Whole of Syria
115	UN agency	UNOPS	William Axelsson	Head of UNOPS Representation to the European Union
116	UN agency	UNOPS	Nikolaj Gilbert	Partnerships Office
117	UN agency	UNOPS	Armen Harutyunyan	Portfolio Manager

Annex C ADR extracts on Phase 2 approach

The Assessment Design Report, as approved by ExCom in November 2017 (Mokoro, 2017) included the following undertakings and guidelines concerning Phase 2 of the hosting review.

121.[16] Our proposed approach will result in the consideration during Phase 2 of up to five broad options for a long-term host (not in any presumed order of likely preference):

- UNICEF;
- an alternative UN-centred configuration;
- GPE;
- a solution based on World Bank hosting in parallel to, rather than within, GPE; or
- a solution based on the model of a fiscal sponsor.

During its session on 1 November 2017, ExCom considered this proposed shortlist and decided that Phase 2 should focus on the first four options (i.e. not pursuing the fiscal sponsor option).

122. All of the options, in practice will have a range of alternative configurations (affecting for example the extent to which ECW is *at* rather than *in* GPE or UNICEF), and these design options may be crucial in mitigating the weaknesses and consolidating the strengths of each option. *We consider therefore that the Phase 2 task is first to consider the optimal configuration of each option, and then to compare the options against each other.*

123 As we noted [above] there are important time dimensions that should affect the consideration of ECW's future hosting. In the light of these factors, *an important part of Phase 2 work should be to consider:*

- Whether and for how long the present interim arrangements with UNICEF should continue, and how concerns about perceived COI should be addressed during this period.
- The time scale for any proposed transition to a permanent host.
- Bearing in mind the lessons of other hosting transitions, ways to minimise the risks of entrenching present arrangements in ways that might unhelpfully constrain future options.

Next steps and Phase 2 of the assessment

Approach to Phase 2

125 The central task for Phase 2 is to employ criteria explained in this ADR to explore and assess the short-listed options for ECW's long-term hosting. This will involve:

[16] Paragraph numbers are from the final ADR.

a) Interaction with the ECW secretariat in order to:

- Ensure that the review team has the fullest possible understanding of ECW's emerging strategic direction and of the various strategic options under consideration. We will draw on this information in developing alternative scenarios of hosting requirements as part of the Phase 2 assessment. (In particular we will model the suitability of alternative hosts against "base case" and "high case" scenarios, in terms of financial throughput and of ECW secretariat staffing levels.)
- Deepen our understanding of the current hosting arrangements with UNICEF. (This is especially relevant to the benchmarking of administrative hosting arrangements – see the approach to VFM analysis in [ADR Annex H] – and we will work rapidly with the secretariat to identify appropriate benchmarks for indicators of costs and of process efficiency.)
- Discuss the optimal configuration of each of the four short-listed alternatives. (We are confident that the Secretariat will assist professionally in helping to develop the optimal design/configuration for each of the short-listed alternatives, while leaving it to the Mokoro team to make an independent recommendation on the choice between the available alternatives.)

b) Interaction with short-listed potential hosts in order to:

- Inform them of the progress of the hosting review so far and of the hosting criteria endorsed by ExCom.
- Agree a timetable for information exchange and discussions between potential hosts and the review team (with the aim of completing all data collection not later than 22 December 2017).
- Discussions will involve:
    - Requests for detailed information to support the ability of each host to provide administrative and financial hosting for ECW.
    - Discussion of any identified constraints on a host's potential offering and the scope (and possible time-scale) for mitigating such constraints.
    - In the case of the "UN other" option, there will need to be discussion with all the potential UN agencies involved, and with the ECW secretariat, of how such an option might best draw on the comparative strengths of the different UN bodies potentially involved. In all cases, the review team will work with potential hosts to develop the strongest possible offer, in the light of agreed criteria, as a prelude to assessing the four alternative offers against each other.
    - Giving each potential host the opportunity to comment on the review team's summary of their potential hosting offer.

128 Given that multiple criteria decision making by definition relies on incorporation of preference information, combined with the fact that the preponderance of hosting criteria cannot easily be quantified, we expect that mathematical weighting of criteria will be of limited value, since it would inevitably be arbitrary – especially as different stakeholders may have different priorities. We will therefore set out the choices and trade-offs we have identified primarily in the form of a decision tree that shows, against the main criteria this ADR has identified, a hierarchy of decisions and the trade-offs that need to be addressed at each step. This approach will help in both stages of the Phase 2

exercise, i.e. (a) in developing the strongest possible design/configuration of each option and (b) in supporting a holistic comparison of alternative options against each other. ...

129 In describing the purpose and scope of the hosting review, the TOR require the final report to address some corollaries:

> .. assessment and documentation of *how* the various recommendations could be operationalized should be included – i.e. an indicative timeline and areas which should be taken into consideration for action and additional analysis. (TOR ¶16)

We expect that some of these corollaries may also have implications for optimising the hosting of ECW in the interim.

Annex D
Essential and desirable characteristics of a potential host for ECW

This annex reproduces the relevant summary table from the ADR (Table 8 in Mokoro, 2017).

Table 3 Necessary and "nice to have" host characteristics/services

Type of service	Comment
A. Strategic support for ECW Core Functions	
Governance *[Function 1: Inspire political commitment]*	**Necessary:** • Has the capacity and commitment to assist effectively in carrying out ECW transformational objective. • Support a sufficient degree of autonomy for ECW. • Sustain role and authority of a HLSG or equivalent (*i.e. must not be subsumed by host – unless otherwise decided by ECW*) **Nice:**
Fund raising *[Function 3: Raise significant additional funds]*	**Necessary:** • Consistency with support to effective ECW fund-raising. • Absence or effective mitigation of COI in resource mobilization **Nice:** • Support resource mobilization – ability to open doors, help ECW professionalize • Familiarity/engagement with humanitarian and development funding mechanisms • Relevant private sector relations • Expertise that can support innovative fundraising
Brand and identity *[Function 3: Raise significant additional funds]*	**Necessary:** • Facilitate (at minimum not resist) ECW developing its brand and identity *(i.e. not subsumed*) • Brand/identity/risks associated with host (e.g. reputational or funding) must not weaken ECW **Nice:** • Provide support of established brand (if COI not an issue)
Convening power, coherence and legitimacy *[Function 2: Unite actors for joint humanitarian/development planning and response]*	**Necessary:** • Ability to respect humanitarian principles • A framework for avoiding COI **Nice:** • Contributes to coherence in the education and humanitarian architecture (or at minimum a commitment to avoid unnecessary fragmentation) • In-country connections • Knowledge, connections, legitimacy in humanitarian space • Knowledge, connections, legitimacy in development space • Field presence in acute and protracted crisis settings (ideally with education-specific capacity, provided any COI is mitigated)

Type of service	Comment
Geographical reach *[Function 2: Unite actors for joint humanitarian/development planning and response]*	**Necessary:** • Ability for ECW to function in/access any crisis-affected country or context • Ability to support suitable location(s) for the ECW Secretariat's office(s) **Nice:** • In-country connections • Field presence in acute and protracted crisis settings
Partnership credentials *[Function 2 and 4: Unite actors for joint humanitarian/ development planning and response; Strengthen capacity]*	**Necessary:** • Demonstrated commitment to, and ability to support, collaborative inter-agency work **Nice:** • Strong relations within existing global architecture • Experience in leading education sector capacity development, ideally at global and national levels • Institutional commitment to the INEE Minimum Standards • Prior involvement in multi-partner advocacy initiatives
B. Grant management services	
Grant management (grant contracting and disbursement) *[Function 2 and 5: Disburse additional funding; Accountability (M&E systems)]*	**Necessary:** • Grant management system in place • Ability to support rapid and efficient disbursement to various partners down to local level • Ability to support rapid and transparent reporting on grant allocation and use **Nice:** • Grant management support (to supplement ECW resources) • Knowledge of innovative disbursement mechanisms • Knowledge of innovative financing
Transparency, oversight, audit *[Function 5: Accountability, M&E systems]*	**Necessary:** • Ability to support rapid and transparent reporting on grant allocation and use • Openness and willingness to foster knowledge management and share good practice and lessons learned • Commitment to accountability to affected populations • Mitigation of any perceived COI related to assessments of its own programmes **Nice:** • Experience of robust evidence and research generation
C. Specific Technical Expertise	
Expertise in education (including EiE)	**Necessary:** • Appreciation of the importance of EiE **Nice:** • Ability to support efforts to raise profile of EiE in humanitarian responses • Technical experience of EiE

Type of service	Comment
Expertise in humanitarian response	**Necessary:** • Basic understanding of humanitarian response and commitment to the humanitarian principles **Nice:** • Active in humanitarian sector • Technical expertise in humanitarian issues
D. Administrative Services	

HR services	**Necessary:**
	• Full HR back office service for
	  ○ recruitment
	  ○ retention
	  ○ employee services
	• Ability to ring-fence from host's own HR management
	• Ability to offer appropriate terms for regular and short-term personnel
	Nice:
	• Flexible and speedy hiring (and if necessary dismissal)of ECW personnel

Office space, IT services etc.	**Necessary:** • Full ECW-tailored turn-key back office procurement rules/processes • Adequate office space • Fit for purpose IT systems • Ability to scale as ECW grows **Nice:** • Access to temporary space in Geneva and on location
Travel (including security)	**Necessary:** • Booking travel • Security, especially in crisis/conflict zones • In-country logistical support **Nice:** • Immunities
Financial and accounting services	**Necessary:** • Systems meet standards acceptable to major funders • Separate transparent accounting/budgeting for ECW • Separate asset management **Nice:**
Legal Services	**Necessary:** • Accommodate ECW as a separate legal entity (unless otherwise indicated by ECW) • Spectrum of legal services, covering corporate (donors, staff, facilities), and grant-facing, including ability to fund a range of recipient entities. **Nice:**

Type of service	Comment
E. Other	

Conflicts of interest	**Necessary:**
	• Clear firewalls in place to ensure ECW's autonomy and identity (unless decided that it should be subsumed by another existing system)
	• Transparent mitigation of any potential COI in relation to:
	  ○ fund raising
	  ○ grant allocation
	  ○ accountability for grant utilisation
	Nice:
	• Absence of substantial COI

Previous hosting experience	**Necessary:** • Clear understanding of requirements of ECW • Capacity and robust financial, HR, etc. systems in place **Nice:** • Track record of successful hosting of partnerships and funds (especially partnerships not fully embedded within the host's systems)

Annex E Initial hosting by UNICEF

Introduction

1. On establishment of ECW, UNICEF was selected as the initial host for a period of incubation.[17] This would allow interim governance and operational arrangements to be established, importantly including the making of initial investments. UNICEF's selection took account of the organisation's global reach, extensive involvement in EiE and other humanitarian work, the strong support of its Executive Director for the ECW initiative, and a strategic choice to ensure strong links to existing UN humanitarian architecture.[18]

2. The present hosting arrangements, described below, are naturally a benchmark against which alternative hosts may be compared.

3. Services provided are in line with a "UNICEF Hosting Statement" dated 27 June 2016 (UNICEF, 2016c), and cover both (a) acting as Funds Custodian and Administrator (FCA) for the ECW Fund, and (b) providing " administrative and operational support to the Fund's governance structure through a Secretariat, which would be a unit in UNICEF operating independently of other UNICEF units and offices."

Services provided

4. The practical services provided by UNICEF include:

a) Human Resources: UNICEF provides all services related to recruitment, contracting and remuneration of staff and consultants. This extends to access to performance management systems, training and development and compliance with relevant laws and regulations. However, UNICEF does not have sole discretion over recruitment. The appointment of the ECW Director takes account of the recommendation of the HLSG chair, and the Director recommends appointments of other Secretariat staff.

   UNICEF has also made provision for secondments to the ECW Secretariat (which currently has secondees from UK DFID, France and UNHCR).

   The HLSG/ExCom has a role in approving creation of ECW Secretariat posts to the extent consistent with UNICEF rules and regulations. ECW Secretariat staff management and performance oversight is the responsibility of the ECW Director. The Director substantively reports to the Chair of the HLSG with an administrative reporting line to UNICEF's Director of Programmes.

b) Physical facilities and logistic support: ECW is housed within a building separate from the main UNICEF New York premises. ECW has been provided with co-located desks/work stations, access to meeting space and necessary IT/phone infrastructure and technical support. All ECW staff currently use @unicef.org email addresses. A website has been established and @educationcannotwait.org generic addresses are noted there.

[17] The initial hosting arrangement was seen as covering a 'start-up phase' of 1-2 years in ODI's draft proposal in mid-February 2016 (see the roadmap described in ODI, 2016a), but the Evidence Paper dated May 2016 refers to an incubation period of "ideally up to five years" (Box 17 in ODI, 2016b).

[18] Based on interviews with key players.

c) Stewardship of funds: UNICEF acts as funds custodian for ECW. This is similar to the trustee role that the World Bank provides to, for example, Gavi and the Global Fund. Funds received from donors related to ECW are segregated and disbursements are made based on decisions by ECW. UNICEF also administers the contribution agreements with donors. To support this function, UNICEF has established a Funds Support Office (FSO) which serves both ECW and the new Global Partnership to End Violence Against Children – http://www.end-violence.org/ (whose offices are next to ECW's).

d) Travel and security: Support for arranging travel, visas and security. Relevantly, this includes provision of adequate security in countries affected by crisis. As staff on UNICEF contracts, staff in the ECW Secretariat will be included on the UN Country Team Security Plan during any in-country visits.

e) Legal Support: ECW secretariat does not have its own legal representation. UNICEF provides access to legal services covering advice on agreements and contracts with donors, grant recipients and other partners. Support is also provided for vetting of grant recipients in crisis-affected countries[19] (for more details on UNICEF's approach to grant management, see Table 5 in Annex H).

f) Procurement: Contracting of services generally for ECW Secretariat.

Charges for services

5. The basis on which UNICEF charges for its various services to ECW, and the relevant rates applied are fully described in Annex G (alongside the charging structures of other potential hosts).

Additional services offered but not taken up

6. In addition to the host services offered for the charges described in Annex G, UNICEF's original hosting proposal also offered to make a range of other additional services available to ECW. The proposal stated that UNICEF could:

- Monitor progress and deliverables at output level against programme results frameworks.
- Review programmatic results, redesign programmatic frameworks as necessary to achieve results, and engage with Fund grantee(s) in appropriate follow-up to reports and build real-time lessons learning capacity.
- Deploy programme evaluation staff to review implementation against the approved proposal and results framework.
- Support creation of a sound control environment by grantees.

7. This support would come within UNICEF's programmatic work, with UNICEF fully accountable for funding and results of the specific interventions involved (but not with regard to programme results achieved by grantees). The funding for this support would be disbursed from the Fund and be received by UNICEF as "Other Resources". Associated accountabilities and costs would be applied, and a Cost Recovery charge of 8% would be applied to the funding for these interventions, separate from the 1% applied with regard to the Fund itself.

[19] By contracting a private-sector firm that has a Long Term Agreement with UNICEF.

8. To date, ECW has not availed itself of these additional services from UNICEF. Box 2 below[20] explains UNICEF's standard procedures for screening potential CSO partners.

Box 2. How UNICEF screens CSO partners

Before partnering with a CSO, a due diligence process must be conducted to identify potential risks. UNICEF identifies these risks by assessing them with respect to their:

- Core values screening for CSO (international and national CSOs) – valid for 5 years
- Financial management capacity assessment i.e. HACT micro assessment – valid for 5 years

Core values screening: Before partnering with a CSO, a due diligence process must be conducted to identify potential risks. UNICEF identifies these risks by assessing them with respect to their core values and integrity - to ensure alignment with UNICEF's core values as contained in the CRC, CEDAW and CRPD,[21] and accountability. All civil society organizations must be assessed with respect to core values and integrity prior to launching a partnership with any UNICEF Headquarter Division, Regional or Country Office.

Financial management capacity: UNICEF also requires all CSOs receiving more than $100,000 per year to undergo a financial management capacity assessment. The assessment is valid for 5 years and assesses key internal controls in 7 areas, resulting in an overall risk rating of the CSO and risk rating for each risk area.

UNICEF's assessment of the financial management capacity of the implementing partners include 96 questions regarding internal controls at the entity in the following categories:

- Programme management
- Organizational structure and Staffing
- Accounting Policies and Procedures
- Fixed Assets and Inventory
- Financial Reporting and Monitoring
- Procurement and Contract Management

Managing conflicts of interest

9. An additional important element in the existing host arrangement is managing actual and perceived conflicts of interest. This arises especially since UNICEF will, at times, be an implementer of programmes funded by ECW. Actual conflicts are managed through "firewalls" ensuring that UNICEF, through recusing itself, does not take part in decisions where it may receive funding. Box 3 below reproduces the Hosting Statement's undertakings on conflict of interest.

[20] Details provided by UNICEF to supplement the information included in the draft of this report.

[21] CRC = Convention on the Rights of the Child, CEDAW = Convention to Eliminate Discrimination Against Women, and CRPD = Convention on Rights of People with Disabilities.

Box 3. UNICEF's approach to Conflict of Interest

Extract from **UNICEF Hosting Statement, 27 June 2016** (UNICEF, 2016c**)**

Managing conflicts of interest

UNICEF's comparative advantage as a UN agency working on child rights and education in emergencies could be seen as leading to real or perceived conflicts of interests. The Secretariat's review of proposals for Fund financing would be carried out by the Secretariat independently of UNICEF.* Any UNICEF representative on the High Level Steering Group would be recused from discussions and decisions when a grant to UNICEF was being considered. In order to further mitigate conflict of interests, and building on the organization's experience of hosting Fund secretariats, UNICEF would implement appropriate firewalls. These include: (i) The head of the Secretariat would report to the High Level Steering Group with regard to implementation of the Secretariat's work plans and would not have reporting lines to those parts of UNICEF which may seek to be a recipient of disbursements from the Fund (institutional firewall); (ii) UNICEF as Funds Custodian and Administrator would disburse funds only on order of the High Level Steering Group (financial firewall) (except with regard to fees and costs and the Secretariat budgets).

* Subject to agreement, the High Level Steering Group could benefit from UNICEF's staff expertise in the field of education in emergencies and the Secretariat could call on the diverse range of technical experts that will be required to hone programmatic areas of focus for the Fund's financial support and make decisions in the start-up period. This could include expert review of proposals (on the understanding that UNICEF staff would recuse themselves if UNICEF applications for funding are being assessed).

10. UNICEF's submission to the hosting review included the assurances on conflict of interest reproduced in Box 4 below.

Box 4. UNICEF submission on COI

Hosting criterion	UNICEF response
Clear firewalls in place to ensure ECW's autonomy and identity	UNICEF has established firewalls between its operations and those of the ECW Secretariat as part of UNICEF's interim hosting arrangements and these have satisfactorily mitigated the potential conflict of interest between staff on both sides of the firewall. We would expect these arrangements to continue, and be similarly effective, in a steady state hosting situation.
Transparent mitigation of any potential COI in relation to: ○ fund raising	Donors who wish to contribute to ECW contact the ECW Secretariat directly and not through UNICEF. UNICEF has helped to follow-up with donors because of well-established relationships. UNICEF has been clear that its fundraising assets are not available to raise funds for ECW in competition with UNICEF, thus avoiding potential conflicts of interest. UNICEF continues to mobilize funds for its own education programmes in emergencies.

Hosting criterion	UNICEF response
○ grant allocation	Grant proposals originating at the country level are developed through a collaborative process involving multiple actors and stakeholders, thus protecting against any actual or perceived conflict of interest associated with a proposal designating UNICEF as grantee. The ECW Secretariat's review of proposals for Fund financing is carried out by the ECW Secretariat independently of UNICEF. Any UNICEF representative on the HLSG/ExCom would recuse themselves from discussions and decisions when a grant to UNICEF was being considered. The HLSG/ExComm/ECW Secretariat has the authority and responsibility to provide instructions to UNICEF as Funds Custodian and Administrator in regard to making disbursements from the Fund and to determine the amount of any disbursement. UNICEF as Funds Custodian and Administrator would disburse funds only on order of ECW's governing entity (financial firewall) (except with regard to fees and costs and the ECW Secretariat budgets). Note: The ECW Secretariat does not have delegated authority from the HLSG to approve grants to UNICEF.
○ accountability for grant utilisation	Accountability for Grant Utilization: sits with the grantee. The Director, ECW reports to the HLSG with regard to implementation of the ECW Secretariat's work plans and does not have reporting lines to those parts of UNICEF which may seek to be, or are, a recipient of disbursements from the Fund (institutional firewall).

Annex F Review findings against hosting criteria

Introduction

1. We expect that the HLSG's final decisions on hosting for ECW will be based on a judgement as to which hosting alternative will best contribute to maximising the impact of ECW. Such a judgement could draw on the following meta-criteria:

a) Which hosting alternative is most likely to help in maximising the funding raised to support education in emergencies and protracted crises?

b) Which hosting alternative is most likely to help in ensuring the most effective use of additional resources for education in emergencies and protracted crises?

c) Which hosting alternative will best support the other core functions of ECW, including transformation of how education is prioritised, resourced, planned and programmed during emergencies, protracted crises and into development?

2. The ADR (Mokoro, 2017) developed a taxonomy of the characteristics/services that may be sought from a host, and used this taxonomy to propose which characteristics of a host may be considered essential ("need to have") and which additional characteristics may be desirable ("nice to have"). The resulting table, as approved by ExCom, is reproduced in Annex D above, and provides the framework for the present annex (the shaded boxes under each heading are reproduced from the Annex D table).

3. During Phase 1 of this review, these criteria were used to conduct a first screening of the long-list of potential hosts, and to narrow the choices down to the short-list approved for detailed review during Phase 2.

4. During Phase 2, the same criteria have been employed in a much more detailed assessment of the organisations still under consideration. The criteria were an important guide for further interviews, and the potential hosts' written submissions to the review team were, in effect, a self-assessment against these criteria. In the course of the exercise, the review team not only learned more about the potential hosts, but also gained a deeper understanding of some underlying issues which have implications simultaneously for hosting and for ECW strategy per se. Such implications are noted in this annex.

5. Accordingly, the annex runs through the criteria at main heading level and comments on:

- the significance of each main criterion;
- the extent to which it discriminates between candidates, and what the differences are;
- implications for the choice of host; and
- other implications for ECW.

6. Comparison of hosts' financial costs is undertaken separately, see Annex G below.

Interpreting the criteria

7. It should be borne in mind that:

a) The criteria are not formally weighted, not least because several have ambiguous interpretations (see for example the discussion of conflict of interest at ¶67ff below).

b) There is an element of strategic flexibility (highlighted in the ADR, and summarised in Box 1 of this report) from the fact that many services can be provided in various ways – by a host, by the ECW secretariat directly, by drawing on the partnership in other ways, or by outsourcing. This does not mean that all ways of doing things are equally good, but there is a complex variety of hosting configurations to choose from, and choice is heavily dependent on a view as to ECW's optimal strategy. Again a mathematical weighting of criteria could not capture this flexibility.

c) According to their perceptions of ECW strategy and priorities, different ECW stakeholders may assess hosts differently against a particular criterion. As an independent review team, we can note alternative assessments, but we cannot "objectively" impose a "correct" judgement.

d) Some criteria may be very important in themselves but fail to discriminate among the short-listed hosts (all can satisfy them). Some such criteria were nevertheless instrumental in excluding other candidates from the short-list.

e) The evaluation team's assessments are based on the information provided by hosts as to the terms which would be likely to apply. However, there may be scope for negotiation to obtain more advantageous terms for ECW before a host is finally selected.

f) Unlike the other organisations reviewed, the World Bank was not actively seeking to play a direct role in hosting ECW.

A. Strategic support for ECW core functions

Governance

Governance *[Function 1: Inspire political commitment]*	**Necessary:** • Has the capacity and commitment to assist effectively in carrying out ECW's transformational objective • Support a sufficient degree of autonomy for ECW • Sustain role and authority of a HLSG or equivalent

Significance of the criterion

8. ECW was launched on the basis that a new and distinct initiative was required to transform approaches to, and levels of funding for, education in emergencies. It therefore requires a degree of autonomy on two levels: its strategic governance by the HLSG, and the operational implementation of its strategy by a secretariat led by a Director who is substantially accountable to the HLSG.

Differences between potential hosts

9. All potential hosts envisaged that the independent role of the HLSG could continue, but there were some nuances:

a) The World Bank is not actively seeking to host ECW. The WB submission assumed that ECW would operate as a Financial Intermediary Fund (FIF), and under current arrangements WB-hosted FIFs can have a substantial degree of autonomy. However, a review of WB trust fund policy and practice is under way, with a new policy likely to emerge in the first half of 2018. There is a significant possibility that in future the WB will be more prescriptive about the FIFs it supports, e.g. in terms of their alignment with WB strategy and interests, and in terms of

coherence among different FIFs it hosts.[22] (For example, the WB might want to take its own view of the coherence among education–oriented initiatives, such as the GPE, IFFEd and ECW.) It is therefore not certain that direct WB hosting for ECW, if available, would satisfy HLSG criteria for autonomy of governance.

b) GPE is itself hosted by the WB, although it is reviewing the case for decoupling from the WB.[23] There are a number of implications:

- While GPE remains hosted by the WB, the WB would be closely involved in determining the terms of GPE's hosting of ECW; the WB itself would become the trustee of ECW funds. The parameters for such hosting would be directly affected by any WB policy changes arising out of the ongoing trust fund review already referred to.
- Decoupling of GPE from the WB, if pursued, could affect GPE itself in many ways (including its physical location), and it is difficult at this point to know precisely what options for governance arrangements and other dimensions of hosting would be available to ECW.
- GPE suggested to us that the case for moving hosting of ECW to GPE depends on the exploitation of synergies between the two funds.[24] Thus, although HLSG authority could be fully retained, it would be important to clarify decision-making authority between ECW governing bodies and those of GPE, to ensure that there were no overlapping mandates that could cause confusion. GPE also noted that greater integration (if desired) would mean efficiency in terms of costs and level of effort of governing body members, given that many of the same actors are actively engaged in the governance of the two Funds.

c) Both UNOPS and MPTFO envisaged no difficulty in providing the HLSG with the same degree of authority it currently enjoys under UNICEF hosting (as described in Annex E).

d) UNICEF could continue the ECW's present degree of autonomy in governance, leaving decision-making to ECW's HLSG.

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[22] The WB's submission noted: "The WB is currently working on an ambitious trust fund reform agenda to further strengthen the link between trust funds and the WB's strategic priorities, improve corporate oversight, and increase efficiencies, with the objective to start implementation at the beginning of the WB's fiscal year 2019."

[23] The following decision was made at the December 2017 Board meeting:

> **BOD/2017/12-17—Institutional Arrangements:** The Board of Directors requests the Secretariat in consultation with the World Bank to prepare a paper for the Board's consideration by June 2018 presenting an analysis of options for any required changes to GPE's institutional arrangements deriving from the GPE's evolving mandate, strategy, and business needs. The paper should consider the implications of the outcome of the GPE financing conference, potential human resource requirements for GPE over the 2018-2020 period, the ongoing World Bank Trust Fund reform process, progress on currency hedging solutions, and the latest information on ECW hosting. (GPE, 2017h)

This is elucidated by the following informal note of the discussions circulated to one of the GPE constituencies:

> **Institutional Arrangements:** A discussion in a similar vein as the HR plan, with continued issues mounting that GPE has really outgrown the WB and increasing number of reasons that it needs to "divorce" (a word used by one Board member) with the WB. In June, the Secretariat in consultation with the WB is to deliver to the Board more analysis on implications of de-hosting and, at the Board's request, more specifically options for GPE on how to do that.

[24] GPE's submission noted: "from a GPE perspective there are opportunities to achieve greater synergies and economies of scale through a more integrated approach to hosting. However, GPE wants a successful ECW and therefore if a more segregated approach is preferred by ECW, then this can of course be facilitated."

10. As regards operational autonomy of ECW:

a) In all cases, ECW would be somewhat constrained by the institutional parameters of the host (e.g. its recruitment procedures, and other over-riding regulations). For example, MPTFO noted that under its legal framework, all funds transfers would have to be signed off by a UN member of the governance structure.

b) GPE has stated that it could, in principle, allow complete autonomy for ECW. But in practice the logic of GPE hosting would imply sharing of services and of certain personnel in order to maximise synergy and realise potential economies of scale and scope. Details would need to be worked out during a transition period. Moreover, for as long as GPE is hosted by the WB, ECW would not have complete autonomy, but would be subject to the same terms as GPE in its host arrangement with the World Bank.[25]

c) Although UNOPS hosts a variety of entities each with separate mandates and governance arrangements, UNOPS' approach to hosting appears less detached than the other hosts'. There is an expectation that UNOPS should have a direct role in overseeing and guiding the performance of the entities it hosts, including such matters as the contractual status of their employees. This is particularly clear in UNOPS' approach to grant management, which is reviewed in detail in Annex H below.

Implications for the choice of host

11. In the review team's judgement, all the hosts considered could potentially allow sufficient autonomy at governance and operational levels. However:

a) In practice there would be somewhat less operational autonomy under UNOPS hosting.

b) The parameters of hosting by GPE and/or by the WB are likely to be affected by the imminent review of WB trust fund policy, and therefore cannot be known with the same level of certainty as for other hosts.

c) GPE hosting parameters will also be affected by whether it remains hosted by the WB or seeks full autonomy. In either case, GPE hosting would imply some streamlining of GPE and ECW governance arrangements, and some degree of operational integration. Arrangements to maximise synergy between the two agencies could range from a simple but comprehensive division of labour and agreement on areas and modalities of collaboration, to a more thoroughgoing merger of staff and sharing of common functions, in which the ECW funds would be distinct windows within a common overall offering.

[25] This point was highlighted by the World Bank in its comments on the draft of this report.

Fund raising

Fund raising *[Function 3: Raise significant additional funds]*	**Necessary:** • Consistency with support to effective ECW fundraising • Absence or effective mitigation of COI in resource mobilization **Nice:** • Support resource mobilization – ability to open doors, help ECW professionalize • Familiarity/engagement with humanitarian and development funding mechanisms • Relevant private sector relations • Expertise that can support innovative fundraising

Significance of the criterion

12. Raising large amounts of funding to support EiE is a principal raison d'être for ECW. ECW does not expect to bridge the identified funding gap entirely with its own funds: part of the aim is to catalyse other external funding and to promote more national funding of EiE. Nevertheless, the direct funding targets for ECW (as evidenced by its emerging strategy documents) are very ambitious (and this is, accordingly, reflected in the scenarios we have used for comparing the financial costs of different hosts – see Annex G). Under this criterion, a host should at least facilitate and not obstruct ECW fundraising, and at best provide significant substantive support to ECW's fundraising efforts.

Differences between potential hosts

13. The organisations under consideration include two that are not large-scale fund raisers (MPTFO and UNOPS), and three that are (UNICEF, WB and GPE). There has been a tacit assumption (reflected in the original documentation around ECW's emergence and in a number of our stakeholder interviews), that ECW would benefit directly from being hosted by a major fundraiser, and that this factor should be given substantial weight in the choice of host. However, there was also acknowledgement of the potential conflict of interest when ECW and the host may in practice be competing for the same funds.

14. The submissions we received have led us to question the scale of the advantages conferred by being hosted by a major fundraiser. UNICEF stated unambiguously:

> "Resource mobilization is the exclusive responsibility of ECW's governance mechanisms, supported by the ECW Secretariat. To avoid even the appearance of a conflict of interest, UNICEF fundraising assets, including UNICEF National Committees, are devoted exclusively to mobilizing financial resources for UNICEF's own programmes."

15. The WB similarly acknowledged that it has to prioritise raising funds for its own use, and its submission indicated that it may in future allow less fundraising autonomy to the FIFs it hosts:

> "During the period 2013-2017, the WB undertook reforms that strengthened the oversight and strategic alignment of trust funds by improving clarity around engagement in new FIFs. These measures included early disclosure and transparency with respect to resource mobilization, in order to facilitate better cross-institutional coordination and decision making around fundraising."

16. GPE expected that its own experience of fundraising, including the organisation of major fundraising campaigns, could be of use to ECW, but also noted that ECW's expectations in this field would need to be carefully defined.

17. Conversely, MPTFO and UNOPS both highlighted their lack of any conflict of interest with ECW in the raising of funds. Both noted that they have ongoing agreements in place with many major donors and their reporting systems support good donor relations. Neither MPTFO nor UNOPS offers fundraising capacity to their hosted entities as part of their default service offering.

Implications for the choice of host

18. In the review team's judgement:

a) The "support to fundraising" criterion is not a strong reason for choosing either UNICEF or the WB as host. Although both have undoubted fundraising expertise, neither would take responsibility for managing the major fundraising effort ECW requires, and both acknowledged the conflict of interest that would be involved in such efforts. It is nevertheless important to seek UNICEF's continued strong general advocacy for ECW.

b) The lack of sophisticated fundraising expertise of MPTFO and UNOPS is accordingly less of a disadvantage than it might at first appear.

c) Moving to hosting by GPE would imply a decision to maximise perceived synergies between the two organisations, and their respective fundraising efforts would need to be closely coordinated, if not merged. ExCom and HLSG would need to consider the implications for ECW's separate "brand" and its ability to maximise fundraising. Closer alignment of GPE and ECW fundraising efforts would be a corollary of a decision taken primarily on the basis of other criteria, rather than a prime motivation in itself. (Indeed, a degree of alignment is desirable irrespective of hosting arrangements.)

Other implications

19. Given the importance of fundraising in ECW's strategy, the ECW secretariat must be staffed to provide adequate support in fundraising to the HLSG. ECW's partnership relations may enable it to draw expert advice from partners such as the WB and UNICEF, and it may benefit from other developments in the international architecture for education financing, such as IFFEd, but ECW must expect to shoulder the main responsibility for meeting its ambitious fundraising objectives.

Brand and identity

Brand and identity *[Function 3: Raise significant additional funds]*	**Necessary:** • Facilitate (at minimum not resist) ECW developing its brand and identity *(i.e. not subsumed*) • Brand/identity/risks associated with host (e.g. reputational or funding) must not weaken ECW **Nice:** • Provide support of established brand (if COI not an issue)

Significance of the criterion

20. ECW was established on the premise that a new and distinctive initiative was needed, in order to give EiE the prominence it merits, and to transform approaches to, and levels of funding for, EiE. Its distinctive brand and identity are an essential element of ECW's strategy.

Differences between potential hosts

21. All the short-listed hosts are organisations of international repute. There is no obvious reputational risk to ECW in being associated with any of them. Host-specific observations concerning ECW's separate identity:

a) As with fundraising, the UNICEF submission implies that – in order to manage conflicts of interest – it will neither hinder nor contribute directly to ECW's branding. However, while

clearly a separate fund, ECW has in practice made deliberate use of its links to UNICEF – e.g. the Secretariat have chosen to keep UNICEF email addresses, because of the UNICEF "brand recognition" this brings. UNICEF, however, recognises the importance of the separate brand and identity of ECW. In discussions with the hosting review team, UNICEF observed that mixed messaging may not be desirable and noted that providing distinct ECW addresses would not be a problem.

b) GPE noted that:

"The ECW brand is critical for its success, and GPE would in no way seek to limit the development of it, but would make best efforts to promote it in any way possible."[26]

c) Because they have no sector specialism, both UNOPS and MPTFO see their own reputations with donors and others as entirely complementary to the ECW identity. By the same token though, neither has an education sector brand that might reinforce ECW's.

d) The WB was more guarded:

" In addition to its own core operations—featuring its distinct brand identity—the WB historically has managed many donor-supported partnership and product sub-brands for the entities it hosts. It should be noted, however, that the WB's ongoing Trust Fund Review exercise is examining the practice of WB-hosted FIF bodies establishing their own, independent brand identities. The results of this review—anticipated for release in early 2018—could have an impact in the area of brand identity for any new WB-hosted FIF."

Implications for the choice of host

22. In the review team's judgement, it is uncertain, pending the results of its Trust Fund Review, whether the WB would satisfy this criterion. Moreover, if World Bank policy in this area shifts, it is unclear how GPE would be able to meet ECW's expectation in this regard.[27] However, the other potential hosts would satisfy this criterion.

Other implications

23. We provide a further discussion of ECW's identification with UNICEF under the conflict of interest heading (see ¶68ff below).

[26] However the WB comments on the draft of this report noted:

"Although GPE has its own logo and Secretariat staff have GPE email addresses, there is no guarantee this would extend to a separate identity for ECW, in particular in light of the TF Review Exercise."

[27] This sentence reflects WB comments on the draft report.

Convening power, coherence and legitimacy

Convening power, coherence and legitimacy *[Function 2: Unite actors for joint humanitarian/development planning and response]*	**Necessary:** • Ability to respect humanitarian principles • A framework for avoiding COI **Nice:** • Contributes to coherence in the education and humanitarian architecture (or at minimum a commitment to avoid unnecessary fragmentation) • In-country connections • Knowledge, connections, legitimacy in humanitarian space • Knowledge, connections, legitimacy in development space • Field presence in acute and protracted crisis settings (ideally with education-specific capacity, provided any COI is mitigated)

Significance of the criterion

24. In order to fulfil its second core function, ECW needs to bring together key development and humanitarian stakeholders. This requires both legitimacy (other actors recognise that the role ECW aspires to is appropriate) and convening power (enough influence to mobilise other actors). Both legitimacy and convening power for ECW may be correlated with these attributes of the host. The coherence issue turns on whether ECW positively complements existing initiatives and enhances the overall aid architecture for education, or whether it has a negative effect through unnecessary duplication and fragmentation of efforts. ECW's location vis-à-vis other significant agencies and initiatives may be expected to influence its contribution to overall coherence. We gather our observations about conflict of interest under a separate conflict of interest heading (see ¶68ff below).

Differences between potential hosts

25. As regards legitimacy, all the short-listed hosts are established actors within the UN system and official aid architecture. (Some other long-list options – e.g. private sector hosting – were severely disadvantaged by doubts about their legitimacy.) All respect the humanitarian principles.

26. There are more obvious differences amongst them when it comes to convening power. MPTFO and UNOPS offer a hosting platform, but are not themselves actors in the international arena in the sense that the other short-listed hosts are. The WB and UNICEF stand out as the best-known and potentially the most influential of the short-listed hosts. How much ECW should rely on the convening power of a host is a slightly separate issue. The overall convening power of the HLSG – which includes both UNICEF and GPE – appears to be a key design feature of ECW, and suggests that ECW does not have to be hosted by an entity in order to benefit from its support and influence.

27. Country-level convening power is also a consideration, and may be related to agencies' roles in the humanitarian and development architecture at country level. UNICEF, in addition to its extensive country presence, co-leads the Education Cluster (it also leads on WASH, nutrition and child protection) and is often active in Local Education Groups (LEGs). GPE does not have country presence but is systematically engaged with LEGs. The World Bank has strong country-level convening power, but is not a prime mover in the humanitarian sphere. MPTFO and UNOPS are service providers whose role is to support rather than initiate.

28. The "nice" sub-criterion "Contributes to coherence in the education and humanitarian architecture (or at minimum a commitment to avoid unnecessary fragmentation)" is the most contentious to interpret. The creation of ECW reflects a strategic judgement that a new entity was

needed if past systemic failures were to be successfully addressed, and the need to bridge the humanitarian–development gap is also axiomatic for ECW. The review team found a polarity of views between some stakeholders who considered it almost self-evident that, as an education fund, ECW should be co-located with GPE, and others who saw ECW's connection to the humanitarian architecture as the essential entry point for strengthening humanitarian–development linkages. The choice of UNICEF as the initial host reflects the latter view, as does ECW's draft strategy.[28] UNICEF also scores strongly against the other "nice" sub-criteria in this category.

Implications for the choice of host

29. The review team does not share the view that respect for the principles of aid effectiveness necessitates a full integration of ECW with what previously existed, in either the development space or the humanitarian space. ECW is premised on a need to be (positively) disruptive. Coherence does however require that ECW should fully coordinate with and complement other parts of the aid architecture, notably the LEGs and the IASC Education Clusters. There is a danger that a preoccupation with ECW's location becomes a distraction from ensuring operational coherence (*Are you in the right place?* gets in the way of *Are you doing the right things?*).

30. Moreover, hosting by UNICEF – a dual mandate organisation – does facilitate ECW's articulation with the humanitarian and development architecture, and this has been an important factor in helping ECW to establish itself during the incubation period.

Other implications

31. As we elaborate in the main text, we consider that the draft strategy thus far does not pay enough attention to ECW's articulation with the pre-existing structures of country-level Education Clusters and LEGs. This is an immediate issue for the strategy to address, and not only a consideration for the long-term hosting of ECW.

Geographical Reach

Geographical reach *[Function 2: Unite actors for joint humanitarian/development planning and response]*	**Necessary:** • Ability for ECW to function in/access any crisis-affected country or context • Ability to support suitable location(s) for the ECW Secretariat's office(s) **Nice:** • In-country connections • Field presence in acute and protracted crisis settings

Significance of the criterion

32. ECW has a global remit, and therefore needs to be able to access any crisis-affected country or context, and can benefit from in-country support if available.

Differences between potential hosts

33. All the short-listed hosts operate world-wide, and provide staff with UN passports, but there are differences in their footprints. UNICEF has the most extensive field presence in crisis situations,

[28] Although as we note elsewhere, the early drafts of the strategy shared with the review team do not pay enough attention to the humanitarian–development gap and the role of clusters, LEGs and GPE.

whereas GPE, which is not an implementer, does not have its own field presence but currently receives in-country facilitation and support from the World Bank. MPTFO is administratively part of UNDP, and could thus offer the wide geographic presence of one of the largest UN agencies. UNOPS has a smaller footprint but has experience in rapidly starting up operations in crisis contexts.

34. There are no immediate plans to set up sub-offices of the ECW Secretariat, or to move its main location away from New York, but Geneva has been mentioned as a location where ECW might need a future presence, in view of its role as a hub for humanitarian agencies. MPTFO is New York based. GPE is currently in Washington DC but its location could change if it were to decouple from the World Bank. Geneva is the default location for UNOPS-hosted entities, although UNOPS is able to provide hosting also in other locations. Other short-listed hosts could also provide support to a Geneva office for ECW, or for other locations, if, in the long run, an alternative location for ECW HQ were to be sought.

Implications for the choice of host

35. UNICEF has the most extensive in-country connections and the most experience of operating in crisis contexts. In the review team's judgement, rapid and efficient access to areas of humanitarian crisis is a fundamental requirement for ECW – a factor which reinforced the case for UNICEF as the initial incubator for ECW. However, dependence on UNICEF for access carries risks of perceptions of conflict of interest which need mitigation (see ¶68ff below). Other hosts could also provide a framework for ECW access (including UN status and security cover), and ECW should be able to elicit in-country support from all key partners, not only its host.

Other implications

36. ECW will need to ensure, whichever the host, that any facilitation offered to assist ECW staff to reach crisis affected areas is done in a way that does not bias or limit the partnerships ECW seeks to foster at country and local levels.

Partnership credentials

Partnership credentials *[Function 2 and 4: Unite actors for joint humanitarian/development planning and response; Strengthen capacity]*	**Necessary:** • Demonstrated commitment to, and ability to support, collaborative inter-agency work **Nice:** • Strong relations within existing global architecture • Experience in leading education sector capacity development, ideally at global and national levels • Institutional commitment to the INEE Minimum Standards • Prior involvement in multi-partner advocacy initiatives

Significance of the criterion

37. ECW is an initiative which simultaneously seeks to draw on and to galvanise its partners. Its hosting should at least allow, and ideally reinforce, such inter-agency working.

Differences between potential hosts

38. All the short-listed hosts have credible partnership credentials, but there are significant differences in what they offer. UNOPS already hosts a number of partnership-oriented initiatives, while the MPTFO, as its name implies, is oriented towards facilitating partnerships. However, neither

is itself a player in the global humanitarian and/or education architecture, whereas UNICEF, GPE and the WB all are. These three all subscribe to the INEE Minimum Standards and have an active institutional commitment to inter-agency work in support of education in emergencies. GPE and UNICEF both focus on education sector capacity development, but UNICEF's humanitarian engagement is much greater.

Implications for the choice of host

39. In the judgement of the review team, all the short-listed hosts can satisfy this criterion. GPE and UNICEF are the most directly experienced in education partnerships, with UNICEF's track record much stronger in humanitarian contexts. The WB is not actively seeking to become the direct host of ECW, and would probably be a more detached host than either UNICEF or GPE. Both GPE and UNICEF are committed to continued advocacy and support for ECW whether or not they are selected as long-term host. Selecting either carries risks in relation to conflict of interest perceptions that would need to be systematically addressed.

Other implications

40. The underlying issue is not so much whether a host can effectively partner, but how well ECW itself can manage partnerships.

B. Grant Management Services

Grant management

Grant management (grant contracting and disbursement) *[Function 2 and 5: Disburse additional funding; Accountability (M&E systems)]*	**Necessary:** • Grant management system in place • Ability to support rapid and efficient disbursement to various partners down to local level • Ability to support rapid and transparent reporting on grant allocation and use **Nice:** • Grant management support (to supplement ECW resources) • Knowledge of innovative disbursement mechanisms • Knowledge of innovative financing

Significance of the criterion

41. ECW is committed to raising and effectively disbursing game-changing amounts of funding for EiE. Key requirements are for rapid identification of requirements and disbursements down to local level. Upward reporting on the use of funds is crucial for learning and for continued ability to raise funds. ECW's host must preferably actively facilitate, or at least not inhibit, grant management approaches that are speedy, flexible and effective. As discussed more fully in Annex H, ECW has yet to define its long-term approach to grant management: various models of grant management are possible, and different approaches may suit different contexts. The three main variants, as described in Annex H, are a direct recipient model, a grant agent model, and a country pooled funding model.

Differences between potential hosts

42. During this review's analysis of potential hosts' self-assessments, it became evident that the basic trustee services provided were relatively similar across hosts (legal agreements, funds disbursement, consolidated financial reporting etc.), but the grant management models offered by

the potential hosts were much more diverse. These differences and their implications for ECW are discussed in Annex H (see Table 5,which explores the different models and approaches offered by different hosts).

Implications for the choice of host

43. Based on the analysis in Annex H, the review team's judgements are:

a) that UNOPS' default model of grant management is probably too restrictive for ECW (see also the earlier comments under operational autonomy – ¶10c) above);

b) that long-term hosting requirements will be clearer once ECW has drawn on its initial experimentation to develop a transparent strategy and processes for grant management;

c) that in the short-term, it makes practical and strategic sense for ECW to draw on the specialised expertise of the MPTFO as it develops its grant management models, including but not limited to, pooled funding approaches.

Other implications

44. ECW's choices between different possible models of grant management have major implications not only for ECW's overall effectiveness but also for grant management skills and staffing levels required within the ECW secretariat. The drafts of ECW's overall strategy seen by this review do not yet sufficiently address grant management strategy or its implications for the role and staffing of the ECW secretariat.

Transparency, oversight, audit

Transparency, oversight, audit *[Function 5: Accountability, M&E systems]*	**Necessary:** • Ability to support rapid and transparent reporting on grant allocation and use • Openness and willingness to foster knowledge management and share good practice and lessons learned • Commitment to accountability to affected populations • Mitigation of any perceived COI related to assessments of its own programmes **Nice:** • Experience of robust evidence and research generation

Significance of the criterion

45. Both learning and accountability objectives are extremely important for ECW. Growth in its levels of funding will increasingly depend on being able to demonstrate the proper and effective use of funds already provided.

Differences between potential hosts

46. The three agencies that have specialist knowledge of education could provide more direct support to the learning objectives of ECW. All the potential hosts maintain high fiduciary and reporting standards.

Implications for the choice of host

47. This is an extremely important criterion in terms of maintaining ECW's reputation and credibility with funders, but all the shortlisted hosts are able to meet the necessary standards.

Other implications

48. ECW should not be over-dependent on its host, or on any one particular partner, for its knowledge management, monitoring, evaluation and learning. Its strategy should include a well-articulated M&E policy, which defines the respective roles of ECW and key partners, and is appropriately reflected in the structure and staffing plans of the ECW secretariat.

C. Specific technical expertise

Expertise in education (including EiE)

Expertise in education (including EiE)	**Necessary:** • Appreciation of the importance of EiE **Nice:** • Ability to support efforts to raise profile of EiE in humanitarian responses • Technical experience of EiE

Significance of the criterion

49. In line with broader shifts in international educational development, ECW is prioritizing not only access to safe spaces that can provide protection and lifesaving messages, but a focus on learning outcomes and educational attainment. ECW seeks to reach crisis-affected children with equitable opportunities to learn, and as such, it will need to have expertise available that allows it to select, support, monitor and evaluate grantees that will deliver measurable impact for children. Education has historically been deprioritized within acute humanitarian response, and while the current humanitarian reform focus on the New Way of Working and the humanitarian-development nexus provides opportunities for the education sector, ECW will need a host that at a minimum appreciates the importance of EiE, and ideally is able to support efforts to advocate more strongly and systematically within the humanitarian system.

Differences between potential hosts

50. All hosts on the short-list are supportive of the goals of ECW in relation to raising the profile of education in emergencies, but from different starting points in terms of sector expertise and experience. UNOPS is supportive of any entity that is sponsored by a UN agency, and thus falls within the broader UN development agenda and therefore the UNOPS mandate. MPTFO also sees itself as a neutral facilitator and does not aim to "duplicate ... [the] ... substantive role" of the Secretariat and other partners engaged in the Fund.

51. GPE has strong credentials relating to educational development, with significant education expertise within its Secretariat. Half of GPE's partner countries are conflict-affected or fragile, where it supports the establishment or strengthening of local sector coordination groups and funds the development and implementation of (Transitional) Sector Plans that prioritize equity, learning outcomes, and systems efficiency. While GPE has a development-focused mission, in recent years it has been expanding the menu of support options available for countries in crisis, including an Accelerated Financing facility, which allows up to 20% of an existing allocation to be used for emergencies, and an Operational Framework for Effective Support in Fragile and Conflict Affected Setting which also allows for redeployment of funds for direct service delivery if governments are not capable of responding. Given GPE's expertise in education sector planning and financing, as a host it

would be able to support ECW objectives relating to mainstreaming emergency preparedness, response and recovery efforts into national planning and budgeting processes.

52. GPE has strong connections to sector coordination groups, and would be well positioned to support ECW efforts to bring development actors into humanitarian strategic planning discussions at an early stage. While GPE advocates for the importance of education generally, it does not have a field presence, and does not have a direct advocacy role in-country during humanitarian response, though the LEG or GPE Grant Agents may.

53. UNICEF has a significant focus on education and education in emergencies globally. According to their submission, in 2016 UNICEF helped 11.7 million children access education. UNICEF is active in sector coordination groups, often serving as Coordinator of LEGs. UNICEF is Co-Lead Agency of the Education Cluster globally (alongside Save the Children) as well as at the country level, a role that includes advocating for education provision in acute emergency response through to development. UNICEF also leads the WASH and Nutrition Clusters and the Child Protection Area of Responsibility. As such, while UNICEF's commitment to education in emergencies is clear, there may be times when it is also advocating strongly for other sectors.

54. In emergencies, UNICEF programming focuses on service delivery with the goal of providing access, quality and equitable education opportunities for crisis-affected children. UNICEF has specialist education in emergencies capacity at headquarters, regional and country levels. Given UNICEF's geographic reach and active presence in emergency response they will likely continue to be a grantee and potentially also Grant Agent, partnering with ECW through the delivery of education in emergencies programmes. If UNICEF were to continue to serve as host, ECW might benefit from the in-house technical expertise and informal knowledge sharing that will naturally occur. However, it will be necessary to ensure that ECW is able to maintain the independence necessary to provide technical oversight and critical feedback when necessary to all its grantees, including – if necessary – its hosting institution.

Implications for the choice of host

55. ECW seeks to not only increase the provision of education in emergencies, but improve the equity and the quality of that provision. It is the view of the review team that only one of the shortlisted hosts – UNICEF – combines significant education in emergencies technical expertise and a seat at the table in in-country humanitarian coordination forums, supporting the key function relating to raising the profile of education in emergencies. ECW can potentially leverage this expertise towards its own objectives. However, it will be important to ensure ECW is able to maintain independence and its "disruptive" intent if it is hosted by UNICEF.

Other implications

56. GPE has very relevant broader education sector expertise which should support the Fund's goals to bring humanitarian and development actors more closely together and ensure they are more aligned. In order to fulfil its strategic functions ECW can and should utilize the technical expertise of both these two major partners – UNICEF and GPE – whether hosted by them or not.

Expertise in humanitarian response

Expertise in humanitarian response	**Necessary:** • Basic understanding of humanitarian response and commitment to the humanitarian principles **Nice:** • Active in humanitarian sector • Technical expertise in humanitarian issues

Significance of the criterion

57. While ECW aims to bring humanitarian and development actors together, the name of the Fund itself strongly implies that education provision from the outset of acute humanitarian response is critical to its definition of success. Working in emergency contexts is a particular area of expertise. The pace, principles, language, standards, systems and processes for humanitarian action are currently quite different from development approaches, though efforts are being made to bring the two together. ECW will need support to develop financing solutions that strengthen and reinforce quality and inclusive emergency coordination, planning and monitoring; the host will have a significant role to play.

Differences between potential hosts

58. As noted under earlier criteria above, UNICEF has significant humanitarian response experience in the education sector and in inter-sectoral responses across a range of Clusters. UNICEF is a key actor in humanitarian leadership at both global and country levels, playing an active role in workstreams coming out of the World Humanitarian Summit and as a member of the Humanitarian Country Team at country level.

59. GPE would also be committed to supporting ECW to uphold humanitarian principles. As already noted, GPE has developed a number of approaches to make the development funds it provides more flexible and able to respond to shocks and emergencies. However, GPE's experience in humanitarian response is limited to the adaptation of its own model rather than the bespoke context-specific solutions that ECW will likely require in order to act swiftly in complex contexts. GPE does not have experience in responding quickly to new crises in countries where it does not already operate.

60. UNOPS has experience managing complex infrastructure projects in risky and insecure environments, so is aware of the challenges of programmatic implementation in crisis contexts. However, UNOPS is a facilitative agency, with project management expertise, but does not play an active role in humanitarian coordination.

61. MPTFO has a dedicated team focused on humanitarian pooled funds, and strong expertise in humanitarian financing and financing across the humanitarian-development-peace nexus. MPTFO works closely with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and country-based Humanitarian Coordinators through its work on Country Based Pooled Funds for several major protracted crises. MPTFO established the Ebola Response Fund, a bespoke model to meet the unique demands of a regional health emergency. MPTFO's humanitarian portfolio is approximately $300 million, and total annual deposits for the overall fund portfolio are between $700 and $800 million.

Implications for the choice of host

62. There is a private-sector saying "organisational culture eats strategy for breakfast". While ECW could work hard to bring a humanitarian "culture" to a non-humanitarian host, this could be an

added burden for a young entity with an already ambitious (draft) Strategy. The review team considers that:

a) In the incubation phase it is important for ECW to be hosted by an organisation with a strong track record in humanitarian response and with a thorough understanding of, and active engagement in, the systems and processes that make up the humanitarian system. The choice of UNICEF as incubator was therefore appropriate. UNICEF is the potential host with the strongest profile in this regard.

b) In the longer-term, as ECW becomes more established as an actor in its own right, the humanitarian entry-point provided by UNICEF may diminish in relative importance and the range of hosting options that are consistent with maximising ECW impact may increase.

c) The fact that UNICEF was appropriately chosen to incubate ECW does not mean that the detailed hosting arrangements currently in place are necessarily optimal. While humanitarian response expertise is a critical factor that supports ECW's current location, fund design and management in humanitarian response is a sub-category of expertise that is particularly relevant to the ECW Secretariat as it seeks to establish itself and design its model and operational approach. MPTFO has much greater depth of expertise than UNICEF to support this element of ECW's organisational development.

D. Administrative Services

D. Administrative Services	

HR services	**Necessary:**
	• Full HR back office service for
	  ○ recruitment
	  ○ retention
	  ○ employee services
	• Ability to ring-fence from host's own HR management
	• Ability to offer appropriate terms for regular and short-term personnel
	Nice:
	• Flexible and speedy hiring (and if necessary dismissal) of ECW personnel

Office space, IT services etc.	**Necessary:** • Full ECW-tailored turn-key back office procurement rules/processes • Adequate office space • Fit for purpose IT systems • Ability to scale as ECW grows **Nice:** • Access to temporary space in Geneva and on location
Travel (including security)	**Necessary:** • Booking travel • Security, especially in crisis/conflict zones • In-country logistical support **Nice:** • Immunities
Financial and accounting services	**Necessary:** • Systems meet standards acceptable to major funders • Separate transparent accounting/budgeting for ECW • Separate asset management

Legal Services	**Necessary:** • Accommodate ECW as a separate legal entity (unless otherwise indicated by ECW) • Spectrum of legal services, covering corporate (donors, staff, facilities), and grant-facing, including ability to fund a range of recipient entities.

Significance of the criteria

63. The presumption for a newly-established organisation is that it is much more efficient to draw on the ready-made administrative systems a host can provide than to be distracted from its core mandate by attempting to recreate such systems itself. ECW's administrative environment needs to support the operational autonomy, flexibility and speed of response that are essential for ECW to maximise its impact. Moreover, such services need to be provided in a cost-effective manner.

Differences between potential hosts

64. We analyse the cost profiles of alternative hosts in Annex G below and our conclusions on the financial comparison are presented there.

65. In most respects the services offered by alternative hosts are very similar. The significant differences in each category are as follows:

a) **HR (Human Resources) services:** All potential hosts draw on their own or (in the cases of GPE and MPTFO) their parent organisation's HR rules and procedures. Contractually, ECW staff become employees of the hosting organisation, and subject to its regulations and procedures regarding recruitment, performance management, and behavioural standards. All have scope for secondments and the appointment of short-term consultants. Any dual accountability (to ECW governance structures as well as to the host) takes place within the host's regular HR framework. None of the potential hosts would be prepared to make HR arrangements that were unique to ECW. Unlike the other potential hosts, UNOPS makes extensive use of an Individual Contractor Agreement (ICA) modality; ICA holders are regarded as UNOPS staff members but do not have all the privileges (including UN Laissez-Passer) available to staff engaged on fixed term or temporary contracts.[29]

b) **Office space, IT services etc:** All potential hosts represented that they could obtain/ provide appropriate physical accommodation for ECW. However physical hosting is not a speciality for the MPTFO; existing examples are on a considerably smaller scale than ECW requires.

[29] The difference is described as follows in UNOPS' submission:

"There are two main contractual modalities which UNOPS offers to its clients:

- **Fixed term appointment (FTA)** for a period of one year, and **temporary appointment (TA)** for less than one year are contracts under the Staff Rules which provide the status of a staff member, including an UN Laissez-Passer and coverage under the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of 1946.
- **Individual Contractor Agreement (ICA)** introduced by UNOPS to engage individuals for provision of services through a flexible and all-encompassing contracting tool, and to replace a previous complicated system of different contracts. Personnel holding Individual Contract Agreement (ICA) will be considered internal UNOPS personnel and therefore enjoy benefits, such on Learning and development in training activities and are eligible to apply to the UNOPS Educational Assistance Program."

c) **Travel including security:** All shortlisted hosts provide access to established travel booking and management services (in MPTFO's case, via UNDP). Security aspects have been noted above, under "geographical reach"; all the short-listed hosts operate within the framework of the UNDSS (United Nations Department of Safety and Security) system.

d) **Financial and accounting services:** As already noted (¶47 above), all the shortlisted hosts are able to meet the necessary standards of financial accounting and reporting to donors and other stakeholders. Annex G notes differences in asset management: in particular UNICEF is the only short-listed host that retains for its own use the interest on fund balances it holds as trustee for ECW. This a significant factor in the comparison of hosting costs across alternative hosts.

e) **Legal services:** None of the potential hosts would provide ECW with a separate legal identity while also acting as its administrative host. All would provide similar legal services, which would be consistent with the approaches to grant management for each host, as described in Annex H. MPTFO's legal services draw on UNDP; GPE's draw on the WB.

Implications for the choice of host

66. Cost comparisons are provided in Annex G. The review team's judgements on other dimensions of administrative hosting are:

a) All the potential hosts apply their own HR systems. As in the area of grant management (discussed above), UNOPS appears to be the most "hands on" in its approach, as evidenced by its promotion of its ICA modality.

b) MPTFO is less oriented than the others towards physical hosting, and has not been the administrative host of an initiative that matches ECW's scale.

c) All have (or have access to) established travel management services, but UNICEF's experience in organising travel to crisis and conflict areas stands out from the others.[30]

d) All can handle essential financial, accounting and asset management services, but UNICEF is alone in retaining the interest on funds for which it is trustee.

e) All can provide adequate legal services.

Other implications

67. This review was an informal process, and the information provided by potential hosts was not binding on them. It is clear that there is room for negotiation on a number of dimensions of hosting arrangements, including financial terms, and possible derogations from some of the host's regular systems and procedures. In order to achieve the best possible terms for ECW, it would be necessary to negotiate binding terms as a part of the final decision on hosting.

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[30] UNOPS commented as follows on this statement in the draft report:

> "This is perhaps an area where *UNOPS could have further articulated its capacities in travel support*, as this is one of the services we provide to a wide range of partners. Alone in Geneva, UNOPS managed around 3,200 travels in 2017 for hosted entities and partners, many of them to and from crisis and conflict areas. Globally, UNOPS not only manages and processes travel for its personnel in 80 offices worldwide, but we are also periodically and globally asked to provide travel support to other UN organizations, such as UNHCR, DPA, WHO, UNEP, UNDSS, UN DPKO personnel."

E. Other

Conflicts of interest

Conflicts of interest	**Necessary:**
	• Clear firewalls in place to ensure ECW's autonomy and identity (unless decided that it should be subsumed by another existing system)
	• Transparent mitigation of any potential COI in relation to:
	  ○ fund raising
	  ○ grant allocation
	  ○ accountability for grant utilisation
	Nice:
	• Absence of substantial COI

Significance of the criterion

68. Conflict of Interest is mentioned as a dimension of several criteria already discussed, but it is useful to provide an integrated discussion here.

69. As indicated, there are three main areas in which conflict of interest is likely to be an issue:

a) Fund raising: ECW and a host may, in effect be competing for funds from the same sources.

b) Grant allocation: there is an obvious potential conflict of interest if an organisation involved in allocating grants is itself a potential recipient.

c) Accountability for grant utilisation: similarly, there is a potential conflict of interest if a host seems to be involved in the monitoring and evaluation of its own grant utilisation. Moreover, part of ECW's remit (Core Function 5) is to "improve accountability by developing and sharing knowledge ... of what works and what does not". This could involve (constructive) criticism of a host's performance in EiE, whether or not ECW funds were involved.

70. Absence of substantial conflict of interest could not be made a "necessary" criterion, because it would automatically rule out hosts such as UNICEF and GPE who may be very strong on other criteria.

71. Perceptions as much as substance of conflict of interest can be a problem with real effects, as we noted in the ADR – see Box 5 below.

Box 5. ADR assessment on conflict of interest

*This was an area of some very strongly held concerns, both about COI as a major risk to be addressed if any hosting arrangement was to be considered acceptable, and as the most trenchant criticism from some stakeholders of the current incubation arrangement***.**

The following potential dimensions were raised with the review team (usually with the proviso that it is important to avoid even the perception of a potential COI):

a) there is a potential COI when the host may also be a recipient of ECW funds;

b) this extends to concerns not only that the allocation of resources may be biased but that

too close an association between ECW and a host may inhibit ECW when its role it to hold the host (and others) accountable for results;

c) there is a potential COI if a host is expected to assist with fund-raising and communications but is itself a de facto rival for funding;

d) there are more subtle issues of unconscious biases that may arise when an agency becomes steeped in its host's culture and world-view.

It is clear that ECW runs substantial reputational, legitimacy and partnership risks that could endanger additional funding and political support if it fails to take conspicuous action to ensure that all significant COIs have been recognised, and that mitigations in place are adequate and transparent.

Source: Mokoro, 2017, ¶99-100 (emphasis added)

Differences between potential hosts

72. The challenge is that the hosts with negligible conflict of interest (UNOPS and MPTFO) are almost by definition the ones with least to offer in terms of technical expertise, humanitarian experience or convening power. Fundraising is the most obvious area of conflict of interest for the WB as a direct host, and also for GPE, since both may be competing for funds from the same sources. GPE does not implement grants itself, and therefore is unlikely to be a recipient of ECW funds, and nor is the WB, but ECW should not be inhibited in commenting on the effectiveness and impact of their EiE-related work.[31] For UNICEF, there are strong prima facie conflicts of interest in all three categories, and as noted in the ADR Box 5 above: "[conflict of interest was] the most trenchant criticism from some stakeholders of the current incubation arrangement."

73. UNICEF's mechanisms for mitigating conflict of interest with respect to ECW are described in Annex E above (see Box 3 and Box 4). GPE has an explicit, Board-approved, policy on conflict of interest (GPE, 2017f).

Implications for the choice of host

74. In the review team's judgement, it would be unwise to discard a potential host on conflict of interest grounds without first making sure that potential conflicts of interest cannot be effectively mitigated. UNICEF has strong positive attributes that can accompany its administrative hosting of ECW; potential conflicts of interest are the other side of the same coin. Its efforts to mitigate acknowledged conflicts of interest have not succeeded in allaying COI concerns among significant ECW stakeholders in more than one constituency, and such perceptions are likely to have negative effects on fundraising and other elements of ECW's strategy. A disinterested host (UNOPS or MPTFO, say) could resolve such concerns, but at a potential cost in other dimensions. It is therefore important to make all efforts to mitigate conflict of interest at UNICEF, not least because of its ongoing role as the host during incubation. Genuine and transparent autonomy of the Secretariat is a key factor in mitigating conflict of interest and perceptions of conflict of interest.

[31] The WB provided the following comment on this statement:

> *"While it is true that GPE does not implement grants itself, the World Bank does, including GPE-financed grants. However, it is true that both GPE and the World Bank would be unlikely to be recipients of ECW funds."*

Other implications

75. The discussion in ¶12-18 above is relevant to consideration of potential fundraising conflict of interest; as noted there, ECW must be careful not to over-rely on a host for fundraising.

Previous hosting experience

Previous hosting experience	**Necessary:** • Clear understanding of requirements of ECW • Capacity and robust financial, HR, etc. systems in place **Nice:** • Track record of successful hosting of partnerships and funds (especially partnerships not fully embedded within the host's systems)

Significance of the criterion

76. Potential hosts who did not meet the necessary requirements for this criterion were eliminated at the short-listing stage, so we focus here on the short-listed hosts' track records. Previous hosting experience is a strong guide to hosting capacity, and also to the likely configuration and characteristics of the hosting arrangement that might be available for ECW.

Differences between potential hosts

77. All the short-listed hosts, in different ways, have significant experience of hosting:

a) UNICEF has hosted various partnerships, including, currently the United Nations Girls' Education Initiative (UNGEI) and the Global Partnership to End Violence Against Children. It was the initial host for Gavi, the vaccine alliance, as described in the ADR (Annex F of Mokoro, 2017). It is the current host for ECW (see Annex E above).

b) The MPTFO's core expertise is the hosting of multi-partner trust funds, which it has been doing for 13 years. Relevant examples include the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF, since 2006), the Ebola Response Fund (2014) and the Somalia MPTF (2014). In some cases, drawing on back office services from UNDP, it acts as host for MPTF secretariats.

c) UNOPS regards hosting as a core service. It has a team of over 50 people working with hosted entities, based at its operational hub in Geneva. Hosted organisations include Stop TB, the Water Supply and Sanitation Collaborative Council, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), and Roll Back Malaria (RBM).

d) The World Bank has very considerable experience of hosting trust fund secretariats and associated financial intermediary funds (FIFs); it is currently hosting 20 such secretariats in a variety of sectors.

e) GPE does not itself have experience of hosting another organisation, but it does have relevant experience as itself a hosted organisation in the education space. Back office services would be provided by the WB, which, as already noted, has long experience of hosting the secretariats of FIFs.

Implications for the choice of host

78. All the short-listed hosts have plausible previous experience of hosting, but with different degrees of experience in administrative and financial hosting of trust funds. In each case, any hosting arrangement with ECW should be designed to offset the relative weaknesses as well as building on the relative strengths of a host's experience and expertise. Thus:

a) UNICEF has significant previous hosting experience (allied to the EiE and humanitarian expertise highlighted in Section C of this annex). However, it does not have particular expertise in supporting hosted organisations' grant management, or in operating multi-partner funds.

b) The MPTFO, on the other hand, specialises in managing multi-partner funds, although it does not have experience of hosting a secretariat as large as ECW's is likely to become, and relies on UNDP for its back office services.

c) UNOPS provides dedicated, specialised hosting services to numerous organisations, but we have noted in Section C above some reservations about whether its grant management approach and organisational culture would allow ECW as much autonomy and flexibility as it needs.

d) The WB's track record leaves little doubt about its capacity to host funds and secretariats. However, its appetite to host ECW is doubtful, and the trust fund reform process under way may make it a less suitable host for ECW.

e) Choice of GPE as a host would have to be based on expectations of synergies and economies of a scale in a closer relationship between GPE and ECW, but GPE would bring to that relationship its own experience of developing as a hosted entity. The institutional configuration of the relationship would greatly depend on whether GPE remains hosted by the WB (see ¶18b) above).

Annex G Value for Money – Financial Cost Considerations

Approach to value for money assessment

1. As described in the ADR, we support a wider interpretation of "Value for Money" (VFM) guided by the UK Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI), which does not limit VFM to financial considerations, and recognises that effectiveness and value for money are inextricably linked (ICAI, 2011,¶2.17-2.18).

2. We expect that the HLSG's final decision on long-term hosting for ECW will be based on a judgement as to which hosting alternative will best contribute to maximising impact. This requires a hosting arrangement which helps maximise the funding raised, ensures the most effective use of resources and supports all core functions of ECW. These strategic criteria are not susceptible to a meaningful ex ante financial calculation or cost-benefit analysis.

3. Nevertheless, comparing financial costs of alternative hosts for comparable services – the focus of this Annex – is certainly useful and relevant. In doing so we acknowledge the limitations of this exercise since the hosting models are not all directly comparable.

Comparing costs of alternative hosting arrangements

4. We have, for comparison purposes, estimated the costs of alternative hosting arrangements. This analysis necessarily relies on some broad assumptions about future events and interpretation of data provided by the potential hosts.

5. We recognize that it is uncommon to find exactly similar metrics in use in different organisations. This makes comparability across the host candidates more difficult. While fee structures vary across hosts, so do the consequent services.

6. ECW is still evolving. The resources it needs to manage expected growth in its grant portfolio will become clearer in time. From a hosting perspective it should be recognised that there may be a trade-off between functions the Secretariat itself will fulfil, including through third party contractors, and those that a host might provide (cf. Box 1 in Section 2 of this report).

7. While recognizing that terminology can vary, the types of hosting services typically provided by hosts include:

a) The Trustee function – where the host acts as custodian (and in some cases investor) of funds received by ECW, fulfils the necessary contractual and fiduciary arrangements with donors, reports on consolidated funds and executes disbursements.

b) Administrative hosting functions – provides support functions to enable the day to day operations of the ECW Secretariat, including in particular, human resources, office infrastructure, travel facilitation, etc.

c) Grant Management support functions – these are more fully described in Annex H, and the service offerings are more diverse across host organisations. Many aspects of grant management will typically not form part of the standard hosting relationship but may be secured as an additional paid-for service.

8. Any ultimate hosting arrangement will in any event result from negotiations around services and commensurate fees. The services in turn will depend on what the ECW Secretariat is resourced to provide itself or obtain from third party contractors, now and in the future as its operations expand (cf. main text, Box 1), levels of operational integration (if any) and host capabilities and capacity.

9. Our analysis was conducted under two scenarios (1) a Base Case comparable to the current level of operations and (2) a High Case reflecting a size that ECW aspires to within the strategy time frame. Key assumptions underlying the two scenarios are:

	Base Case	High Case
Donor Income in year	$150m	$750m
Disbursements in year	$135m	$675m
Staff Levels (FTEs, including consultants)	20	50
Salary Costing	Based on rates advised by candidate	

10. In estimating the running costs of ECW under these scenarios we have used fee and cost rates as established through dialogue with the hosts. Consistent assumptions have also been applied to ECW needs (for example number/grade of secretariat staff) for each of the host alternatives modelled in order to improve comparability.

11. The organizations considered are summarised below along with key attributes:

Organizations	Main Attributes	Key Fee Metrics
UNICEF	• Administration and funds management services • Has technical knowledge of education sector • For a fee can offer technical services • Certain COI considerations	• 1% Fee for Fund Management based on inflows from donors • Recharge all direct costs • 8% Fee on direct costs of Secretariat to cover indirect costs • Surplus funds do not generate investment/interest income
MPTFO	• Specialist Fund Management agency • Can provide fund management as adjunct to admin hosting by other organisation (e.g. UNICEF) • Can also provide hosting admin services on UNDP model • Does not profess technical EiE know-how	• 1% Trustee Fee (Administrative Agent Services) for Fund Management based on inflows from donors, discounted for volume • Recharge all direct costs • Hosting fee of 7% of direct costs • Surplus funds earn investment/interest income
UNOPS	• Specialist in providing hosting services encompassing admin and funds management • Humanitarian credentials, but not an education expert as such • Provides grant management services within fee structure	• Management Fee of 4% reducing to 2.5% on a sliding scale based on grant expenditure • Recharge all direct costs • 7% Fee on direct costs of Secretariat to cover indirect costs • Surplus funds earn investment/interest income

Organizations	Main Attributes	Key Fee Metrics
GPE	• Is itself hosted, and currently would 'host' through accessing its own hosting arrangements with WB (but it is not certain GPE will continue to be hosted by the WB) • Technical knowledge of education sector, but more development focus • In theory could accommodate an integrated or more independent host model • Certain COI considerations	• The World Bank charges costs associated with trustee services on a full recovery basis. Over the past three years, the costs charged by the World Bank associated with trustee services for GPE represent 0.05% (approx.) of the sum of inflows from GPE donors and grant disbursements. • Recharge Direct Costs – salaries at WB rates. • Provision of support services (Office Space, IT, HR, Legal, Procurement, Travel, Medical, Security etc. charged at 17% of staff costs.[32] • Surplus funds earn investment/interest income.
World Bank	• Question over whether interested in hosting ECW. Its Trust Fund Policy, including the hosting of FIFs is currently under review. • Has provided costing based on a WB/GPE model.	• Cost structure similar to GPE option[33]

Results and key messages from financial cost comparison analysis

12. Different fee structures: The analysis has highlighted the differences in fee structures applied by the various organisations. Figure 2 below helps illustrate the triggers for host fees and cost reimbursement.

13. Several prospective hosts levy Funds Management fees calculated on inflows from donors, while one organisation, instead, charges fees based on grant expenditure. All organisations would typically seek to recover direct costs incurred on behalf of the hosted entity and also charge a management fee, typically calculated as a percentage of Secretariat direct costs, to cover the host's indirect costs. With different metrics across organisations, direct comparability is not possible.

14. Relevance of ECW capacity as it goes to scale: The analysis and in particular the different service offerings from hosts has highlighted the importance and impact of the ECW business model on the hosting decision. As the ECW portfolio expands and increases in scale (for example as projected during the strategy period), the secretariat will need to determine the extent to which grant management, monitoring and assurance functions are fulfilled from within the secretariat or by Grant Agents, partner organisations, third party private contractors and/or the host. During the preparation of this analysis, especially with the ECW Strategy still in its early stages of development, it was not clear how this would unfold.

[32] It is more usual to calculate the fee on all direct costs, rather than staff costs.

[33] The World Bank does not enable GPE (or other trust funds) to hedge the exchange rate risks they face, given that donor commitments are made in multiple currencies and and for varying periods into the future. (However, it is understood that this is under review by the WB.) The potential risks are very substantial for a large-scale fund, and ECW should seek appropriate scope for currency hedging from any potential host.

Figure 2 Drivers of fees for hosting



15. Results of the costing comparison: As Table 4 below shows, there are material variations in hosting costs across organisations:

a) GPE and WB are at the lower end of the spectrum due to a comparatively low funds management (trustee) fee modelled on what GPE incurs with the WB.

b) Costs for MPTFO and UNICEF are reasonably aligned, especially in the base case.

c) UNOPS fees are substantially higher. We note however that the UNOPS model is more 'hands-on'. UNOPS would provide greater grant management support to ECW, within the fees depicted in our analysis, than envisaged under other hosts. We have assumed that no ECW grant disbursements would qualify as 'pass-through' under UNOPS' definition, noting that such transfers attract substantially lower fees.[34]

d) As ECW scales to a higher volume, the percentage of overall costs (including hosting fees) declines as an overall percentage (whether relative to income or grant disbursements). In this situation host fees increases as an overall proportion. This is largely a consequence of the assumptions made regarding staff numbers.

Table 4 Comparison of costs across potential hosts

	MPTF	UNICEF	GPE	UNOPS	WB
	Base Case: $150m Income, $135m Grant Disb.				
	$'000	$'000	$'000	$'000	$'000
Total Projected Secretariat Expenses	7,749	7,730	6,807	10,892	6,807
Secretariat Expenses as % of Disbursements	*5.7%*	*5.7%*	*5.0%*	*8.1%*	*5.0%*
Secretariat Expenses as % of income	*5.2%*	*5.2%*	*4.5%*	*7.3%*	*4.5%*
Total Host % Based Fees	1,909	1,961	621	5,759	621
Host fees as % of Total Secretariat Expenses	*25%*	*25%*	*10%*	*55%*	*10%*
	High Case: $750m Income, $ 675m Grant Disb.				
Total Projected Secretariat Expenses	21,571	23,636	16,891	35,326	16,891
Secretariat Expenses as % of Disbursements	*3.2%*	*3.5%*	*2.5%*	*5.2%*	*2.5%*
Secretariat Expenses as % of income	*2.9%*	*3.2%*	*2.3%*	*4.7%*	*2.3%*
Total Host % Based Fees	7,019	8,695	2,068	22,918	2,068
Host fees as % of Total Secretariat costs	*36%*	*37%*	*14%*	*69%*	*14%*

[34] In comments on the draft report, UNOPS argued that our costing comparison was unfair, since they (as we have noted) also have a pass-through modality where charges are much lower. However we stand by our judgement that the pass-through rate would not fit ECW's case. This is based on the following reply by UNOPS to an earlier query about the criteria for applying pass-through rates:

"In regards to your question on pass-through fee rate, the Pass-through fee rates will apply when the grantees are pre-selected by the funding source(s), no matter what type of entity the grantee is. In order for pre-selection in the engagement / donor agreement to be valid, the agreement shall include:

- *The name of the grantee, the grant activities and the budget;*
- *A statement that the donor has selected the grantee in accordance with its own internal procurement procedures; and,*
- *A statement that UNOPS shall not be liable for any failures on the part of the pre-selected grantee.*

In cases of pre-selection and pass-through, UNOPS and ECW's role will be limited to receiving funds from donors and disbursing them to grantees. UNOPS may offer grant management services, depending on the need, and this will be either part of the UNOPS PMT or the ECW Secretariat."

16. Staff costs: The costs for projected staff and consultants are estimated based on salary rates applicable to the host organisation, as provided to us. Even where salary scales and benefits are very similar between organisations, the estimates provided to us may differ according to assumptions about precise positions within a pay grade, and the costs of allowances including joining costs, dependency allowance, education allowances etc. The details in Figure 3 below show that staff cost estimates by UNOPS are noticeably lower than others. After cross-checking, we believe this disparity is due to UNOPS' efforts to make a realistic estimate based on their current average staff costs, while others' estimates are more fully loaded and might turn out to be overestimates in practice. Because ECW would pay actual realised salary costs, the difference in estimates is probably more apparent than real.

17. Staff costs, inclusive of consultants, are in all cases a very significant portion of overall costs. Consequently, assumptions regarding eventual numbers of staff will have a key impact on overall cost projections.

18. Interest income: All the hosts considered, with the exception of UNICEF, will credit interest/investment income earned on any surplus funds to ECW. In most scenarios, this interest defrays a sizable portion of the overall percentage-based host fee (i.e. disregarding direct costs recovered).

19. Further negotiation: None of the potential hosts have submitted formal bids to host ECW. The fee structures and rates are to enable this comparative analysis. For all organizations, fees may be subject to negotiation, especially taking in to account the relative volume of income/grants and the specific services that ECW may wish to contract.

20. More detailed costing results are provided in Figure 3 at the end of this Annex.

Important Caveats

21. As we noted upfront, value for money is inextricably linked to strategic effectiveness. This costing analysis must be read in that context.

22. The cost projections are reliant on:

a) assumptions made by us in projecting the required human and other resources under the two scenarios;

b) the information provided by prospective hosts, and our interpretation of that data; and

c) could vary materially depending on the eventual balance of services fulfilled within the Secretariat versus those sought from the host.

23. Costings could change materially upon more formal negotiation of commercial terms.

24. The analysis has highlighted the challenge of comparing alternative models. This is due, on the one hand to different fee models and on the other, to differences in what services they include. Such issues are discussed in more detail in Annex H below.

Figure 3 Detailed summary of cost comparison

Attachment to VFM Annex	Base Case Costing					High Case Costing				
	MPTF	UNICEF	GPE	UNOPS	World Bank	MPTF	UNICEF	GPE	UNOPS	World Bank
	Fee/cost	Fee/cost	Fee/cost	Fee/cost	Fee/cost	Fee/cost	Fee/cost	Fee/cost	Fee/cost	Fee/cost
	$'000	$'000	$'000	$'000	$'000	$'000	$'000	$'000	$'000	$'000
Management Fee										
Based on Income	1.00% of Donor Income	1.00% of Donor Income	0.05% of Donor Income	0.0% of Donor Income	0.05% of Donor Income	0.80% of Donor Income	1.00% of Donor Income	0.05% of Donor Income	0.00% of Donor Income	0.05% of Donor Income
What fee includes	Trustee/Fund adminsitrator/grant related	Fund administration (assumes income by SCA and not bilateral contributions), fund contrib and donor refunds, HLSG allocations, disbursements, grant refunds, fin management, risk mgmt, fund monitoring	Trustee fee works out at .05% of sum of donor income and grant disbursements	No fee linked to donor income		Trustee/Fund adminsitrator/grant related	Fund administration (assumes income by SCA and not bilateral contributions), fund contrib and donor refunds, HLSG allocations, disbursements, grant refunds, fin management, risk mgmt, fund monitoring	Trustee fee works out at .05% of sum of donor income and grant disbursements	No fee linked to donor income	
Consequent fee	1500	1500	81	0	81	6000	7500	405	0	405
Based on Grant Expenditure	0% of Grant Expenditure	0% of Grant Expenditure	0.05% of Grant Expenditure	4% of Grant Expenditure	0.05% of Grant Expenditure	0% of Grant Expenditure	0% of Grant Expenditure	0.05% of Grant Expenditure	3.27% of Grant Expenditure	0.05% of Grant Expenditure
			Trustee fee works out at .05% of sum of donor income and grant disbursements	Man Fee based 'on all funds expended'				Trustee fee works out at .05% of sum of donor income and grant disbursements	Man Fee based 'on all funds expended'	
	0	0	73	5400	72.9	0	0	365	22050	365
Direct costs										
Secretariat incurred										
- ECW staff	3045	2961	2750	2161	2750	8806	8623	7636	6229	7636
- Consultants	974	909	945	945	945	1392	1298	1350	1350	1350
- Premises rental	208	0	200	208	200	520	520	500	520	500
- Travel	728	728	728	728	728	1886	1886	1886	1886	1886
- IT	60	50	50	50	50	150	125	125	125	125
- HLSG and ExCom	15	15	15	15	15	30	30	30	30	30
- Trainings and workshops	100	100	100	100	100	188	188	188	188	188
- Communications	310	310	310	310	310	581	581	581	581	581
- FMA and Proposal Review	400	400	400	400	400	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000
	5840	5473	5498	4917	5498	14552	14251	13296	11909	13296
Host Project Team direct costs										
- Staff taken on by host	0	2	5	2	5	0	4	10	4	10
- Share of pooled and other direct costs	0	296	688	216	688	0	690	1527	498	1527
Indirect Cost recharge										
Based on Direct Expenditure (excl. grant disb.)	7%	8%	17%	7%	17%	7%	8%	17%	7%	17%
Consequent fee	409	461	468	359	468	1019	1195	1298	868	1298
Total Cost	7749	7730	6807	10892	6807	21571	23636	16891	35326	16891
Interest/income on surplus cash	-375	0	-375	-375	-375	-1875	0	-1875	-1875	-1875
Total cost (net of interest income)	7374	7730	6432	10517	6432	19696	23636	15016	33451	15016
Total cost as % of Income	*5.2%*	*5.2%*	*4.5%*	*7.3%*	*4.5%*	*2.9%*	*3.2%*	*2.3%*	*4.7%*	*2.3%*
Total cost as % of grant disbursements	*5.7%*	*5.7%*	*5.0%*	*8.1%*	*5.0%*	*3.2%*	*3.5%*	*2.5%*	*5.2%*	*2.5%*
Total host % based fee (Exc direct cost recovery)	1909	1961	621	5759	621	*7019*	*8695*	*2068*	*22918*	*2068*
Host Fees as % of total cost	*25%*	*25%*	*10%*	*55%*	*10%*	*36%*	*37%*	*14%*	*69%*	*14%*
Staff/Consultants as % of total cost	*51.9%*	*50.1%*	*54.3%*	*28.5%*	*54.3%*	*47.3%*	*42.0%*	*53.2%*	*21.5%*	*53.2%*

Annex H Overview of potential grant management models

Introduction

1. During the analysis of potential host self-assessments, through additional documentation as well as the value for money analysis, it became evident that while the basic trustee services provided were relatively similar across hosts (legal agreements, funds disbursement, consolidated financial reporting etc.), the grant management models offered by the potential hosts were much more diverse. As noted in Annex G above, the resulting fees for trustee services and the grant management models are therefore also varied. These differences have implications for the hosting decision, both in terms of cost as well as the substantive services potential hosts can offer. This in turn has significant implications for ECW's fundamental strategy, given the centrality of grant management both to the core function of disbursement of funds and the broader commitment to effectively change the way education is planned and resourced across the humanitarian-development nexus.

2. We found that discussion of different hosts' arrangements was complicated by differences in the terminology they used. There is inevitably overlap between different elements of hosting, but we found it helpful to distinguished broadly between the following different facets of (potential) host responsibilities:

Fund custodian	The institution responsible for holding and safeguarding the assets within a fund. The fund custodian enters into legal agreements with donors to the fund and provides consolidated financial reporting.
Grant administration	The administrative steps necessary to issue grants and then close them when complete. Includes: grant recipient accreditation and due diligence, legal agreements with grant recipients, disbursement of funds, closing of grants, etc.
Grant management	The oversight of how grants are spent: project cycle management (eligibility, assessment, supervision, and evaluation), application of environmental and social safeguards, review of financial and programmatic reporting, narrative reporting for donors, results based and knowledge management.

3. The review team used the UN's Harmonized Approach to Cash Transfers (HACT) as a benchmark for the financial and risk assurance processes offered by potential hosts, and it is referred to in the comparison table below. HACT was introduced in 2005 as a direct result of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, that called for reinforcing five principles on development and humanitarian aid, namely ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing for results, and mutual accountability (for a recent account of HACT see UNDG, 2014). HACT was created as a common operational framework for disbursing cash to government and non-government implementing partners with the objective of ensuring a closer alignment of development aid with national priorities and strengthening national capacities for management and accountability.

4. HACT processes include provisions on how and when to assess partners' financial management capacity and how to ensure proper assurance that the funds are being used for the intended purpose and contributing to the strategic goals of the partnerships. HACT processes also include a capacity building component, whereby high-risk implementing partners are provided ad hoc support during assurance activities as well as dedicated trainings on financial management issues.

HACT aims to reduce transaction costs and shift from a control-based to a risk-based financial management system. HACT is applied during emergencies, but processes are streamlined in order to speed up disbursement of funds to implementing partners without compromising accountability systems that mitigate the potential risk for fraud or misuse of funds. UNICEF and UNDP apply HACT. UNOPS and the World Bank have their own systems for handling financial and risk assurance processes.

The significance of alternative grant management models

5. As with other host services, an analysis of available grant management models needs to bear in mind the extent to which the ECW Secretariat might be resourced itself to take on grant management responsibilities, or take a strategic decision to pay the host, private contractors or members of the partnership to undertake elements of grant management. The grant management models outlined below represent different trade-offs in terms of who is responsible for elements of grant management; from selection of grantees, to risk assessment and eligibility checks, results monitoring, financial management capacity assessment/development, grant renewal etc. Some of the difference in costings captured in Annex G above is due to the different grant management models offered by potential hosts.

6. While the draft ECW Strategy has not outlined a grant management approach in detail, there are clear requirements for the Fund to be able to disburse quickly to a wide range of actors while ensuring financial and programmatic accountability. Given the range of complex contexts in which it will need to operate, it is likely that ECW will require versatility and a degree of flexibility in the grant management models at its disposal, while maintaining accountability systems that effectively address donor requirements and mitigate risks of fraud or misuse of funds. Commitments to the localisation agenda and the Grand Bargain mean ECW also requires a host whose grant management models enable local and national NGO grantees to access funds as directly as possible. Commitment to localisation also implies a responsibility to support local and national partners to develop their financial and risk management capacities.

Early practice by ECW

7. To date, ECW has used the two grant management models available to it through the current host UNICEF:[35]

a) A Grant Agent Model whereby a UN Agency or International NGO contracts to sub-grantees.

b) A Direct Recipient Model where funds are given directly to the national or international NGO or UN Agency that will implement the grant.

8. On a mission to Uganda the ECW Secretariat has also explored:

c) a country-level Pooled Fund Model where a range of actors can access a national window, overseen by an in-country Steering Committee and external oversight mechanisms.

9. This third model has not yet been tested by ECW and it would require technical and administrative support from MPTFO as this is not a model that UNICEF's Fund Support Office currently has the capacity to facilitate.

[35] This categorisation reflects the review team's analysis. What we have referred to as Grant Agents and as Direct Recipients are all referred to as grantees by UNICEF.

Grant management models offered by potential hosts

10. Table 5 below summarises each potential host's grant management models, along with an overview of the strategic and cost implications. The taxonomy of Grant Management Models (Grant Agent, Direct Recipient, Country Pooled-Fund, Direct Grant Management and Pass-through) was developed by the review team in order to assist in analysis across hosts. Potential hosts themselves use diverse terminology to describe the grant management services they offer.

Table 5 Hosts' grant management models and some implications

Host	Grant Management Models	Strategic and Cost Considerations
UNICEF	**Trustee Role:** UNICEF established a trust fund for ECW and acts as Funds Custodian and Administrator, a role managed through the Funds Support Office (FSO).[36] **Grant Management**: UNICEF has supported ECW to provide grants through a **Grant Agent Model**. To date, Grant Agents have either been UN agencies or HACT-assessed INGOs who take financial and programmatic accountability for the funds and report back to ECW on the implementation of the funds carried out by the grant agent and any sub-grantees.[37] UNICEF has also facilitated ECW to use a **Direct Recipient Model** providing funds directly to grantees, with a more direct oversight role for the ECW Secretariat. Direct Recipients can be any HACT-assessed partner including national and international NGO. Government entities could also be eligible.[38] *(UNICEF, in comments on the draft report, pointed out that it does not have pre-designated "Grant Agent" vs. "Direct Recipient" models and uses*	UNICEF levies 1% on donor income for the trustee service. ECW does not earn interest on any surplus funds held by UNICEF. For the Grant Agent Model, where UNICEF is Grant Agent there is a 7% fee, which applies both to UNICEF and other Grant Agents. For the Direct Recipient Model, the ECW Secretariat has contracted a private company to undertake basic financial risk assessment activities. UNICEF could offer a Technical Assistance package to supplement the Secretariat's grant management capacity, with UNICEF seeking a full recovery of costs incurred and an additional 8% fee on such costs to cover overheads. These services include the full HACT assurance processes, including support to grantees to strengthen financial management capacity. The Secretariat has not yet accessed these TA services. Where UNICEF is Grant Agent, full HACT processes are followed. (Details of UNICEF screening procedures are in Box 2 of Annex E above.)

[36] In commenting on the draft report, UNICEF drew attention to the fact that:

> "*UNICEF disburses funds from the ECW Trust Account directly to grantees and vendors via wire transfer, to mitigate risks. UNICEF is open to a discussion with the ECW Secretariat and HLSG of alternative disbursement mechanisms approved by the HLSG taking into account the HLSG and fund Contributors' risk appetite*."

[37] For example, in the initial disbursements made by ECW to Syria, Yemen, Chad and Ethiopia, UNICEF was sole grantee in each location and worked with partners to utilise the funds.

[38] An example of this approach can be seen in the ECW support provided to Somalia, where 12 National and International NGOs were awarded grants; UNICEF Somalia did not receive any funding.

Host	Grant Management Models	Strategic and Cost Considerations
	the term "grantee" in both cases. Nevertheless we consider this taxonomy to be relevant and useful.)[39]	The Grant Agent model requires some Secretariat capacity to provide general oversight. If ECW pursues a Direct Recipient Model at scale it would either need significant internal grant management capacity, or would need to pay UNICEF or a third party to provide the service.
GPE / World Bank	**Trustee Role**: Currently the World Bank is trustee of the GPE fund, and, if ECW were to be hosted by GPE it is assumed that the World Bank would also serve this role for the ECW Fund. However, the World Bank Trust Fund Policy is currently under review. **Grant Management**: GPE uses a **Grant Agent Model**. Grant Agents are rigorously pre-assessed as meeting GPE minimum standards and have signed standard financial procedures agreements that govern the use of funds. GPE-accredited Grant Agencies can be multilateral, bilateral and international NGOs. Grant Agents can sub-grant using their own policies and procedures.	Over the past three years, the costs charged by the World Bank associated with trustee services for GPE represent 0.05% (approx.) of the sum of inflows from GPE donors and grant disbursements. Surplus funds would be invested for the benefit of ECW. The WB charges GPE a standard Grant Agent fee of 1.75%. GPE negotiates other Grant Agent fees in the range of 7-8%. To date, most GPE grants have used the WB or UNICEF as Grant Agents, but GPE is seeking to diversify Grant Agents further, particularly in fragile and conflict affected settings with INGOs such as Save the Children and CARE now performing the role. If ECW were to pursue a Grant Agent Model similar to the GPE approach there would be need for some internal grant management capacity, but there could be synergies with GPE and economies of scale sought. The GPE Grant Agent pre-assessment process is rigorous and does not permit national NGOs to become accredited.
MPTFO	**Trustee Role**: MPTFO's core business is to serve as an independent trustee of multi-partner funds. With all Grant Management Models offered, MPTFO maintains the Trustee role. **Grant Management**: MPTFO offers three grant management models. • **Grant Agent Model** (termed Managing Agent). Requires a UN Agency with a strong country presence providing administrative and financial service to facilitate access to the funds by NGO partners. NGOs	MPTFO levies a 1% trustee fee based on donor income, discounted for volume. Surplus funds would be invested for the benefit of ECW. In the MPTFO model, Grant Agents are entitled to a fee that would not exceed 7%, a UN-wide agreed harmonised cost recovery rate. Grant Agents are required to facilitate HACT assurance processes for any sub-grantees.

[39] The UNICEF comment in full: *"Grant management: UNICEF disburses to Grantees as instructed by ECW. There is not a pre-designated (grant agent, direct recipient etc) model. To date, Grantees have either been UN agencies or CSOs (INGOs/NGOs) who have been assessed in accordance with HACT policies and who take financial and programmatic accountability for funds – reporting back to ECW. All non-UN grantees are assessed prior to funds disbursement."* [UNICEF's assessment procedures for CSO partners are set out in Annex E Box 2.]

Host	Grant Management Models	Strategic and Cost Considerations
	accessing funds through Grant Agents must be HACT assessed. The Grant Agent is programmatically and financially accountable for the funding passed to NGOs. • **Direct Recipient Model**. NGOs who are screened through a rigorous eligibility review (criteria including legal status and structure, control frameworks and outcome of audits) can receive funds directly from the Fund. The eligibility review must be undertaken for each location of an NGO (e.g. even if Plan International is reviewed as eligible, Plan International Bangladesh would still need to undergo review). The NGO, once approved and granted funds, is programmatically and financially accountable for the funding. • **Country Pooled Fund Model**. MPTFO can support ECW to establish national windows which, in addition to allowing funds to be granted to Grant Agents or Direct Recipients as outlined above, also allows direct transfers to Government entities. A Ministry (usually the Ministry of Finance) assumes accountability for the use of the funds on behalf of all national entities. This model allows other funds to be pooled alongside ECW grants at country level. A country pooled fund automatically includes the establishment of a Steering Committee which plays an oversight role, as well as other external control mechanisms such as external audit and third party monitoring. These are included as direct costs in programme budgets.	Direct Recipients are also entitled to a maximum fee of 7% for cost recovery. The Direct Recipient eligibility process is rigorous, but, at least in theory, both international and national NGOs can apply. For the MPTFO-managed Peacebuilding Fund, 25% of NGOs who applied passed the eligibility review. As above, using Grant Agent or Direct Recipient models would require ECW Secretariat grant management capacity and/or the involvement of a third party service provider. Due to the relatively rigorous process for the Direct Recipient model its use at scale would have major implications for the staffing of the ECW secretariat. If using the Country Pooled Fund Model, the costs of local coordination functions and additional external controls would be included as direct costs in programme budgets with no additional indirect charges levied by MPTFO. With this model, some of ECW's grant management capacity requirements would shift from New York to the investment countries, with the same range of options regarding whether ECW would employ its own local staff, or work with partners or contractors to undertake the work. Given ECW's emerging strategic focus on multi-partner multi-year plans and fund allocations, a country-pooled fund model which allows for bespoke nationally-led design might is a useful grant management model for ECW to have at its disposal (as evidenced by the ongoing discussions with MPTFO regarding the Uganda investment).
UNOPS	**Trustee**: UNOPS will serve as trustee with full fiduciary responsibility and accountability for the receipt, custody and disbursement of funds. **Grant Management**: UNOPS has assured us that there would be flexibility to adapt to ECW's requirements, but the "default" Grant Management approach is one of **Direct Grant Management**, in that UNOPS essentially takes on grant management responsibilities, with fiduciary responsibility remaining with them. The UNOPS model assumes a competitive bidding selection process for grants. Depending on the type of	UNOPS levy a trustee fee of 4% reducing to 2.5% on a sliding scale based on grant expenditure. Surplus funds would be invested for the benefit of ECW. This is a higher fee than other hosts, in part because the grant management model offered by UNOPS is such that UNOPS automatically undertakes more of the grant management services. This would mean less need for internal ECW Secretariat grant management capacity. However,

Host	Grant Management Models	Strategic and Cost Considerations
	grantee (UN or I/NGO), greater or lesser oversight is provided by UNOPS, but their standard grant model expects, for example, at least one monitoring site visit per year.[40] UNOPS also offer a **Pass-through Model.** Any type of entity is eligible for pass-through but the donor takes full responsibility for pre-selection and definition of grant activities and budget. The donor must provide a statement that the grantee is selected in accordance with its own internal procurement procedures. UNOPS also requires a statement that with the pass-through model they are not financially or programmatically accountable and shall not be liable for any failures on the part of the pre-selected grantee.	whether UNOPS systems are sufficiently flexible to meet the requirements of a Fund working in complex contexts with humanitarian speed would need to be tested. The Pass-through model levies a lower 0.75-1% fee, but given ECW's commitment to the Grand Bargain and evidence- and needs-based allocation strategy, the earmarking required for the pass-through might mean this is a model that ECW would choose to utilise only in exceptional circumstances. Furthermore, given that the donor must waive UNOPS programmatic and financial accountability in this scenario, many donor risk assurance requirements may also preclude the use of this model.

[40] In comments on the draft report, UNOPS highlighted its track record of managing trust funds, such as:

- Example 1: UNOPS is the Fund Manager of the 3MDG Fund, funded by Australia, Denmark, the EU, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the USA, with commitments to date totaling more than $284 million. It is currently the largest health fund in Myanmar, with over 100 grants issued to over 60 implementing partners. The oversight and decision making structure for the 3MDG Fund is the Fund Board, acting as the Project Board and providing overall responsibility for the fund's operating policy, funding decisions on grants and monitoring.
- Example 2: The Livelihoods and Food Security Trust Fund (LIFT), a multi-donor fund (currently 14 donors contributing over $450 million) aims to improve the lives and prospects of smallholder farmers and landless people in rural Myanmar. The LIFT Fund Board is a 5-8 member decision-making body, appointed from members of the Donor Consortium, and decides on the allocation of LIFT funds with guidance from the FM.

Nevertheless, the review team does not consider that UNOPS' grant management approaches are likely to be the best fit with the speed, flexibility and global reach that ECW aims for.

Annex I More on the recommended UNICEF/MPTFO configuration

Introduction

1. This annex has been added since the previous draft in order to provide more detail on the rationale for, and the implementation of, the review team's recommendation that MPTFO should take over the financial hosting of ECW while UNICEF continues as administrative host. Successive sections deal with:

- the respective roles proposed for UNICEF and MPTFO and their rationale;
- how the recommendations address COI issues;
- cost implications of the change of financial host; and
- the steps involved in implementing the recommended changes.

Respective roles for UNICEF and MPTFO

2. Table 6 below explains the division of labour between UNICEF and MPTFO that we recommend, and the rationale for it, against the standard set of hosting criteria that the review has employed. (For cost comparison see Table 8 below.)

Table 6 Proposed roles for UNICEF and MPTFO and implications for ECW

Role	UNICEF	MPTFO	Implications / rationale
Governance	**Continues current role in strategic governance for ECW, with HLSG and ExCom continuing as at present**		Maintains stability during incubation, no case for change.
		Role as funds custodian /trustee	UNICEF's small Funds Support Office cannot provide the range and depth of expertise available from MPTFO. It is common for global funds to have an external funds trustee: e.g. the WB acts as trustee for Gavi and GFATM. MPTFO is a specialist in this role, with a very large portfolio of multi-donor funds. Corollary of proposed role in grant management and helps mitigate COI (see below)
Fund raising	As noted, the review sees fund-raising as a responsibility for ECW itself, not its host. But using MPTFO as financial host should not diminish fund-raising capacity. MPTFO has a an established reputation and portfolio in this role; for some donors, an independent financial host may allay COI concerns.		
Brand & identity	Both UNICEF and MPTFO will highlight ECW's distinct identity and brand. (See Recommendation 4 for actions to strengthen this element of UNICEF's Administrative hosting.) The transparency of MPTFO's on-line financial reporting will be an asset.		
Convening power, coherence, legitimacy	ECW retains links to UNICEF convening power and links to both humanitarian and development architecture.	MPTFO has well established legitimacy as a financial host with experience of working in both humanitarian and development contexts.	Net gain for ECW.

Role	UNICEF	MPTFO	Implications / rationale
Geographical reach	ECW retains links to UNICEF's global footprint. UNICEF remains as ECW's travel facilitator.	MPTFO has established ability to operate in all contexts.	Financial hosting strengthened (see below) with no loss in geographical reach.
Partnership credentials	No change in UNICEF's partnership role.	MPTFO also has very strong partnership credentials.	Potential to strengthen overall partnership, both through operation of pooled funds as appropriate, and by allaying COI concerns.
Grant management	UNICEF continues to be eligible to receive funds as an ECW grantee.	**Takes on grant management support to ECW**	MPTFO has much greater depth of expertise than UNICEF in supporting a range of grant models for the partnerships it supports; has the ability to support country-level pooled funds, and experience in assisting fund design, including the preparation of operating manuals. Already has a well-established web platform for transparent reporting on the funds it manages. Detaching UNICEF from ECW's financial hosting and grant management reduces COI perceptions.
Transparency, oversight audit	UNICEF standards continue to apply to administrative hosting	**Fiduciary role for MPTFO as funds custodian and grant management support**	No diminution in applicable standards of oversight and audit. Some increase in transparency of reporting on fund utilisation.
Specific technical expertise	ECW retains the backing of UNICEF's exceptional experience in EiE and its articulation with both development and humanitarian architecture	ECW gains full access to MPTFO's superior expertise in fund design and management.	ECW gains specialist financial expertise without losing other technical expertise support.
Expertise in humanitarian response	UNICEF's ability to provide an entry-point to UN humanitarian system was a key reason to choose UNICEF as incubator, and this advantage is retained.	MPTFO has a dedicated humanitarian funds team and a large portfolio of humanitarian funds.	MPTFO role in fund management strengthens ECW's overall capacity in humanitarian contexts.
Administrative services	**UNICEF continues as administrative and physical host**, providing HR services, office space, IT support, travel facilities etc	**Role for MPTFO in financial and accounting services linked to role as funds custodian.**	No change in physical/administrative hosting. This avoids disrupting current arrangements, which are generally working well.

Role	UNICEF	MPTFO	Implications / rationale
Conflicts of interest	UNICEF has potential COI in all three dimensions (fundraising, grant allocation, accountability for grant utilisation). These result from its strengths in other dimensions, and so COI needs to be managed, not eliminated.	MPTFO has no COI.	MPTFO roles as funds custodian and support to grant management are primarily justified by MPTFO's superior experience and expertise in providing these services to partnerships. At the same time: • MPTFO role as funds custodian removes any potential UNICEF COI in this role. • MPTFO role in grant management diminishes potential UNICEF COI. • MPTFO support to the development of clear processes and manuals helps to increase transparency and should thus also reduce perceptions of potential UNICEF COI.

How the recommendations address conflicts of interest

3. This review has argued that:

> ... it would be unwise to discard a potential host on conflict of interest grounds without first making sure that potential conflicts of interest cannot be effectively mitigated. UNICEF has strong positive attributes that can accompany its administrative hosting of ECW; potential conflicts of interest are the other side of the same coin. (¶74 in Annex F above)

4. We have stressed that the mere perception of potential COI can be damaging. Our confidential interviews revealed concerns among donors and among others active in EiE that, in our judgement, are likely to inhibit support for, and collaboration with, ECW.

5. We have identified three main areas in which conflict of interest is likely to be an issue:

a) Fund raising: ECW and a host may, in effect be competing for funds from the same sources.

b) Grant allocation: there is an obvious potential conflict of interest if an organisation involved in allocating grants is itself a potential recipient.

c) Accountability for grant utilisation: similarly, there is a potential conflict of interest if a host seems to be involved in the monitoring and evaluation of its own grant utilisation. Moreover, part of ECW's remit (Core Function 5) is to "improve accountability by developing and sharing knowledge ... of what works and what does not". This could involve (constructive) criticism of a host's performance in EiE, whether or not ECW funds were involved. (¶69 in Annex F above)

6. Table 7 below spells out the current situation under each category and how the review's recommendations will mitigate real and perceived potential for COI.

Table 7 How the review's recommendations will address COI issues

Potential COI	Status	Recommended mitigation
Fund raising	As noted in Annex E above (Box 4): "UNICEF has been clear that its fundraising assets are not available to raise funds for ECW in competition with UNICEF, thus avoiding potential conflicts of interest."	Mitigation as such is not required, but ECW must be sure to take responsibility for its own fundraising.
Grant allocation	As funds custodian, UNICEF is responsible for all payments to grantees. Although there are firewalls to isolate UNICEF from decisions concerning its own possible receipt of ECW grants, perceptions of COI persist. The Secretariat who manage the grant allocation process are themselves employees of UNICEF, although direct accountability of staff is to the Director, and of the Director to the HLSG.	With MPTFO as funds custodian, UNICEF will no longer be both a payer and a recipient of ECW funds. The operational independence of the Secretariat, and the separate identity of ECW, should be reinforced by: • (as proposed by UNICEF) adapting Secretariat staff contract terms to emphasise their distinct status (and also to avoid staff contract entitlements becoming an obstacle to a future possible change of host) • avoiding confusion between UNICEF and ECW brands (including e-mail addresses etc)

Potential COI	Status	Recommended mitigation
	Although firewalls are in place during ECW grant allocation processes, the procedures themselves are not fully codified and transparently published though grant manuals and guidelines. Lack of transparency invites (mis)perceptions of COI. UNICEF (and other potential grant recipients – e.g. CSOs) are represented on ExCom (and HLSG), which have grant-approval authority, but recuse themselves from decisions from which they benefit.	Documented and publicised procedures are a necessary aid to efficiency and effectiveness as ECW's grant models become established. They will also ensure greater transparency as an antidote to COI perceptions. MPTFO role in assisting ECW with grant management will strengthen ECW's credibility. ExCom (and HLSG) continue to ensure that members do not participate in decisions from which they may directly benefit.
Accountability for grant utilisation	Direct accountabilities for grants will vary with the grant model employed (cf. Annex H above). ECW is in early stages of developing its wider accountability role (core function 5).	The technical support role of MPTFO will strengthen the credibility of ECW monitoring and reporting. COI mitigations above, including more manifest operational independence of the Secretariat, will strengthen credibility of this role
General	Although ECW does have various firewalls and good governance practices in place, these are not codified in a transparent policy on COI.	Develop and adopt a comprehensive COI policy so as to ensure: • systematic mitigations are in place for all likely dimensions of COI; • scope for misperceptions of COI is minimised.

Cost implications of the changes

Approach

7. This hosting review recommends that ECW's incubation should continue with UNICEF as administrative and physical host. At the same time it is recommended that ECW's efficiency should be maximized through the transfer of financial hosting responsibilities to the UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office (MPTFO) (cf. Table 6 above).

8. This section makes a comparison between the operating costs related to UNICEF as both administrative and financial host (the current arrangement), and the costs implied by separating these functions between respectively UNICEF and MPTFO.

9. The analysis below estimates the costs of each of UNICEF-alone hosting and the combined UNICEF/MPTFO model. Each is presented under 'Base' and 'High' case scenarios.

	Base Case	High Case
Donor income in year	$150m	$750m

Financial Analysis

10. Table 8 below summarises the key costs under the two models for each scenario.

Table 8 Hosting cost comparison – UNICEF alone vs. UNICEF+MPTFO

	Base Case		High Case	
	UNICEF	UNICEF-MPTFO	UNICEF	UNICEF-MPTFO
	$'000	$'000	$'000	$'000
Direct Secretariat costs	5,473	5,473	14,251	14,251
Host direct costs	296	296	690	345
Host indirect costs	461	461	1,195	1,168
Fund trustee costs	1,500	1,500	7,500	6,000
Interest earned	-	(375)	-	(1,875)
Total projected ECW costs net of interest	7,730	7,355	23,636	19,888

Assumptions and key findings

11. The analysis is necessarily based on interpretation of information supplied by hosts. Specific assumptions relevant to this comparison include:

a) Direct Secretariat costs are identical and are based on ECW administratively being hosted by UNICEF in both scenarios, and under both models.

b) Fund trustee costs vary dependent on whether UNICEF or MPTFO is financial host.

c) Interest on funds held is calculated assuming 25% of donor income is on hand on average and earns interest at 1% under MPTFO financial hosting.

12. Key findings

a) Especially in the 'High' case scenario, there are material overall savings arising from the joint UNICEF+MPTFO model, with net costs 16% lower.

b) This is a consequence of:

- Interest being credited by MPTFO, but not by UNICEF; and
- MPTFO applying a reducing financial trustee fee scale commensurate with volume of income. The income-based fee in the 'High' case consequently falls to 0.8% from 1%.

Other considerations

13. Although there appears to be a significant cost advantage in utilising MPTFO as financial host, we have made clear in the first section of this annex that this is not the review team's main reason for recommending the transfer.

14. Transaction costs of making the change are not quantified in this analysis. However, as indicated in Table 6 above, no change of physical or administrative hosting is entailed; the direct costs arising from transferring funds custodian / trustee responsibilities to MPTFO should be very limited, particularly if the period of overlapping responsibilities during handover is kept to a minimum.

Implementing the changes

15. At the ExCom meeting on 9 March 2018 it was proposed that a management response be prepared, concerning which of this review's recommendations will be adopted and how they will be put into effect. Table 9 below (at the end of this annex) is designed to assist this process. ExCom and the Secretariat will need to decide additional details (e.g. whether external support may be needed for some actions, or whether it would be useful to involve existing task teams or establish temporary task teams for some of them).

16. In Figure 4 below we offer a summary timeline for implementing the review's recommendations. In the short term this depicts the transfer of financial hosting to MPTFO with associated measures to strengthen ECW during the incubation period. The required actions are spelled out in Table 9 below.

17. In the medium term, ECW also needs to ensure that ExCom and HLSG are in a position to make an informed decision on hosting for the next strategy period, and to do so in time for it to be factored into ECW's strategy and implementation plan for 2022 and beyond. We do not consider that another full-scale hosting study would be either necessary or appropriate: it should not be necessary because the present study has already identified the key parameters and criteria to apply; and it would not be appropriate because any future hosting decision should be directly linked to an evaluation of ECW's performance and of the factors which have assisted or impeded the achievement of ECW's overriding objectives.

18. We note that ECW is about to adopt its strategy for 2018–2021 and we assume that the successor strategy will commence from 2022. We also note that two evaluations of ECW performance are envisaged:

> A formative evaluation of ECW will take place in April 2019 (one year after the approval of the strategy) and another, summative evaluation will take place in 2021.[41]

19. We assume that this means the formative evaluation will *commence* in April 2019, and most likely issue its final report about six months later. We would not expect the formative evaluation to re-open the issue of long-term hosting, although its findings (e.g. about progress in grant management or about general efficiency) might have implications for the fine-tuning of the incubation arrangements.

20. The recommendations from the summative evaluation should feed into the formulation of ECW's strategy from 2022 onwards.[42] *This means that the final report and recommendations of the summative review should be delivered no later than June 2021. This in turn means that its TOR must be finalised no later than June 2020, so as to allow adequate time for selecting consultants and conducting the evaluation according to a timetable that allows consultation as well as rigour.*

21. The summative evaluation should be asked to include the following evaluation questions:

- How have the arrangements for ECW's administrative and financial hosting affected (positively or negatively) ECW's performance?
- In light of recent experience, what should the future hosting arrangements be to optimise ECW's impact as it contemplates the strategy period commencing in 2022?

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[41] From ECW Strategy Draft 2.0 as of 11 February 2018.

[42] A summative evaluation of an ongoing initiative would be expected also to provide formative recommendations.

Figure 4 Summary timeline for implementing recommendations



Table 9 Management Response Table

Recommendation	Action Required	Management Response
1. Extension of ECW's Incubation		
a) ECW's incubation at UNICEF should be continued through the period covered by ECW's strategy for 2018–2021	HLSG decision	
b) ECW should ensure that UNICEF's hosting of ECW during incubation does not create unnecessary obstacles to a future change of host.	HLSG approval for Recommendation 4b)	
2. Choice of ECW permanent host		
a) Choice of a permanent host for ECW should be deferred until the end of ECW's incubation period.	HLSG decision	
b) The question of long-term hosting should be reconsidered during 2020/21 (and not before), in the context of evaluating ECW's performance and preparing ECW's strategy for 2022 onwards.	HLSG decision, plus: • ECW Secretariat and strategy working group include timetable and process for incorporating hosting issues in ECW's scheduled evaluations	
3. Transfer of Financial Hosting (from UNICEF to MPTFO)	HLSG decision, plus: • Secretariat works with UNICEF and MPTFO to effect the transfer (which will require close collaboration between the FSO and MPTFO) • ExCom approval for MOUs with UNICEF and MPTFO confirming the agreed arrangements	
4. Strengthen the current administrative hosting arrangement	HLSG authorise ExCom and Secretariat to implement detailed recommendations	
a) Safeguard ECW's separate identity through clearer branding, e.g. with separate (non-UNICEF) email addresses.	Secretariat and UNICEF	
b) Change ECW Secretariat contract terms to emphasise that they are specifically ECW staff.	ExCom to designate team to work with UNICEF and the Secretariat on this (as Secretariat staff themselves are not disinterested)	
c) Increase transparency – policy on COI	ExCom to establish task team to develop COI policy, for eventual approval by ExCom and HLSG	
d) Increase transparency and efficiency – grants manuals	Secretariat in collaboration with MPTFO	

Recommendation	Action Required	Management Response
5. Strengthen ECW's relationship with GPE	Secretariat and task team to ensure that ECW's working relationships with GPE (and with LEGs and clusters) are adequately reflected in draft strategy Secretariat to report on, and ExCom to monitor, ongoing collaboration	
6. Clarify ECW's grant management and oversight role	Linked to continuing work, supported by MPTFO, on grant management models and fund designs, Secretariat to make proposals to ExCom for appropriate organisation and adequate staffing of the Secretariat's grant management responsibilities (including appropriate plans for scaling up as grant volumes increase)	
7. Strengthen other dimensions of ECW strategy and forward planning		
a) Strategy to be supported by a well-articulated and costed strategy implementation plan, which will clarify secretariat staff requirements at the same time as it specifies services to be sought from the host or other parties.	ExCom to specify requirement and timetable; Secretariat to draft implementation plan	
b) Provide an adequate number of qualified staff/human resources to ensure sufficient attention is paid to the resource mobilisation strategy and fundraising.	To be reflected in Secretariat's draft implementation plan, with inputs from financing task team.	

Annex J Supporting evidence for the recommendations

The first two columns of the matrix below are taken verbatim from the recommendations at Table 2 in the main text. The final column draws attention to the supporting evidence in this report and in the ADR.

Recommendation	Rationale	Supporting evidence
1. Extension of ECW's Incubation		
a) ECW's incubation at UNICEF should be continued through the period covered by ECW's strategy for 2018–2021 (subject to the improvements embodied in Recommendation 3 and the safeguards in Recommendation 4 below).	ECW's original design documents envisaged an incubation period of 3–5 years. Confirming the length of the incubation period would allow ECW to focus on establishing and consolidating itself without the potential disruption of a major change in hosting. Uncertainty is potentially damaging to ECW and to its relationships with other actors in the field of EiE. The HLSG should therefore make clear that there will be no change of host before 2021/2022 and provide a clear timetable for linking any future decision to the preparation of ECW's strategy for 2022 onwards.	Annex E provides detail on the current UNICEF hosting arrangements. The team's judgement on the effects of uncertainty, overall and for ECW's collaboration with GPE is reinforced by confidential interviews, supported by the relative neglect of GPE-ECW collaboration in the draft strategy so far (though there is a similarly cursory treatment also of the role of Education Clusters).
b) ECW should ensure that UNICEF's hosting of ECW during incubation does not create unnecessary obstacles to a future change of host.	As ECW grows and matures there may be a change in the balance of advantages between its current hosting and possible alternatives (including the alternative of independence if ECW becomes, in financial terms, a very large fund). Experience of other global partnerships that have outgrown an initial host shows the importance of anticipating the possibility of a future move, and ensuring that staff contracts and expectations do not become a major factor resisting change and raising its costs.	Gavi and GFATM are among global funds which opted for administrative autonomy after they reached a major scale; GPE is now considering a similar move. ADR Annexes E and F provide an extensive review of the experiences of other partnerships, including evidence that unintended obstacles (particular around staff terms and conditions and expectations) may be a serious cause of delay and additional costs when a transition takes place.
2. Choice of ECW Permanent Host		
a) Choice of a permanent host for ECW should be deferred until the end of ECW's incubation period.	A final choice made now would be unnecessarily speculative because of uncertainties about:	Interviews: the review team is not at liberty to reveal details of specific interviews, but numerous interviewees, including some members of ExCom/HLSG, regretted the decision to hold the hosting review so early and considered that a deferred decision would likely to be a better one. ¶57-0 expose ambiguity about the intended length of incubation.
	(a) *ECW's long-term hosting requirements*. ECW is still developing its strategy and business model. ECW's long-term hosting requirements, and its scale of operation, will be clearer towards the end of its current strategic cycle than they can be now.	The draft strategy available to inform the hosting review is still at a very high level and does not yet provide specifics on ECW staffing structure and projections, fund-raising strategy, or grant management approach. On grant management approach see the discussion in Annex H.

Recommendation	Rationale	Supporting evidence
	(b) *Alternatives to UNICEF as a long-term host*. In particular, uncertainties about the World Bank's emerging policy on trust funds, and about whether GPE may seek independence from the World Bank make it impossible at this point to define all the possible long-term alternatives with equal clarity. Moreover, a stand-alone option might also be considered if the scale ambitions in the strategy are realised.	¶14c), 14b) Some other large-scale funds/partnerships have migrated direct from hosted to stand-alone status. See Annex F of ADR on Gavi and GFATM experiences, and ADR Annex E on general lessons of hosting partnerships.
b) The question of long-term hosting should be reconsidered during 2020/21 (and not before), as part of evaluating ECW's performance and preparing ECW's strategy for 2022 onwards.	There should be a defined process and timetable for reconsidering hosting options when ECW is more mature. The aim should be to end short-term uncertainty without closing off long-term options in a situation where both ECW itself and the international education financing architecture are evolving.	If ExCom/HLSG agree that a permanent hosting decision now would be premature, it is intuitively obvious that it would make sense to link further consideration of hosting to the evaluation of ECW's performance during its current strategy period and the formulation of the successor strategy.
3. Transfer of financial hosting		
Transfer financial hosting of ECW from UNICEF to the MPTFO.	The MPTFO is a specialist in trust fund management with much more experience in setting up and managing a variety of global and country level funds than UNICEF can offer. A practical relationship between MPTFO and the ECW Secretariat is already developing. Financial hosting by the MPTFO would be more effective and efficient for ECW, it would have cost advantages, and would further allay concerns about conflict of interest arising from UNICEF's role as both a financial host and a major recipient of ECW funds.	See main text ¶38, 45; Annex F, ¶61-62, ¶77-78. On cost-advantage of MPTFO hosting, see main text ¶54 and Annex G. See also UN MPTF documents cited in our bibliography (Annex K), together with reports on MPTFO-managed funds including the Peace Building Fund (Kluyskens & Clark, 2014a, Kluyskens & Clark, 2014b), and the Ebola fund (Baumann & Frère, 2017). On the range of MPTFO expertise relevant to grant management, see Annex F; on its cost advantages over UNICEF, see Annex G. See also further elaborations in Annex I.

Recommendation	Rationale	Supporting evidence
4. Strengthen the current administrative hosting arrangement		
The administrative hosting arrangements at UNICEF should be strengthened so as to consolidate ECW's separate identity, further address concerns about (perceived or actual) conflicts of interest, and avoid unnecessary constriction of future options for ECW.	Incubation at UNICEF has worked well in many respects: UNICEF has respected ECW's strategic independence and worked hard to facilitate its rapid launch. However, it also has downsides that undermine ECW's effectiveness and therefore need to be taken very seriously. Fortunately, non-disruptive remedial measures are available and could be rapidly implemented.	See Annex E for description of UNICEF hosting arrangements. Annex F highlights as UNICEF's comparative strengths: • Convening power (including at country level) (¶26) • Geographical reach (¶28) • Technical expertise (especially humanitarian and EiE experience) (¶34-36) ..and weaknesses: • Conflict of interest (¶39-42) • Lack of specialised fund management and grants management services (Annex H) See also further elaborations on COI in Annex I, Table 7.
a) Safeguard ECW's separate identity through clearer branding, e.g. with separate (non-UNICEF) email addresses.	ECW aspires to become a major international fund. While the connection with UNICEF may have been helpful during launch, the continuing confusion between ECW and UNICEF brands is unhelpful, and reinforces perceptions of conflict of interest that discourage some important stakeholders from engaging fully with ECW. In this respect, continuing to use UNICEF email addresses is an unnecessary own goal.	We obtained strong evidence from our (confidential) interviews that the conflation of UNICEF and ECW brands reinforces perceptions of COI and is a significant discouragement to some potential funders and collaborators..
b) Change ECW Secretariat contract terms to emphasise that they are specifically ECW staff.	At present ECW Secretariat staff are UNICEF employees with the same privileges as regular UNICEF staff (e.g. in terms of eligibility to be considered for vacant positions anywhere in UNICEF). This implies possibly divided loyalties, feeds external perceptions of conflict of interest, and builds in a potential obstacle to a change of hosting arrangements if that could become desirable. There are precedents for hosted agencies adopting contracts that make clear that staff are employees of the hostee and not the hosting organisation. Revised terms should ensure that staff attracted to ECW are not swayed by the 'security' of a UNICEF position. UNICEF proposed to us that ECW Secretariat staff contractual terms could include adaptations to mitigate perceived COI.[43]	As noted, this proposal was volunteered by UNICEF in the context of the UNICEF hosting submission. On relevant hosting precedents for such an arrangement, see ADR Annexes E and F.

[43] On reviewing the draft version of this report, UNICEF commented that: "ECW Secretariat staff are employees of UNICEF and any adaptations will still retain their UNICEF staff status (albeit with adaptations)".

Recommendation	Rationale	Supporting evidence
c) Increase transparency – policy on COI.	Concerns about conflict of interest (COI) in the present arrangement have been exacerbated because firewalls in place have been insufficiently advertised and understood. ECW should operate with maximum transparency: to this end it should draw up and publicise an explicit policy on COI that sets out the principles it will follow and the practical safeguards that are accordingly in place.	COI concerns come out very strongly in interviews, with some interviewees sceptical about firewalls. COI potential was clearly acknowledged in UNICEF's basic hosting document (extracts included in Annex E), and in UNICEF's hosting submission. UNICEF appears not to have a consolidated policy on COI, but GPE first adopted such an explicit policy in2011 (see GPE, 2017f). See also further elaborations on COI in Annex I, Table 7.
d) Increase transparency and efficiency – grants manual	ECW also needs to develop a full Grants Manual with documented business processes and formats, which should be communicated widely and available on its website so that all partners – global and in-country – are clear how decisions around grant recipients and grant agents are made, including the expected role of the Education Clusters at country level. This will also help ensure UNICEF is not inhibited by perceptions of COI and can continue to be a strong partner for ECW, as well as linking with the implementation of Recommendation 6.	On grants management generally see main text ¶32-34, Annex F, ¶41-44 and Annex H. Grants manuals are a fundamental tool, not only for grant management per se, but in clarifying procedures and demonstrating the impartiality of ECW approaches. Our bibliography – Annex K – includes several examples of manuals and process guides from GPE, UNOPS and MPTFO (e.g. GPE, 2017i, UN MPTF, 2016, UN MPTF, 2017b, UN MPTF, 2017c, UNOPS, 2013, UNOPS, 2016a)
5. Strengthen ECW's relationship with GPE		
Ensure that synergy between ECW and GPE is maximised; reflect this in ECW's strategy for 2018–2021 and in working relations between ECW and GPE going forward.	Uncertainty about hosting has been detrimental to working relations between ECW and GPE. ECW was founded on a strategic premise that a new and separate global fund was needed. Nevertheless, in bridging the humanitarian/development divide as regards EiE, ECW needs to work closely with GPE (and with LEGs and Clusters at country level) through joint planning at global and national levels. ECW strategy should more directly address the complementarity of GPE and ECW offerings and the mechanisms for ensuring that they dovetail effectively, while also linking to, and strengthening, the cluster mechanisms.	Based on reading of ECW founding documents (full description of ECW origins is in ADR Annex C, with stakeholder analysis in ADR Annex D), review of ECW early investments and ongoing in-country work, review of GPE strategy documents, including operational strategy for fragile and conflict-affected states (GPE, 2013). See also Annex F, ¶26-27.
6. Clarify ECW's grant management and oversight role		
Ensure greater clarity on who has operational responsibility for grant management and ensure proper resourcing for that function.	How ECW addresses grant management is inextricably linked to its hosting arrangements, now and in the future. As ECW evolves and scales up, the demands on the Secretariat for fiduciary and programmatic monitoring and oversight of grants will grow. ECW's desire to walk the localization talk also has implications for grant management and grant recipient engagement. Strategic choices will need to be made about the relative roles of the Secretariat, the host, partners, and grant agents.	The discussion of grant management in Annex H is particularly relevant here. See also the references against Recommendation 4d) above.

Recommendation	Rationale	Supporting evidence
7. Strengthen other dimensions of ECW strategy and forward planning		
a) The strategy under preparation will need to be supported by a well-articulated and costed strategy implementation plan, which will clarify secretariat staff requirements at the same time as it specifies services to be sought from the host or other parties.	Given its current stage of evolution, the strategy is not yet underpinned by plans for how it will be implemented. This again has implications for the hosting services that ECW will need in order to deliver on its Strategic Functions. Such an implementation plan will also begin to help identify more analytically the resources required and related budget allocations.	The review team had sight of successive draft of the ECW strategy for 2018–2021. Our observations draw on our collective experience (going back several decades) of approaches to planning and budgeting. We looked to the strategy for guidance on the secretariat's future role and staffing level (key determinants of hosting services required) but found that there was more in the way of general advocacy than specific planning for implementation of the strategy.
b) Provide an adequate number of qualified staff/human resources to ensure sufficient attention is paid to the resource mobilisation strategy and fundraising.	The resource mobilization strategy of ECW is currently a work in progress. The need for such a strategy is well recognised by current management. Naturally, with the scaling-up aspirations inherent in ECW's strategy, resource mobilization success will be at the heart of ECW's eventual impact. The hosting review has shown us that while some support may be forthcoming from hosts, the heavy lifting and strategizing will need to be from within ECW and its governance structures. ECW must be properly skilled to succeed in this competitive task.	This was acknowledged to us by the ECW Secretariat. A resource mobilisation strategy is in preparation but, at the time of writing, was significantly less developed than the main strategy. Main text, ¶24-25. Also see discussion of fund-raising in Annex F for evidence of the limited support to fund-raising that is likely to be available from hosts (Annex F, ¶12-19)

Annex K Documents Consulted

In the table below the first column gives the short reference used in the text, by which it is linked to this table. The second column gives details of the document, while the third column indicates where the document can be found in the team dropbox.

Short reference	Full reference	Location
ALNAP, 2016	*Improving Humanitarian Coordination: Themes and recommendations from the ALNAP meeting 'Working together to improve humanitarian coordination',* by Paul Knox Clarke and Leah Campbell. *(ALNAP Working Paper 2016)*	*2.9-6*
Anderson & Hodgkin, 2010	*The Creation and Development of the Global IASC Education Cluster*, Background Paper for the 2011 *Education for All Global Monitoring Report*, Allison Anderson and Marian Hodgkin. (INEE, 2010).	
Anderson & Hodgkin, 2011	*Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies: A community of practice, a catalyst for change,* ODI and INEE, co-edited by Allison Anderson and Marian Hodgkin, (INEE IIEP, 2011).	
Anderson, 2016	*Report from INEE Global Consultation on Education in Emergencies, Phase II, January – March 2016,* Allison Anderson, INEE 2016.	
Baumann & Frère, 2017	*UN Ebola Response Multi-Partner Trust Fund. Lessons Learned Exercise,* Peter Baumann & Jean-Jacques Frère: 18 March 2017.	*2.27.1-1*
BCG & MANNET, 2016	*OCHA Functional Review. Final Report, 29 July 2016.* The Boston Consulting Group and MANNET, 2016.	*2.22-2*
BCG, 2016a	*ECW Operational Model & Results Framework: Kick-off with Task Team #2,* October 17, 2016	*2.3-1*
BCG, 2016b	*ECW Operational Model & Results Framework: Consultation process and overview,* November 22, 2016	*2.3-2*
BCG, 2017a	*Education Cannot Wait Operating Model design.* The Boston Consulting Group, updated May 2017	*2.1.4-1*
BCG, 2017b	*Education Cannot Wait: [Operating Model Design] Annex A: Education Cannot Wait Governance Overview.* The Boston Consulting Group, updated May 2017.	*2.1.4-3*
BCG, 2017c	*ECW Operational Model & Results Framework. Results Framework Annex B.* The Boston Consulting Group, February 10, 2017.	*2.1.4-2*
Bezanson & Isenman, 2012	*Governance of New Global Partnerships: Challenges, Weaknesses and Lessons*, Keith A Bezanson and Paul Isenman, CGD Policy Paper 014, October 2012, Center for Global Development.	
Boutel & Vijay, 2013	*Independent Review: Hosting Arrangements.* For 23rd Stop TB Partnership Coordinating Board Meeting, 11 – 12 July 2013, Ottawa, Canada. Tamima Boutel and Anant Vijay. 2013.	*2.24.1-2*
Boutel et al., 2013	*Independent Review of Hosting Arrangements: Stop TB Partnership. Report, 1 July 2013.* Tamima Boutel, Anant Vijay, Ruth Szabó. 2013	*2.24.1-1*
Coffey, 2016	*GEC Process Review Report. Evaluation Manager Girls' Education Challenge Fund.* Simon Griffiths, Ashley Craft, Elizabeth Edouard, Maha Batran. February 2016.	*2.10.1-4a*
Commins et al., 2013	*Pooled Funding to Support Service Delivery: Lessons of Experience from Fragile and Conflict-Affected States*. Stephen Commins, Fiona Davies, Anthea Gordon, Elizabeth Hodson and Stephen Lister. Commissioned by DFID. May 2013.	
Dalberg, 2017a	*Implications of Hosting ECW,* February 14, 2017 (Report by Dalberg for GPE – BOD/2017/03 DOC 06 – Meeting of the Board of Directors March 1, 2017, Washington, D.C)	*2.2.1-1*
Dalberg, 2017b	*Financing and Funding Framework, Annex 4: ECW Interface – Implications for GPE.* February 14, 2017 (Report by Dalberg for GPE – BOD/2017/03 DOC 03 – Annex 4, Meeting of the Board of Directors, March 1, 2017, Washington, D.C.	*2.2.1-4*
DCLG, 2009	*Multi-criteria analysis: a manual, Department* for Communities and Local Government [UK government] January 2009.	*2.25-1*

Short reference	Full reference	Location
Development Initiatives 2017	*Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2017, Executive Summary,* Development Initiatives, 2017.	*2.9-3*
Devictor, 2016	*Forcibly Displaced: Toward a Development Approach Supporting Refugees, the Internally Displaced, and Their Hosts.* Devictor, Xavier. World Bank, 2016.	*2.13-1*
DFID, 2016	*Terms of Reference and Additional Information Documents For PO7590 – Sierra Leone Secondary Education Improvement Programme (SSEIIP).* DFID, 2016.	*2.19-1*
DFID, 2017a	*Early Market Engagement Event: Independent Hosting Review.* DFID Education Policy Team on behalf of *Education Cannot Wait,* 22nd May 2017. PowerPoint presentation.	*2.1.1-2*
DFID, 2017b	*'Maintaining Essential Services After Natural Disasters' (MAINTAINS): Business Case Summary Sheet. DFID*, 2017.	*2.19-2*
DFID, n.d.	*Terms of Reference for a consultancy to develop guidance on supporting the delivery of education in emergencies (EiE).* DFID, no date.	*2.19-3*
EC, 2013a	*Terms of Reference for a Pillar Assessment contracted by the European Commission.* [Template document]. *Annex 1: Engagement context – Key Information for a Pillar Assessment.* European Commission, 2013.	*2.15-1*
EC, 2013b	*Terms of Reference for a Pillar Assessment contracted by the European Commission.* [Template document]. Version November 2013. European Commission, 2013.	*2.15-2*
EC, 2013c	*Terms of Reference for a Pillar Assessment contracted by the European Commission.* [Template document]. *Annex 2: Assessment Questionnaire and Criteria*. European Commission, 2013.	*2.15-3*
EC, 2013d	*Terms of Reference for a Pillar Assessment contracted by the European Commission.* [Template document]. *Annex 2a: Assessment Questionnaire (indicative questions)*. European Commission, 2013.	*2.15-4*
EC, 2013e	*Terms of Reference for a Pillar Assessment contracted by the European Commission.* [Template document]. *Annex 3: Other Questions*. European Commission, 2013.	*2.15-5*
EC, 2013f	*Terms of Reference for a Pillar Assessment contracted by the European Commission.* [Template document]. *Annex 4: Assessment Procedures*. European Commission, 2013.	*2.15-6*
EC, 2013g	*Terms of Reference for a Pillar Assessment contracted by the European Commission.* [Template document]. *Annex 5: Pillar Assessment Report*. European Commission, 2013.	*2.15-7*
ECW, 2016i	*Education Cannot Wait – High Level Steering Group: Terms of Reference.* Draft. Education Cannot Wait, 27 June 2016.	*2.1.3-4*
ECW, 2017a	*Education Cannot Wait: Grantee Operation Manual.* Last updated on February 10, 2017. Education Cannot Wait, 2017.	*2.1.3-3*
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Acronyms

ADB	Asian Development Bank
ADR	Assessment Design Report
ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
BCG	Boston Consulting Group
BEC	Basic Education Coalition
CAR	Central African Republic
CBPF	Country Based Pooled Fund
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
COI	Conflict of interest
CRRF	Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DFAT	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australia)
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EC	European Commission
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian aid Office
ECW	Education Cannot Wait
EDT	Education Development Trust
EiE	Education in Emergencies
ExCom	Executive Committee of ECW
FCA	Funds Custodian and Administrator
FSO	Funds Support Office (UNICEF)
FTA	Full Time Appointment
FTE	fulltime equivalent
GAC	Global Affairs Canada
Gavi	The Vaccine Alliance (Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization)
GAD3RES	Global Alliance for Disaster Risk Reduction and Resilience in the Education Sector
GBC-Ed	Global Business Coalition for Education
GCE	Global Campaign for Education
GEC	Global Education Cluster
GEMR	Global Education Monitoring Report
GFATM	The Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria
GPSDD	Global Partnership for Sustainable Data Development
GPE	Global Partnership for Education
GPEVAC	Global Partnership to End Violence Against Children
GPSDD	Global Partnership for Sustainable Development
HACT	Harmonised Approach to Cash Transfers
HLSG	High Level Steering Group
HR	Human Resources
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan
IADB	Inter-American Development Bank
IASC	Inter-Agency Steering Committee
ICA	Individual Contractor Agreement
ICAI	Independent Commission for Aid Impact (UK)
ICVA	International Council of Voluntary Agencies
IFFEd	International Finance Facility for Education
INEE	Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies

IR	Inception Report
IRC	International Rescue Committee
IRG	Informal Reference Group
IT	Information Technology
LEG	Local Education Group
MCA	Multi-Criteria Analysis
MDB	Multilateral Development Bank
MPTF	Multi-Partner Trust Fund
MPTF	MPTF Office
NCA	Norwegian Church Aid
n.d.	no date
NFE	Non-Formal Education
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
Norad	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
R4D	Results for Development
RBM	Roll Back Malaria
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SUN	Scaling Up Nutrition Movement
TA	Technical Assistance / Technical Assistant
TOR	Terms of Reference
TSG	Technical Strategy Group
UK	United Kingdom
UKFIET	The Education and Development Forum
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDSS	United Nations Department of Safety and Security
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNGEI	United Nations Girls' Education Initiative
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollar
VFM	value for money
WB	World Bank
WHO	World Health Organization
WHS	World Humanitarian Summit